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Executive Summary

Executive Summary
Canada is drawing an ever-greater proportion of its
new immigrants from countries in the Global South,
including Africa. There is little evidence that Canadian
policy makers have seriously considered the possible
negative consequences of this trend for the development
prospects of these countries. In part, this is because of a
lack of coherence between Canadian immigration and
development policy. As a result, Canada has traditionally
been extremely defensive about charges that it, along
with other industrialized countries, is responsible for a
crippling “brain drain” of skills from the South. The idea
that migration to the North inevitably leads to economic
and social stagnation and decline in the South was
extremely common a decade ago. Since then, however, a
new and more positive prognosis has emerged about the
nexus between migration and development. In the words
of one commentator, there has been a “pendulum swing”
from deep pessimism to unbridled optimism (de Haas,
2012).
The migration and development nexus has risen rapidly
to the top of the international policy agenda over the last
decade. Evidence for this includes the UN High Level
Dialogue on Migration and Development (convened
in 2006 with a second scheduled for late 2013), the
annual meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and
Development, the formation of the multilateral Global
Migration Group and the growing number of migration
and mobility partnerships between blocs of states (Crush,
2013). Central to the new consensus that migration is, or
can be, good for development is the empirical reality that
migrants from the South to the North rarely cut their ties
when they emigrate. There is growing evidence that these
ties are responsible for massive, though uneven, transfers
of remittances, direct investment, philanthropic capital,
knowledge, skills, technology and personnel from North
to South. Some have even argued that this process has
been essential to the unprecedented growth of emerging
economies in the South.
States in the North and South are increasingly concerned
with how to tap the potential of migrant diasporas to
facilitate social and economic development in the South.
Various “diaspora engagement” initiatives are currently
emerging in countries such as Canada and in many of
the countries from which people immigrate to Canada. In
order to better understand the potential for government
support of diaspora engagement and to identify which
kinds of activities are likely to bring the greatest return, it is
extremely important to build knowledge on the links that
diasporas currently maintain with their countries of origin.
This report is presented as a contribution to that project by
constructing a systematic knowledge base about Southern
African diasporas in Canada. In addition to providing
insights about the actual and potential development

impacts of these diasporas, this report presents a new
methodology for accessing information about diasporas
which could be used for other national groups in Canada,
and more broadly.
At present, the Southern African diaspora in Canada
exceeds 120,000 people and continues to grow. Migration
from the 15 countries of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) to Canada is certainly not a new
phenomenon although it has accelerated rapidly in recent
years. In the 1980s, for example, between 1,000 and 2,000
people emigrated each year from this region to Canada, a
figure that increased to around 3,000 per year in the 1990s
and rose again to over 4,000 per year after 2000. Since
1990, every SADC country has experienced a growth in
emigration to Canada. The greatest increases came from
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mauritius. By 2006, the Southern
African immigrant population of Canada constituted
27 percent of the total number of African immigrants in
Canada. Three countries dominate the flow, making up 72
percent of the total: South Africa (40,570), Tanzania (20,115)
and the DRC (15,795).
Over the past three decades, more than half (55 percent)
of SADC immigrants to Canada entered in the economic
class. An additional 22 percent entered in the refugee class
and 20 percent in the family class. Temporary migration
from SADC to Canada has also increased considerably
since the late 1990s. SADC migrants (including temporary
workers and students) make up less than three percent
of all temporary migrants in Canada but 31 percent of all
African temporary residents in the country. Over 95 percent
of SADC immigrants in Canada live in just four provinces:
Ontario (48 percent), British Columbia (19 percent),
Quebec (17 percent) and Alberta (12 percent). Francophone
immigrants mainly settle in Quebec. Immigrants from
South Africa and Zimbabwe are dispersed throughout the
country. Over 90 percent of South Africans, Zimbabweans
and Tanzanians live in Ontario, British Columbia and
Alberta. Two-thirds of all Southern African immigrants to
Canada settle in three main metropolitan areas: Toronto,
Montreal and Vancouver.
In 2010 and 2011, the Southern African Migration
Programme (SAMP) conducted an innovative online and
face-to-face survey of Southern Africans in Canada. The
survey made extensive use of social media to identify
members of the diaspora for interview. The questionnaire
was completed by a total of 2,439 respondents. The
information collected focussed on the demographic,
social, economic, employment and educational profile
of individuals and households; their reasons for leaving
Africa and coming to Canada; their experiences in Canada
and comparisons between Canada and countries in Africa;
the linkages maintained with countries of origin, including
remittances and other economic links, family ties, and
frequency and reasons for return visits; involvement in
SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME • 1
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development-related activities in countries of origin;
and the likelihood of returning to Africa temporarily or
permanently.
The survey revealed significant differences between South
Africans and non-South Africans. The immigrants from
outside South Africa fit the profile of a diaspora that is
engaged with countries of origin. Among the key findings
for the respondents from SADC countries outside South
Africa are the following:
• While Canada has been accused of precipitating
a brain drain from Africa, only 19 percent of the
sample actually entered Canada in the economic
class (20 percent). The bulk of the remainder entered
as asylum seekers/refugees (34 percent), students (18
percent) and family-class immigrants (15 percent).
Irrespective of the category of entry, 53 percent had
acquired Canadian citizenship and another 35 percent
were permanent residents.
• The immigrants had attained high levels of education
before coming to Canada, and are more educated
than the Canadian-born population. For example, 30
percent had at least a university degree upon entry to
Canada, compared with 19 percent of the Canadian
population. As many as a third had to re-certify or retrain in Canada in order to work in a field for which
they were already trained. Furthermore, 30 percent
were working in occupations that did not make full
use of their qualifications.
• Only seven percent were unemployed, while an
additional 21 percent were students. The most
common occupations included sales and service,
health and finance, business and banking. Almost a
third of the respondents earn less than CDN$25,000
a year. An additional 34 percent earn between
CDN$26,000–50,000 a year and less than five percent
earn more than CDN$200,000 a year. The income
profile is consistent with the African immigrant
population in Canada more generally.
• Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the respondents
said that they have an important role to play in
developing their countries of origin. Only 15 percent
thought that they had no role to play.
• Nearly 70 percent of the respondents remit money
to their country of origin. One-quarter remit at least
once a month, another third at least once a year and
the rest occasionally. The average amount remitted is
CDN$1,000 per year. A smaller number (55 percent)
also remit goods with an average annual value of
CDN$500. Remitting consists almost exclusively
of private funds sent to immediate and extended
family. Nearly all remitters (95 percent) send money
to immediate family members, while 50 percent
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also remit to extended family. Only 10 percent send
remittances to community groups and organizations.
Households receiving remittances from relatives in
Canada spend the funds on their immediate needs:
61 percent of remitters send money for food purchase
and 44 percent to meet other day-to-day household
expenses. A significant proportion also remit to
meet medical expenses (59 percent) and to pay for
education and school fees (58 percent). A much
smaller proportion send money for direct productive
investment: for example, 12 percent send remittances
for purchase of agricultural inputs, 10 percent for
starting or running a business and six percent for
buying property.
• In terms of diaspora engagement activities, nearly 50
percent of the respondents have participated in some
kind of economic activity in their country of origin:
25 percent have exported Canadian goods for sale,
11 percent had invested in business, 11 percent have
generated employment, 10 percent have engaged
in research partnerships and nine percent have
purchased local goods for resale in Canada.
• In terms of willingness to be engaged in the future,
only nine percent said they had no interest. The
favoured avenues of engagement included skills
transfer (mentioned by 58 percent), investing
in businesses (55 percent), participation in
developmental projects (52 percent), educational
exchanges (52 percent), volunteer work (48 percent),
fundraising for development projects (46 percent),
philanthropy (42 percent), export and import of
goods to and from the country of origin (38 percent),
investing in infrastructural development (39 percent)
and providing distance learning (37 percent). Others
specifically mentioned their desire to be involved in
activities that would lead to greater empowerment
for women and children.
• Despite high levels of citizenship and permanent
residence in Canada, and the fact that Canada was
rated more favourably on a wide range of economic,
social and political indicators, 55 percent of the
respondents had given return migration some or a
great deal of consideration. However, only 15 percent
thought it was likely within two years, a figure that
rose to 27 percent within five years and to 57 percent
at some time in the future (usually upon retirement).
In sharp contrast to immigrants from other Southern
African countries, South Africans in Canada display a
very different attitudinal and behavioural profile. The
differences are so marked that they are referred to in this
report as a “disengaged diaspora.” The key characteristics
of the South African diaspora in Canada are as follows:

Executive Summary
• The dominant mode of entry into Canada by
South Africans is as economic-class immigrants
(56 percent of respondents). Most of the remainder
were accompanying family members. Less than 10
percent of respondents said their primary reason
for coming to Canada was economic; rather, the two
main reasons that were given were concerns about
safety and security in South Africa (34 percent) and
the future of their children (26 percent).
• The South African diaspora in Canada is highly
educated and dominated by skilled professionals.
Before leaving South Africa, 54 percent of the
respondents had obtained a university degree. After
leaving South Africa, 47 percent continued with their
formal education, primarily in Canada. Yet, as many
as 25 percent of the respondents noted that they were
working in a job that did not make full use of their
professional qualifications and experience. Nearly
a third of the respondents are health professionals,
eight percent are employed in the education field,
seven percent occupy management posts, six percent
are employed in the sales and service industry, five
percent occupy administrative or clerical positions
and five percent are employed in the finance, business
and banking industry.
• In comparison to immigrants from other Southern
African countries, those from South Africa are high
earners by Canadian standards. As many as 44
percent of the respondents said they earn more than
CDN$100,000 a year. Over a quarter earn more than
CDN$200,000 a year, yet they remit far less and far
less frequently. Nearly 45 percent of the respondents
have never remitted funds to South Africa and only
12 percent could be considered regular remitters,
sending money to South Africa at least once a
month. The rest remit only sporadically. Those who
remit send the funds to immediate family members.
Over a third (38 percent) of the remitters identified
household expenses in South Africa as the major use
of the remittances. Levels of savings and investment
of remittances are extremely low and there is little
evidence of collective remitting for development
projects.
• Most South African immigrants in Canada maintain
strong contact with their family members in the
country and travel relatively frequently to South
Africa. As many as 92 percent had visited South
Africa at least once since immigrating to Canada and
59 percent had done so in the previous three years.
More than 80 percent of the visits were for familyrelated issues and events. Although most regard
themselves as South African and display high levels
of nostalgia, they hold very negative views about
most aspects of life in post-apartheid South Africa.

Some even portrayed themselves as persecuted
victims of post-apartheid policies.
• About 40 percent still maintain bank accounts in
South Africa, while 22 percent have investments,
14 percent own a house and nine percent own land
in South Africa; however, half of the respondents
indicated that they do not own any of these assets in
South Africa. The survey also showed that the longer
immigrants have lived in Canada, the less likely they
are to hold assets in South Africa. In other words,
over time they progressively disinvest and cut these
links.
• Over 80 percent of the South Africans said that they
had no interest in any role in the development of South
Africa. The survey revealed very low levels of interest
in activities such as educational exchanges, volunteer
work, philanthropy, skills transfer, import and export
of goods, fundraising for projects in South Africa,
remitting for development projects and investment in
South African businesses. Interest in return migration
to South Africa is also very low. Only six percent said
they were likely to return within the next two years,
10 percent within the next five years and 20 percent at
some time in the future.
While the vast majority of South Africans in Canada do
not participate in activities typical of an engaged diaspora
and do not see themselves playing any role in the future of
South Africa, a small minority (around 20 percent) does.
What differentiates these engaged South Africans from
their peers? There were no significant differences between
the two groups on a range of indicators, including where
they lived in Canada (city and province), gender, race,
education and training (both inside and outside South
Africa) and whether or not they had family members in
South Africa. Other variables did seem to differentiate
the two groups. First, more of the engaged group were
in lower income brackets. Second, there is a marked
difference between the two groups in terms of their main
reason for coming to Canada. Disengaged South Africans
were far more likely to cite concerns about safety and
security and their children’s future than engaged South
Africans. Third, engaged South Africans in Canada tend to
visit South Africa more frequently than their disengaged
counterparts. Finally, they have a much stronger South
African identity and hold more positive views about the
country and its future. What kinds of links do engaged
South Africans maintain with their country of origin?
• While engaged South Africans tend to be lower wage
earners than disengaged South Africans, they remit
more and do so more regularly. The average annual
remittance of the engaged group is more than twice
as much as the disengaged group.
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• Engaged South Africans are more likely to participate
in diaspora organizations and associations than the
disengaged. There is a consistent pattern of greater
involvement in South Africa on every measure
used, ranging from buying property, to investment,
importing South African goods for sale and,
especially, philanthropy. The intention to engage in
the future was also significantly higher among the
engaged group. For example, 28 percent said it was
likely they would work in South Africa in the next
two years (compared to only three percent of the
disengaged group). Forty percent said they would
fundraise for projects in South Africa, compared
to only six percent of the disengaged. Other major
differences included sending funds for development
projects in South Africa (39 percent versus four
percent) and making charitable donations that
benefit South Africa (55 percent versus 16 percent).
• Skills transfer was rated as the most important area
of interest for future engagement through training
programs in South Africa (55 percent of respondents)
or working there (53 percent). Forty-four percent of
the engaged group were interested in undertaking
educational exchanges. Another area of preferred
activity is philanthropy, with 54 percent willing to
fundraise in Canada for projects in South Africa,
49 percent volunteering in South Africa, 42 percent
participating in development projects in South Africa
and 34 percent making charitable donations to South
Africa. Other activities of interest included investing
in South African businesses (34 percent), importing
goods from South Africa (27 percent) and investing in
infrastructural development (18 percent).
• Given that the engaged group is more favourably
disposed towards South Africa on most measures, it
is interesting to see if this translates into an intention
to return. The engaged and disengaged groups think
about this question very differently. Only four percent
of the disengaged group have given it a great deal
of consideration, compared with a third (34 percent)
of the engaged group. Nearly 20 percent of the
engaged group said it was likely they would return
within two years, compared to only two percent of
the disengaged group. At the five-year mark, the
figures were 30 percent and three percent. As many
as 65 percent of the engaged group thought it likely
that they would return at some point (compared to
only seven percent of the disengaged group). In other
words, the likelihood of engaged South Africans
returning to South Africa increases over time, while
the likelihood of disengaged South Africans returning
is low and static.
Diasporas are well known globally for forming diaspora
associations and organizations with those who come
from the same country. These associations allow for a
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range of social, cultural and economic interactions within
the diaspora. Besides demonstrating an affinity with the
country of origin, diaspora associations can provide an
avenue for the diaspora to make meaningful development
contributions to those countries. The final section of this
report examines the development-related activities of
Southern African diaspora organizations in Canada. The
study focussed on those associations actively engaging
in development initiatives or those with the potential
for engaging in such development work. A number of
diaspora associations or networks limit their activities to
Canada and are given less attention.
The activities discussed here include initiatives by
individuals who rely on their diaspora networks, as well
as initiatives by groups that, as a collective, raise funds
and material resources in Canada to support projects
or institutions in their countries or communities of
origin. Southern African diaspora organizations engage
in a wide variety of collective formal and informal
development initiatives in Africa. Most tend to be
directed at the grassroots level and generally avoid
any form of engagement with national governments.
Despite their strong developmental focus and impact,
very few associations and projects receive financial or
material support from either the Canadian federal or
provincial governments. Their main source of support
and fundraising is the diaspora itself. These groups could
have an even bigger impact if such support was available
through, for example, fund-matching programs.
All of the 70 or so groups identified during the research
play a role in building, maintaining or strengthening
development activities in countries of origin. Given their
diversity and function, their contributions to developmentrelated activities are wide-ranging and varied. A number of
groups have been directly involved in community projects,
from inception to completion, especially those established
by diaspora-led charitable or non-profit organizations
in Canada. Some diaspora organizations have played a
supporting role to organizations or projects already set up
in Africa, while others have provided support to Canadian
organizations with development projects in SADC
countries. In some cases, a collective of diaspora and nondiaspora actors have worked jointly to build up existing
systems in SADC countries, such as education and health.
Diaspora-led charitable organizations have contributed
to a variety of sectors, including education (school and
college/university level), humanitarian assistance, gender
and development, poverty reduction, environment and
development, food security, basic amenities development
and health. The number and strength of diaspora-led
charitable/non-profit organizations is not necessarily
related to the size of a country’s diaspora in Canada.
Smaller communities, such as the Zambian diaspora in
Canada, have established similar or larger numbers of
development-centred organizations compared with larger

Executive Summary
groups such as the South African and Tanzanian diaspora
communities.
The report draws a number of conclusions about the nature
and future of engagement in development by Southern
African diasporas in Canada. First, redefining immigrants
from developing countries in Canada as “diasporas”
raises the interesting possibility that there might be real
development benefits for those countries from emigration
to Canada. This study set out to test this proposition with
a subset of African immigrants in Canada. The primary
reason for separating out the South Africans in this analysis
is that it quickly became clear that there were considerable
attitudinal and behavioural differences between this
group and other immigrants from Southern Africa. When
it comes to the maintenance of links with countries of
origin, attitudes towards those countries and engagement
in development, the differences are so stark that the term
“divided diasporas” was coined.
Second, the South African diaspora in Canada — for all its
wealth, privilege and skills — displays an attitudinal and
behavioural profile which leads us to the conclusion that
it is largely disengaged and unlikely to play a significant
role in South Africa’s development. The majority used
their skills and training acquired in South Africa to
immigrate to Canada. However, they do not feel that
they owe their country anything in return. Their intention
was to leave South Africa, not to look back. The majority
of South Africans in Canada hold negative views about
their country of origin, are divesting themselves of their
resources there and show little inclination to be involved
in its development. Our conclusion is that the majority of
South Africans in Canada are lost to South Africa and that
there is little point in trying to foster diaspora engagement
for development among this group as a whole.
Third, the South African diaspora in Canada is itself
divided with a minority showing a very different
attitudinal profile. This minority, around 20 percent of those
interviewed, are far more typical of an engaged diaspora
with a genuine desire to be involved in the development
of their South Africa. Their efforts and activities need to
be profiled, encouraged and supported. Their views and
activities are far more similar to those of immigrants from
other Southern African countries in Canada than they are
to other South African immigrants.
Fourth, immigrants from the Southern African region
outside South Africa are characterized in this report as
an engaged diaspora. Like many immigrants from Africa,
they have a very strong affinity for their countries of origin
(Baffoe, 2009-2010). The majority are comparatively recent
immigrants to Canada and maintain close personal cultural
and economic ties with their countries of origin. Most of
these ties are focussed on family living in those countries.
The clearest indication of this is their remitting behaviour.
Individually, they do not remit large sums but, by the same

token, they are not particularly high earners in Canada.
They remit cash (and goods) extremely regularly and tend
to use formal channels to do so. While most remit to meet
the living expenses of relatives, remittances clearly have
positive development implications at the household and
community level, including contributing to improved food
security and nutrition, medical expenses and education.
Fifth, only a small minority use their remittances
in a broader development-related manner through
investments in community projects, productive
activity, entrepreneurship and so on. A significant
minority, however, engage in other activities that
have development-related implications. For example,
a quarter have exported goods from Canada for sale
in their countries of origin and one in every ten have
imported goods for sale in Canada. The same proportion
have invested in business, generated employment and
engaged in research partnerships. These numbers could
grow rapidly with the return of political and economic
stability and opportunity in countries such as Angola, the
DRC and Zimbabwe.
How can the considerable potential for engagement be
better tapped in the future? Disaporas, as individuals or
groups, are unlikely to put words into action if it means
supporting a government or political system that they
consider unacceptable or unrepresentative; however,
this does not mean that they will do nothing until the
political situation is more to their liking. Highly motivated
individuals and groups in Canada have already established
a significant and impressive array of community-oriented
projects throughout Southern Africa, particularly in
education and health, with their own resources and
through fundraising within and outside the diaspora.
An evaluation of many of these initiatives would help to
identify best practices and new ideas that could be scaled
up, with appropriate financial backing, for broader impact.
Another challenge is that there is only so much that
individuals can do unless they are independently wealthy
or have major financial backing. Here, there is a critical
enabling role for various types of diaspora organizations,
which potentially provide the structure, ideas and
resources to harness individual energy and enthusiasm.
Diaspora organizations rely heavily on volunteer and pro
bono work, and private donations, which affects their
ability to develop systematic long-term projects. The
Canadian government, in particular, needs to reframe the
diaspora as development partners in new ways and to
support their work and projects creatively, with dedicated
funding and support. By identifying the kinds of activities
that members of the diaspora are, or would like to be,
engaged in, we hope that this report makes a contribution
to this process.
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Brain Drain or Diaspora Engagement?
Although Canada is one of the world’s most proactive
countries regarding immigration, it does not appear to
be overly concerned about the possible negative impact
of its policies on the countries its immigrants come from
(Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998; Green and Green, 2004). This
is a legacy from the period when almost all immigrants
came from Europe and the impacts of migration to
Canada on European countries were fairly modest. This
kind of thinking persists but is no longer tenable with
more and more Canadian immigrants drawn from poorer
developing countries (Biles, Bursten and Frideres, 2008).
Canada needs to address the question of the impacts its
own immigration policies have on those countries and,
where these are negative, to consider how to mitigate
them. Canada gives millions of dollars each year in
international aid to developing countries. If, at the same
time, it is pursuing an immigration policy that deprives
those same countries of scarce skills, then its immigration
and international development policies are seriously at
odds with one another.
The term most often used to describe the emigration of
skilled people from Africa to countries like Canada is
“brain drain” (Maharaj, 2010; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011;
Kalipeni, Semu and Mbilizi, 2012). It was coined in the
1950s and 1960s to describe the emigration of scientists
from Britain to North America, but is now widely applied
to any form of skilled migration deemed to have damaging
consequences for the countries of origin and benefits
for the countries of destination — usually advanced
industrial nations, including Canada (Johnson, 1965;
Gish and Godfrey, 1979; Wright, Flis and Gupta, 2008).
The term has also been used in Canada itself to describe
the movement of Canadian professionals to the United
States (Devoretz, 1999; Finnie, 2001). The sense of moral
outrage that brain drain elicits in Africa can be seen in a
public outburst by anti-apartheid icon Nelson Mandela
in the late 1990s. Lashing out at people who were leaving
South Africa, Mandela called them unpatriotic cowards
and intimated that the country was better off without them
(“Good Riddance,” 1998).
African politicians are not the only ones to rail against brain
drain; so do the media and many researchers (Reynolds,
2005; York, 2011; McAllester, 2012). A contributor to the
British Medical Journal, for example, suggested that brain
“suction” rather than “drainage” would be a more apt
metaphor (Richards, 2002). Others feel that Africa’s skills
are being “poached” or “looted” by the West in a “great
brain robbery” (Patel, 2003; Singh et al., 2003; Snyder
2009). Health recruiters are labelled “global raiders” and
“merchants of medical care” (Crush, 2002; Connell and

Stilwell, 2006). Incentives to emigrate are called “grab
factors” and the medical brain drain, in particular, is seen as
a “fatal flow” for source countries (Muula, 2005; Chen and
Boufford, 2005). Others argue that the brain drain produces
“intolerable inequities” in health-care access between
Africa and the West, and represents a “catastrophe” for
African development (Mensah, Mackintosh and Henry,
2005; Bach, 2008). Some have suggested that the brain
drain of scarce human resources from Africa should be
viewed as an “international crime” (Mills et al., 2008). It
has even been called a “sugar-coated” version of the old
slave trade, a plundering of Africa’s human resources for
the benefit of the West (Benedict and Ukpere, 2012).
Beyond the rhetoric, critics have noted negative impacts,
including the loss of Africa’s “best and brightest,” skill
shortages in the public and private sectors, loss of public
investment in training and skills development, and
economic decline (Kapur and McHale, 2005). According to
the World Bank:
High-skilled emigration can also impair
development by reducing the supply of critical
services; limiting productivity spillovers to both
high- and low-skilled workers; reducing the
potential for innovative and creative activities that
are at the core of long-term growth; and limiting
contributions to the health of social, political,
and economic institutions. The loss of workers
educated at public expense can represent a
substantial fiscal drain, and the many universityeducated African emigrants who fail to obtain
skilled jobs in high-income destination countries
represent a lost investment in human capital.
(Ratha et al., 2011: 7)
In the health sector, documented damages include reduced
access to basic and advanced health care, a growing
disease burden and under-qualified personnel performing
tasks for which they were not trained (Awases et al., 2004;
Schrecker and Labonte, 2004; Chikanda, 2006; Dovlo,
2006; Gerein, Green and Pearson, 2006; Kirigia et al., 2006;
Chikanda, 2007; Connell et al., 2007; Khaliq, Broyles and
Mwachofi, 2009; Naicker et al., 2009):
Understaffing results in stress and increased
workloads. Many of the remaining health
professionals are ill-motivated, not only because
of their workload, but also because they are poorly
paid, poorly equipped and have limited career
opportunities. These, in turn, lead to a downward
spiral where workers migrate, crippling the
system, placing a greater strain on the remaining
workers who themselves seek to migrate out of the
poor working conditions. (Labonte et al., 2006: 6)
Several researchers argue that the deepening crisis
of health-care delivery in Africa is exacerbated by a
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combination of the increased demands of the HIV and
AIDS epidemic and the medical brain drain (Bhargava
and Docquier, 2008; Dambisya et al., 2009). The negative
economic impacts of brain drain on developing countries
have also been examined in some depth. The general
conclusion seems to be that although the loss of a single
skilled professional by a developing country is one too
many, the economic impacts do vary from country to
country. If South Africa loses 100 doctors, engineers and
accountants, the overall impact is likely to be much less
significant than if Lesotho or Swaziland loses the same
number.
A group of European and American neo-liberal economists
has challenged critics of high-skilled emigration, arguing
that the way that brain drain is conceptualized and
discussed is inaccurate and misleading. Michael Clemens,
a researcher at the Center for Global Development in
Washington, DC, for example, suggests that it is time to
bury the “unpleasant and judgemental” term in favour of a
more “brief, accurate and neutral” term such as “skill flow”
(Clemens, 2009: 34). In the context of a highly polarized
debate, this alternative is neither neutral nor accurate,
since it suggests that brain drain is a “natural” process
without causation or direction. While the suggestion is
unlikely to find much traction in Africa, it is certainly true
that the term is not, and was never meant to be, value-free.
Since its inception, the term has embodied a critique of the
causes of skills migration and the impact on countries of
origin.
Critics of the brain drain idea argue that there is little
evidence to suggest it is responsible for the parlous state
of African economies and health-care systems and counter,
in fact, that the migration of professionals can have
significant positive benefits for countries of origin (Stark,
2004; Skeldon, 2008). A Brookings Institute working paper,
for example, maintains that “contrary to a lot of the worries
expressed in the media and in aid agencies, the brain drain
is probably a net benefit to the source countries” (Easterly
and Nyarko, 2008). How can this be? First, the Brookings
paper argues that the African brain drain “is not large
enough to have much effect on Africa’s skills gap relative
to the rest of the world” (ibid.). Second, it suggests that the
gains to the migrants themselves, and to their families who
receive indirect benefits and remittances, more than offset
the losses of the brain drain. Third, it argues that the value
of remittances more than covers the cost of educating a
“brain drainer” in the source country (ibid.). Finally, it
asserts that the brain drain “has a positive effect on skill
accumulation that appears to offset one for one the loss
of skills” (ibid.). This means that a brain drain becomes
an incentive for more people to acquire the education and
skills that will allow them to leave. The pool of local skills
expands, but since not everyone can or will leave, the
result is a net expansion in a country’s skill base (Fan and
Stark, 2007; Schiff, 2006).
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All of these arguments (with the possible exception of
the second) are highly contentious and the subject of
ongoing debate. African researchers and policy makers
might argue that it is hardly surprising that economists
in Europe and North America have attacked the whole
idea of brain drain, given that these are the regions that
benefit most from skills migration from Africa. Sometimes
the debate is not between Africans and those in the North
at all, but between researchers with differing ideological
positions within the North. In late 2011, for example, a
research team at the University of Ottawa attempted to
calculate the magnitude of the financial savings (in terms
of training costs avoided) provided by the brain drain
from nine African countries to the United Kingdom, the
United States, Canada and Australia (Mills et al., 2011).
Based on the number of doctors working from these source
countries and the average cost of medical education in the
destination countries, the University of Ottawa researchers
calculated a savings of at least US$2.7 billion for the United
Kingdom, US$846 million for the United States, US$621
million for Australia and US$384 million for Canada, for a
combined total of US$4.55 billion (ibid.).
In a strongly worded rejoinder, Clemens noted that “it
[made him] sad to see such unscientific analysis in a
respected scientific forum like the British Medical Journal”
(Clemens, 2011a). Clemens accused the University of
Ottawa research group of making “back-of-the-envelope”
calculations, asserting that aspects of their argument were
“indefensible,” “incoherent” and seriously mistaken: “If
all this public investment were ‘lost’ to Africa, to say that
‘migration’ causes that loss is like saying that tires cause
a car’s movement” (ibid.). He concluded that “policy
must not be based on simplistic arithmetic and unjustified
economic assumptions, but on a fuller economic
consideration of the subject” (ibid.). One of his substantive
arguments was that the Ottawa study did not discount the
substantial amounts of money that physicians are known
to remit to their countries of origin — supposedly double
what it cost to train them (Clemens, 2011b).
This dispute highlights a basic question about brain drain
impacts: when individuals emigrate from Africa, are
they an absolute loss to their families, communities and
countries? The simple answer to this question is usually
not, although the more general impact of their departure
depends on who and how many people leave, what kinds of
links they maintain with their home countries and whether
they develop new links once they are settled abroad. This
reality has led to the idea that the very real costs of the
brain drain must be set against the compensating benefits
in a kind of “balance sheet” approach. In Africa and Asia,
there is growing interest in government and business
circles in proactively forging mutually beneficial linkages
with citizens or former citizens living in other countries.

Chapter 1: Diasporas and Development
Defining Diasporas
A decade after Mandela’s renunciation of South African
emigrants, a very different attitude is developing in
Africa towards those who have departed. Throughout the
continent, those who have left are increasingly viewed
in a positive light for a number of reasons. The personal
blame and finger pointing embedded in the idea of brain
drain is being replaced by an acknowledgement that, in an
increasingly mobile and globalized world, people with the
means, desire and incentive to move will do so, and trying
to stop them infringes on their freedom of movement.
Skilled emigration has become a reality whose negative
impacts need to be addressed urgently.
Individuals and groups who have left Africa clearly
become significant contributors to the massive global
flow of remittances to the continent (Maimbo and Ratha,
2005; Mohapatra and Ratha, 2011; Ratha et al., 2011). Many
are independently and informally engaged in activities
relating to their countries of origin that have positive
development aims and outcomes. As a result, governments
and international organizations are increasingly viewing
these expatriates as important resources and agents of
change and development, and are actively seeking them
out. There is also evidence that brain drains can be partially
reversed, as has happened in India and China, with
returning migrants often bringing invaluable knowledge,
skills, technology, capital and networks acquired abroad
(Saxenien, 2005).
To break conventional ideas of immigration as a onetime, permanent move from one country to another, and
immigrants as people who largely abandon their countries
of origin for a new life in another country, a new language
is needed to acknowledge that many immigrants maintain
active links and interests with their countries of origin. The
term diaspora has been increasingly used by migration
researchers and policy makers to try to capture this
reality. Central to the notion of immigrants as a diaspora
is a continued identification with the country of origin:
an attachment that facilitates the transfer of resources
and ideas from the country of destination to the country
of origin. Robin Cohen, an eminent international scholar
on the subject of diasporas and a member of the South
African diaspora in the United Kingdom, has suggested
that diasporas have the following generic characteristics:
• dispersal from an original homeland,
traumatically, to two or more foreign nations;

often

• the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in
pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambition;
• a collective memory and myth about the homeland,
including its location, history and achievements;

• an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a
collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration,
safety, prosperity, even to its creation;
• the development of a return movement that gains
collective support;
• a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained
over a long period of time and based on a sense of
distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a
common fate;
• a possibly troubled relationship with host societies,
suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that
another calamity might befall this group;
• a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic
members in other countries of settlement; and
• the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching
life in host countries with a tolerance of pluralism.
(Cohen, 1997)
More recent definitions have focussed less on the common
cultural characteristics identified by Cohen, and more on
the material links that members of a diaspora maintain
with one another and with their countries of origin. One
definition consistent with this emphasis sees diasporas as
“populations of migrant origin, who are scattered among
two or more destinations, between which there develop
multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people
and resources; between the homeland and destination
countries, and among destination countries” (Van Hear et
al., 2004: 3).
The African Union (AU) has designated the African
diaspora as the “sixth region” of Africa (along with
Southern, Eastern, Central, West and North Africa). In
practice, the African diaspora is scattered around the
world. Recently, it has been suggested that there are also
significant African diasporas within Africa itself (Crush,
2011). Whether located inside or outside the continent,
many now feel that the African diaspora is an untapped
resource for African economic, social and human
development (Kaplan, 1997; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Newland
and Patrick, 2004; Kuznetsov, 2006a; Brinkerhoff, 2009;
Plaza and Ratha, 2011). This, in turn, has led to the idea of
“diaspora engagement,” which occurs when individuals
or groups in a destination country participate in activities
in, or relating to, their countries of origin that have positive
development impacts and implications for those countries:
Diasporas may act as “bridges” between the
destination and the source countries, and they
can stimulate trade, investments and the transfer
of technology. The hypothesis that migration
may generate positive externalities on the source
country may be true not only with regard to trade,
investments and technology diffusion but also for
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other areas as well. In particular, migrants to more
democratic societies may have a positive impact
on the social, economic, and political institutions
in their home countries...Although much work
has investigated whether expatriate networks
can induce trade, other issues remain almost
entirely unexplored. Nevertheless, the literature
does show that the diaspora may be important
for the development of migrants’ origin countries.
(Lodigiani, 2009: 36)
There is now a growing emphasis on identifying
and developing policies to encourage these forms of
engagement as a way of contributing to the development
of their countries of origin (Agunias, 2009; Newland
and Tanaka, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2011a; 2012; Agunias and
Newland, 2012). Kuznetsov (2006a) notes that members of
diaspora communities have three resources that position
them to make potential contributions to the development
of their countries of origin: an unusually high motivation
to have a significant influence on the course of events in
those countries; new knowledge and expertise that can
be transferred in various ways; and financial resources to
act on new opportunities and perceived needs. A useful
starting point is to group diaspora home-country-focussed
activities into economic, political, social and cultural
dimensions (Table 1.1).
The AU (2005: 7) specifically defines the African diaspora
as “people of African origin…who are willing to contribute
to the development of the continent and the building of
the [AU].” This seems a rather narrow definition since
it precludes any consideration of those who choose, for
whatever reason, not to contribute to development in
Africa. A workable definition of diasporas, therefore,
needs to include those who do and do not contribute
to the development of the continent. One of the aims of
this study is to find out why some members of a diaspora

engage and others do not. The presence of a large immigrant
community in a destination country, however, does not
automatically translate into development impacts in their
country of origin. It is therefore important to understand
whether and under what conditions individuals,
households and communities choose to maintain an active
interest in the development of their country of origin.
There is no easy or automatic answer to this question.
Only by systematic research with those concerned can we
begin to understand why some turn their backs on where
they came from, why others take an active interest in the
country left behind and how greater engagement might be
encouraged and supported by policy makers.

Diaspora Remittances
Global remittance flows were estimated to exceed US$440
billion in 2010, with developing countries receiving
US$325.5 billion (World Bank, 2011). This is three times as
large as official development aid and almost as large as
foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries.
Remittance flows are much more stable than private
capital flows and tend to be less volatile to changing
economic cycles (Ratha, 2003). Remittances have been
shown to reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty:
a 10 percent increase in per capita official international
remittances will lead, on average, to a 3.5 percent decline
in the share of people living in poverty (Adams and
Page, 2005). One study of the socio-economic impact of
remittances on poverty reduction suggests that the two
primary motivations for remitting are risk sharing and
altruism, and the two main uses of remittances received
are consumption and productive investment (Table 1.2)
(Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005). As Table 1.3 shows,
potential impacts can be felt at different scales (household,
community, national and international) and can be divided
into poverty-reducing impacts and various other impacts
(ibid.).

Table 1.1: Diaspora Engagement Activities in Countries of Origin
Economic

Political

Social

•

financial remittances

•

participation in elections

•

visits to friends and family

•

other remittances (for example,
medicine or clothes)

•

membership of political parties

•

social contacts

•

investments

•

social remittances

•

charitable donations

•

contributions to newspapers
circulated in home country

•

taxes

•

purchase of government bonds

•

purchase of entry to government
programs
Source: Van Hear et al., 2004.
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Cultural
•

cultural events, including
visiting performers from
the home country
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Table 1.2: Remittance Motivation and Use
Motivation

Consumption

Risk sharing

Altruism

Productive Investment

•

remittances help households cope with risks

•

remittances help households manage idiosyncratic risks

•

cash receipts are used to purchase daily food and
luxury consumables or to purchase locally available
essential services (health, education)

•

investment in liquid assets such as livestock, agricultural
implements and new technologies help households to cope
better in future

•

ensures the household functions day to day

•

goods and gifts are sent to the household to fulfill
altruistic obligations to the family

•

remittances are used to expand available capital assets

•

indirect benefit to the household, but long-term benefit to the
wider community

Source: Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005: 90.

Table 1.3: Key Impacts of Remittances on Poverty at Different Levels
Recipient

Poverty-reducing Impact

Household

•

income and consumption smoothing

•

increased savings and asset accumulation (liquid and non-liquid assets), collateral for loans, liquidity in times of crisis

•

improved access to health services and better nutrition (potential for improved productivity)

•

access to better education for longer, reducing child labour

•

increased social capital and ability to participate in social groups and activities, savings clubs, money rounds, reciprocal
labour pools

Community

National

International

•

improved access to information

•

improved local physical infrastructure

•

growth of local commodity markets

•

development of local capital markets and availability of new services: banking, retail and trade, travel, construction

•

development of new development institutions

•

changes to cultural practices, especially attitudes toward girl children

•

generation of local employment opportunities

•

reduction of inequality between households, particularly for poor households

•

improved foreign currency inflows, in some countries up to nine percent of GDP

•

employment creation as remittances are invested in the productive sectors

•

increased human capital as migrants learn new skills and work practices

•

reduction in inequality among countries as remittances exceed official aid transfers in some regions
Source: Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005: 95-96.

There is a growing amount of research into the variety
of remittance patterns and remitting behaviours of
immigrants in Canada, including from countries such
as Haiti, Jamaica, Brazil, Vietnam, Ghana and Somalia
(Hernández-Coss, 2005; Hamza, 2006; Wong, 2006;
Simmons, Plaza and Piché, 2009; Todoroki, Vaccani
and Noor, 2009; Goza and Ryabov, 2012). A recent
Statistics Canada survey of the remitting behaviour of
immigrants in their first four years in Canada confirms this
observation (Houle and Schellenberg, 2008). The survey
tracked the remitting patterns of migrants who entered
Canada between 2000 and 2001. On average, 26 percent
of Canadian immigrants remitted funds to their country
of origin in their first four years in Canada; however, the
incidence of remitting varied markedly from source region
to region (Table 1.4). Immigrants from Southeast Asia (54
percent) and the Caribbean (50 percent) were the heaviest

remitters, while those from East Asia, North Africa and
the Middle East were the lowest (16 percent). Immigrants
from Sub-Saharan Africa were well above the overall
average, at 39 percent. The average amounts remitted
also differed considerably, from CDN$1,500 per year in
the case of Caribbean immigrants, to CDN$3,600 per year
in the case of South Asian immigrants. Statistics Canada
also provides information on a selection of countries to
illustrate the range of remitting behaviour. Immigrants
from the Philippines and Haiti were most likely to remit
(around 60 percent) and those from South Korea the least
(less than 10 percent) (Figure 1.1). The only African country
shown was Nigeria (at around 48 percent). Countries
ranked very differently with regard to average amounts
remitted: the United States, South Korea and India were
top (at over CDN$4,000 per year), followed by Mexico,
Lebanon, Nigeria and China (all between CDN$3,000
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and CDN$4,000 per year) (Figure 1.2). Another recent
study on the characteristics of African remittance senders
in nine Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries found that the average
annual remittance sent by diaspora households was

US$1,263. Africans tend to remit more often than migrants
from other areas and African migrants from poorer
countries are more likely to remit than those from richer
countries (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2010).

Table 1.4: Remitting Patterns from Canada
Proportion of Immigrants Who
Remitted (%)

Average Amount Remitted
per Year (CDN$)

Southeast Asia

54

2,200

Caribbean

50

1,500

Sub-Saharan Africa

39

2,500

Eastern Europe

37

1,900

South Asia

25

3,600

Central and South America

24

2,000

East Asia

16

3,500

North Africa and Middle East

16

2,300

Total all regions combined

26

2,700

Region

Data source: Houle and Schellenberg, 2008.

Figure 1.1: Proportion of Immigrants in Canada who Remit to Country of Origin
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Figure 1.2: Average Amount Remitted by Immigrants in Canada
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The probability of remitting from Canada did not vary
significantly with the immigrant’s class of entry. Familyclass immigrants were just as likely to remit as economic
immigrants (29 percent) and both were marginally less
likely to remit than refugees (31 percent); however, the
amounts remitted did differ significantly. Economic
migrants had the highest average remittance (CDN$3,000
per year) and the greatest proportion of those remitting
over CDN$5,000 per year (12 percent, compared with five
percent of refugees). In contrast, refugees had the lowest
average remittance (CDN$1,900 per year) and the greatest
proportion of those remitting less than CDN$500 per
year (45 percent, compared with 21 percent of economic
immigrants). Another study used a subset of the Statistics
Canada data and identified several other variables that
affect remitting behaviour:
Remittances rise with income, jobs and age,
though at a decreasing rate — and, in the latter
two cases, they eventually decline. Higher
housing costs and more family responsibilities
in Canada reduce remittances. Higher levels of
educational attainment are also associated with
lower remittances. Those identifying stronger
intentions to support their family at home or who
invest in their home country remit more, while
those with seemingly stronger financial ties to
Canada remit less. A migrant’s region of origin
is also important, although religion and attitudes
towards integration seem to matter much less.
(Unheim and Rowlands, 2010: 133)
“Collective” remittances by groups of immigrants to
groups or communities in their countries of origin are
thought to offer considerable development potential,

although they tend to bear more resemblance to charitable
and philanthropic donations than productive investments
(Goldring, 2004). Remittances for collective projects
generally fall into four categories: basic infrastructure and
communications projects; public service infrastructure
related to education, health and social security;
recreational; and other community or urbanization
projects. Most of the projects carried out to date with
collective remittances thus focus on public goods. The
best-documented case of collective remitting is from
migrants to rural home communities in Mexico (Aparicio
and Meseguer, 2012).
Migrants generally remit goods as well as cash. These
remittances in-kind need to be seen as part of the overall
remittance package for two reasons: first, most goods
have a definite cost to the purchaser and cash value. In
many cases, goods are purchased and sent because they
are much more expensive or do not exist locally; however,
most studies of remittances focus only on cash remitting.
This is especially true of studies using International
Monetary Fund and World Bank data, including those by
the Bank itself. Second, the nature of the goods remitted is
an important indication of the reasons they are sent and
the needs of households in countries of origin. While some
goods are unsolicited gifts, the vast majority of goods
are sent in response to an actual or perceived need of the
household itself. It is therefore important to know not only
the cash value of goods remitted, but the character of the
goods themselves.

Diaspora Entrepreneurs
Members of the diaspora who have been particularly
successful economically in other countries are in a
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position to do much more than send remittances to family
members in their countries of origin. Many developing
countries are anxious to increase FDI and diasporas are
viewed as potential “pioneer investors,” especially when
major capital markets regard these economies as too risky
(Kuznetsov, 2006b). Other entrepreneurial activities of
note include “nostalgia trade” (which meets the demand
of diasporas for products from their country of origin) and
“diaspora-led import/export businesses,” which have a
more diverse product base and clientele (Wong and Ng,
2002). The extent of global diaspora entrepreneurship and
investment is not known with any certainty, although the
cases of China and India are well-documented (Guha and
Ray, 2000; Bajpai and Dasgupta, 2004; Smart and Hsu, 2004;
Roy and Banerjee, 2007; Zhu, 2007; Tsai, 2010). A study in
2001, for example, showed that the diaspora provided an
estimated 70 percent of FDI in China in the 1990s (Devan
and Tewari, 2001). The Indian diaspora is estimated to
have invested US$2.6 billion out of US$10 billion of FDI
between 1991 and 2001 (Yingqi and Balasubramanyam,
2006). More recently, a global study of diasporas in the
OECD found that a one percent increase in migration from
a particular country leads to a 0.1 to 0.25 percent increase
in FDI in that country (Gormsen and Pytlikova, 2012).
While there have been some studies of African diaspora
entrepreneurship, few have focussed on the Southern
African region (Sheikh and Tanaka, 2009; Chaco and Price,
2009; Belai, 2007; Negash, 2009).

Diaspora entrepreneurship and investment have the
following potential development impacts on the countries
of origin:

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) has proposed five
different levels of diaspora entrepreneurial engagement
with countries of origin: networking, mentoring, training,
investment and partnerships (Figure 1.3). These different
levels describe “ascending levels of commitment” to the
entrepreneurial project (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 18).
More passive forms of support towards the bottom of the
pyramid “proliferate and dissipate” more quickly than the
active forms of engagement at higher levels (ibid.).

• acting as sources of local knowledge about investment
opportunities, information about regulations and
procedures, or familiarity with language and
customs decrease the transaction costs associated
with investment (Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Debass
and Ardovino, 2009).

• sustainable local business development, job creation
and innovation;
• integration of developing countries into global
economic, trade and knowledge networks;
• transfer of new technologies and skills from North
to South (Kapur, 2001; Gueron and Spevacek, 2008;
Nanda and Khanna, 2010);
• identification of new economic opportunities
through their local knowledge, contacts and cultural
familiarity (Leblang, 2001);
• diaspora members act as early innovators into a
country, which may act as a catalyst for further
investment by diaspora and non-diaspora members;
• contributions to the development of capital markets
in countries of origin (Terrazas, 2010);
• encouraging FDI by providing market and
operational information about the homeland to
potential investors and brokering relationships with
buyers, suppliers, partners, government officials and
lending institutions in the homeland; and

Figure 1.3: Levels of Commitment to Diaspora Entrepreneurship
Venture Capital
and Partnerships
Investment

Training

Mentoring

Networking

Source: Newland and Tanaka, 2010.
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Not much is known about what motivates diaspora
individuals and groups to invest in their countries of
origin and why levels of investment and entrepreneurial
engagement differ considerably from country to country
(Galetto, 2011). Two models have recently been proposed
to try and understand the factors that influence the
level and type of engagement by diaspora investors
and entrepreneurs (Table 1.5). The first focusses almost
exclusively on the availability (or absence) of investment
opportunities in countries of origin and argues that it is
the interaction among factors (or “nodes”), rather than
the factors per se that create the conditions for investment
(Galetto, 2011: 301). This model identifies four basic nodes:
the earning capacity of the migrant and the amount of
money remitted; a minimum level of local development;
suitable investment opportunities; and intra-household
arrangements that facilitate the adoption of new investment
opportunities. Each node is, in turn, influenced by a set
of sub-factors in countries of origin and destination. A
second psycho-social model focusses more on the decision
making of the potential entrepreneur investor, arguing
that there are three specific categories of return likely to
impact on the motivation to engage: financial, social and
emotional (Nielsen and Riddle, 2007). The model also tries
to take into account cultural and structural variables that
might affect motivations to invest.
Both models help to identify factors that interact and
impact on diaspora entrepreneurial engagement. Other
important variables that need to be taken into account
include: the reasons for leaving the country of origin;
the opportunities for creating wealth and raising capital
in the country of destination; the facilitating role of
diaspora organizations; the degree of personal and
community identification with, or alienation from, the
political system of the country of origin; and financial
and other incentives for investment put in place by
origin governments (Riddle, Brinkerhoff and Nielsen,
2007; Nielsen and Riddle, 2008). Several studies have
explored the motivations of diasporas to invest in the
reconstruction of post-conflict societies (Mohamoud,
2007; Nielsen and Riddle, 2008; Hammond et al., 2011;
Brinkerhoff, 2011b; Antwi-Boateng, 2012). Others have
suggested that attitudes towards government and the
political system more generally play an important
role. Diaspora investors tend to be wary, for example,
of countries with a “disabling environment” — high
levels of bureaucratic red tape, corruption and political
instability, even while they may be sizable remitters to
their own family members still living there (Brinkerhoff,
2012). Not all countries are equally amenable to
diaspora entrepreneurship and those that are “tend
to have promising prospects for economic growth, as
well as proactive diaspora engagement policies, good
governance, positive socio-cultural perceptions of
entrepreneurship, a critical mass of human and social

capital, and accessible financial institutions and pools of
capital” (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 1).

Diaspora Philanthropists
The growth of diaspora communities has generated
a growing interest in the developmental potential of
diaspora philanthropy (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diaspora
philanthropy refers to “the private donations of diaspora
populations to a wide range of causes in their countries
of origin” (Agunias and Newland, 2012: 187). There is no
consensus on whether remittances should be included
in the calculation of total diaspora philanthropy. The
primary argument against viewing remittances as a
form of philanthropy is that they are really private
transfers to family members and are not meant for public
benefit (Mehta and Johnson, 2011). Yet, totally excluding
remittances from diaspora philanthropy could lead to an
underestimation of the full extent of diaspora giving. A
number of studies therefore see remittances as an integral
part of diaspora philanthropy (Copeland-Carson, 2007;
Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010).
The basic premise of diaspora philanthropy is that
it converts private wealth into philanthropic capital
(Johnson, 2007). Among its constituent elements are
charitable giving from individuals who reside outside
their homeland, who maintain a sense of solidarity with
their home country, give to causes or organizations in
that country, and give for public benefit (ibid.: 5). One
study of diaspora philanthropic giving in the Philippines
observed that it was motivated by the following factors:
a desire to give back to the country of birth, motivated
by a sense of gratitude for the life lived in the country
of origin; compassion for the poor and underprivileged,
especially in their hometowns; a desire to “pay back,”
especially among those who were themselves poor or
underprivileged before they left for abroad; a wish to
maintain their ties with their country of birth; a desire
to prove that they have succeeded in their adopted
country and are now in a position to be generous; an
expression of their faith, which encourages sharing and
giving to the less privileged; and a desire to provide
humanitarian assistance to help victims of a natural
disaster (Garchitorena, 2007). Amongst the Kenyan
diaspora in the United States, the principle of ubuntu,
which emphasizes common humanity, interdependence
and mutual responsibility for others, is another driving
force behind diaspora philanthropy (Copeland-Carson,
2007).
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Table 1.5: Diaspora Investment Models
Diaspora Investment Model One
Node 1: Investment is contingent on the earning capacity and amount of money remitted.
•

level of integration into labour market in destination country

•

access to employment through social networks

•

legal status

•

time since immigration

•

level of social capital

•

level of human capital

•

economic situation of country of destination

•

economic sector in which migrant is employed

Node 2: Investment is contingent on a minimum level of local development.
•

provision of basic services

•

availability of physical infrastructure

•

minimum level of commercialization

•

market demand and accessibility of markets

•

availability of natural resources

•

public-private partnership opportunities

Node 3: Investment is contingent on suitable investment opportunities.
•

entry-level requirements that can be met by local population

•

prior local experience minimizes risks and uncertainties

Node 4: Investment is contingent on household arrangements.
•

pooling of income and capital

•

split households with complementary roles in origin and destination countries

•

social norms about gender roles

•

place of business activity within (where those who remain manage the business)
Diaspora Investment Model Two

Financial motivations
•

the potential for financial returns on investment in country of origin

•

diaspora members’ perception of “ethnic advantage” in business (knowledge of and social capital in the country of origin)

Social motivations
•

the potential for social returns (e.g., social recognition, stronger social relations, “homeland duty”)

•

the density and strength of a diaspora member’s social network ties within their diaspora community (or social embeddedness)

•

the density and strength of a diaspora member’s social network ties in the country of origin

Emotional motivations
•

the potential for emotional returns (altruism, feelings of personal satisfaction, psychological rewards)

•

the degree to which diaspora members are emotionally invested in their diaspora community

•

the degree to which diaspora members are emotionally invested in their country of origin
Data sources: Galetto, 2011; Nielsen and Riddle, 2007.

Both individual and institutional actors are involved in
diaspora philanthropy (Table 1.6). Prominent individual
diaspora members, for instance, are known to raise cash
to support various causes in the home country (Singh and
Singh, 2007). Other diaspora members choose to channel
their resources to intermediary agencies that support
various initiatives and projects in the country of origin
16 • The Centre for International Governance Innovation

(Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010). Examples of such
initiatives include the African Women’s Development
Fund, which raises funds from US-based diasporas
and directs them to projects in Africa, and the African
Federation Inc., a multi-ethnic, national intermediary
designed to build the capacity of emerging US-African
non-profits (Copeland-Carson, 2007).

Chapter 1: Diasporas and Development
Three main donor actors have gained special prominence
in recent years (Johnson, 2007). First, diaspora associations
have emerged as powerful philanthropic players. They
include hometown associations (HTAs), which are small
voluntary associations organized by migrants from the
same country of origin who reside in close proximity to
each other and professionals’ associations, whose main
role is to support and protect the interests of its members.
These diaspora associations may eventually develop
strong philanthropic programs (Aikins, Sands and White,
2009). Second, diaspora foundations and philanthropic
intermediaries have been established to encourage and
facilitate philanthropic giving to a specific country or
region. These organizations essentially connect diaspora
donors with causes and organizations in the country
of origin (Bakshi and Baron, 2011). Third, new actors
and models are taking advantage of opportunities that
have arisen in the diaspora philanthropic sphere. They
include community foundations, whose main role is to
support issues and organizations in a local or regional
geographical area. The Kenyan Community Development
Fund (KCDF), for example, was founded in 2001 by a
coalition of Kenyan leaders interested in fostering and
giving support to local development. KCDF established
a US arm in 2006, called Friends of KCDF, which raises
funds to support initiatives in Kenya (Copeland-Carson,
2007). New technologies, such as mobile phones, the
Internet and other information technologies are likely
to revolutionize diaspora philanthropy, as it has become
easier for potential donors to identify causes to support.
For instance, the website GiveIndia.org posts a list of
approximately 100 certified non-profit organizations that
donors can contribute to (Johnson, 2007).
A study of philanthropy by diasporas in the United States
found several common features of diaspora giving (Najam,
2007). First, there is a strong desire among diasporas to
give to individuals in need, rather than to institutional
causes, despite the fact that they do not benefit from the
economies of scale that come with pooling resources. Part
of the reason is that most donors want to be more “hands
on” and involved, while beneficiary institutions view
them simply as donors, regardless of the fact that diaspora

knowledge and experience may sometimes make a bigger
contribution than their financial resources (Kapur, Mehta
and Dutt, 2004). Second, many diasporas are distrustful
of institutions in their countries of origin. The Pakistan
diaspora, for instance, has responded by setting up its
own non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the
country, that not only channel the funds they raise, but
also provide a role model of institutional governance
(Najam, 2006). Third, philanthropic giving serves as a
crucial psychological and cultural need for diaspora
communities, whether in terms of national, regional/
community or religious identity. While this can potentially
widen social, political or religious rifts in the country of
origin, in some cases, such identity can be used to promote
greater community good (Sidel, 2004). The Egyptian
Coptic community in the United States, for example,
raises funds to support Coptic orphanages in Egypt. By
2005, it had served over 10,500 children in Egypt with
annual donations of over US$1 million from the Coptic
diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Fourth, constrained giving
instruments are a key hurdle to greater diaspora giving.
This is especially true in the aftermath of 9/11, which has
made it more difficult to send money internationally. Thus,
without cheap and easily available means of transferring
funds, a large amount of philanthropic potential remains
untapped (Najam, 2007).
The literature on diaspora philanthropy in Canada is
much smaller, although Mehta and Johnson (2011: 4)
argue that the phenomenon is growing as a result of “the
pervasiveness of globalization, the changing composition
of the Canadian population, evolving allegiances, and
a growing global consciousness of diasporic buying
power.” A 2007 survey of Canadian gift-giving found
that immigrants contribute 20 percent of all charitable
donations in Canada and the probability and size of giftgiving increases the longer a person has been in Canada.
This survey, however, did not distinguish between
donations to local or overseas organizations. Indeed,
“there are very few comprehensive statistics available
about how Canada’s diaspora is giving back to their
countries of origin” (ibid.).

Table 1.6: Diaspora Philanthropy Matrix
Individual Donor
Donation Size

Donor Aggregation
Individual Donor

Multiple Donors

Small

Some remittances, individual donations

HTAs, online platforms, small
foundations

Large

Direct donations from magnates, celebrities,
sports stars; large foundations established by
such individuals

Professional associations,
family foundations, venture
philanthropy funds

Source: Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010.
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Diaspora Knowledge Networks
One of the defining features of diasporas is that they are
usually spread between two or more destination countries.
This presents opportunities for diaspora members to
network both within and across countries, furthering
their economic and social interests. Among emigrant
skilled professionals, knowledge networks can help
diasporas build new establishments in their countries
of origin. Diaspora knowledge networks (DKNs) have
played a critical and highly visible role in accelerating
technology exchange and FDI in China, India, Israel and
the United States (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006). Advocates
have promoted their broader potential for converting the
“brain drain” into a “brain gain” (Meyer, 2001; Meyer and
Wattiaux, 2006; Biao, 2005). DKNs also allow migrantsending countries to access the social capital accumulated
by its expatriates (Meyer, 2007). These networks have also
received support from international organizations such as
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Development
Program’s (UNDP’s) Transfer of Knowledge Through
Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program (Rizvi, 2007).
The five most common DKNs are summarized in Table 1.7
(Meyer and Brown, 1999).
DKNs can make a number of important contributions
to the development of the home country: the exchange
of scientific, technical, administrative or political
information; specialist knowledge transfer; “scientific or
technological diplomacy,” or promoting the home country
in the research and development and business community
of the host country; joint projects, partly on a virtual basis
(distant working, simulations); training: attending homecountry sessions and meeting/mentoring students abroad
(a feature shared by most networks of this type); enterprise
creation (including multinational subsidiaries) to assist the
possible return of expatriates on a part-time or permanent
basis; and ad hoc consultations, for example on research/
development projects (peer review, job recruitment and
technology assessment) (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 8).
The success of DKNs depend on a number of factors,
including the nature and extent of the intellectual
capital of the networks; the level of organization of the
networks; the home country governments’ commitments
to “genuinely engage” their intellectual diasporas;
the perceptions and attitudes of home communities
toward their intellectual exiles; the existence of policy
frameworks, resources, infrastructure and so on to
involve networks in national development efforts; the
technical and logistical issues involved in engaging the
diaspora network; and the compatibility of the home
and diaspora environments in supporting partnership
and interaction (Teferra, 2004).
In 2007, at least 50 countries had developed, or tried to
develop, networks for and with their diasporas (Leclerc
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and Meyer, 2007). They include the well-known Caldas
network of scientists and engineers abroad that was set
up in 1991 with the aim of mobilizing, gathering and
reconnecting expatriates with Colombia. At its peak,
the network had over 800 members from 25 different
countries (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006). In South Africa,
the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA)
once seemed to be a promising initiative (Meyer and
Brown, 1999). However, the effort to link diaspora
South Africans with each other and with employers and
potential partners in South Africa petered out when
SANSA left the University of Cape Town (UCT) and
moved to the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and
Technology (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006; Seguin et al.,
2006). Another example with a short lifespan was the
South African Diaspora Network (Marks 2004; 2006).
More recently, a network called Global South Africans
has emerged to promote South Africa abroad and to link
high-profile South Africans in the diaspora to pursue
initiatives jointly that would benefit that country (Global
South Africans, 2013).
It is difficult to establish exact trends in the formation of
DKNs at the global level. Attempts to enumerate these
networks at various times illustrate this complexity, as
Figure 1.4 shows (Meyer, 2006). In 2006, the number of
DKNs in Latin America, Asia and Africa was said to be
158 by one study, while another found 191 operational
networks the same year. Africa seems to be doing
well, relative to other continents, when it comes to the
establishment of DKNs. In the first study, Africa had 51
of the 158 networks identified (Table 1.8) (Meyer and
Wattiaux, 2006).
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Table 1.7: Typology of DKNs
DKN

Description and Characteristics

Student/scholarly networks

Offer assistance to students studying abroad and encourage the sharing of information
and dialogue between scholars. They often facilitate studies abroad and reintegration
into the highly qualified labour market afterwards. They have a limited scope in terms of
activities and contributions to the country of origin.

Local associations of skilled expatriates

Groups of highly skilled professionals who meet regularly on both a professional and
social level. The aim is to promote the professional interests of members as well as to
socialize on a more personal level.

TOKTEN program

A UNDP program that uses the expertise of highly skilled expatriates by assisting
them to return to their home country for short visits. These visits usually last between
three weeks and three months, during which time the expatriates engage in various
development projects or undertake teaching assignments at local universities.

Developing intellectual/scientific
diaspora networks

They share certain characteristics with intellectual/scientific diaspora networks, but due
to certain constraints have not fully developed into this type of network. Their aim is
to make use of the highly skilled expatriate pool of their countries to contribute to the
development process of the home country.

Intellectual/scientific diaspora networks

In order to be classified as such, networks must fulfill the following criteria:
•

members must be mostly nationals of a particular country living and working or
studying abroad;

•

members must be highly skilled, active in a number of professional fields, specifically
conducting scientific research;

•

the networks must have, as their main purpose, the economic and social development
of the country of origin; and

•

there must be a degree of connection or linkage between different network members
and between network members and their counterparts in their country of origin.
Data source: Meyer and Brown, 1999.

Figure 1.4: Number of Diaspora Knowledge Networks
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Table 1.8: Breakdown of Diaspora Knowledge Networks by Region
Regions

Identified Networks

Networks Active in 2005

Latin America

25

15

Number in Home Countries
9

Africa

51

27

11

Asia

82

56

18

Total

158

98

38

Source: Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006.

Even though DKNs hold much promise for a “brain
gain,” some researchers have observed that they have
been more successful in emerging economies, mostly in
Asia (Meyer and Brown, 1999; Barré et al., 2003; Tobin
and Sallee, 2006). The success of the DKN programs in
India, for instance, is often attributed to the crucial input
provided by associations of Indians working in Silicon
Valley, but does not take into consideration other factors
such as the presence of cheap, highly skilled local labour
(ibid.). Nonetheless, the growth of DKNs could increase
the potential contribution of diasporas in many regions of
the developing world, including Africa.

Diaspora Associations
Diaspora associations are playing an increasingly
significant role in the affairs of diaspora communities,
as well as shaping development activities in countries of
origin. Diaspora organizations are extremely diverse but
encompass associations of migrants originating from the
same locality, ethnic affinity groups, alumni associations,
religious
organizations,
professional
associations,
charitable organizations, development NGOs, investment
groups, affiliates of political parties, humanitarian relief
organizations, schools and clubs for the preservation of
culture, virtual networks and federations of associations
(Table 1.8) (Newland and Patrick, 2004).
HTAs of various kinds consist of groups of migrants from
the same local community or country who, through their
activities, maintain formal links to their village, urban area
or nation (Sorensen, 2004). The HTAs of Mexicans in the
United States are well-known, but they have also been
reported amongst West Africans in both Europe and the
United States (Owusu, 2000; Henry and Mohan, 2003; Van
Hear et al., 2004; Mohan, 2006; Lampert, 2009; Reynolds,
2009). A large number of Ghanaian diaspora associations
in the United Kingdom and United States, for example,
comprise migrants from the same part of Ghana (Orozco,
2005). In some instances, associations in cities are branches
of national associations, such as multi-ethnic or multicountry diaspora associations (Ellis, 2003; Biao, 2005;
Sökefeld, 2006; McGregor, 2009). Another study has shown
that hometown and ethnic associations are common among
newer African diasporas, but absent among older African
diasporas in the United Kingdom (African Foundation
for Development [AFFORD], 2000). Activities pursued by
diaspora associations vary according to the nature of ties
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that they enjoy with the country of origin. General factors
that influence the participation of individuals in HTAs
include the emotional satisfaction of helping their country
of origin, receiving recognition in that country for their
contribution and making personal financial gains (Ghosh,
2006). Some associations also take on more overt, and often
oppositional, political roles in relation to the country of
origin (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001; Guarnizo, Portes
and Haller, 2003).
Diaspora business associations are another relatively
common, though specialized, form of organization with
development potential. A report by FOCAL in 2007
identified a range of activities common to many business
associations including, most significantly, networking,
trade promotion, business partnerships, lobbying and
knowledge sharing (Figure 1.5). The members of these
associations also tended to be involved in shared social
and cultural activities and functions. A smaller number
engaged in philanthropic and policy consultancies. Most
work on associational formation among the African
diaspora has focussed on diasporas from either East or West
Africa and little is known about the possible associational
linkages within the Southern Africa diaspora outside the
continent (Bloch, 2008; Mercer, Page and Evans, 2009).

Diaspora Return Migration
Return migration is an increasingly viable option for those
who have spent considerable periods of time in other
countries (Diatta and Mbow, 1999; Thomas-Hope, 1999;
Olesen, 2002; Iredale, Guo and Rozario, 2003; McCormick
and Wahba, 2003; Potter, Conway and Phillips, 2005; Mayr
and Peri, 2008; Dustmann, Fadlon and Weiss, 2011). In
some cases, return is prompted by the end of a period of
crisis or instability that forced people out in the first place
(Basta, 2011). In others, return is prompted by the prospect
of new economic opportunities. Empirical evidence shows
that countries such as India and China have benefitted
from the return of their citizens from abroad who have
brought with them much-needed technical expertise, as
well as the capital that is crucial for economic development
(Kuznetsov, 2006b).
Professionals seem most likely to return permanently
after reaching retirement age and therefore make limited
contribution to resolving a country’s human resource
problems (Tettey and Puplampu, 2005). There have also
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Figure 1.5: Activities of Diaspora Business Associations
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been reports of “brain waste” in some regions. Studies in
the South Pacific, for example, have shown that between
10 and 20 percent of migrant health workers return to
their countries of origin, but only a few return to the
health sector (Ray, Lowell and Spencer, 2006). The rest are
absorbed into non-medical fields. Furthermore, studies in
India have shown that some of the returnees who rejoin
the medical field are absorbed into the medical tourism
industry, which serves the foreign, rather than the local
population (Khadria, 2004).
Return is more likely to be beneficial when it occurs after
a moderately long time away, between five and 10 years,
a period of time that allows the migrant to save sufficient
resources to ease reinsertion (UN, 2006). The return of
professionals from abroad offers potentially numerous
benefits to migrant-sending countries, especially those
that have lost a substantial proportion of their skilled
professionals to brain drain (Skeldon, 2008). The United
Nations (2006) claims that return migration is more
common than is widely believed; however, evidence from
Africa seems to contradict this claim (Ammassari, 2005;
Kirigia et al., 2006; Connell et al., 2007).
Programs that encourage the short-term return of
professionals to their country of origin have received
widespread institutional support. The UNDP ran the
TOKTEN program, which supported the return of experts
and technicians from the diaspora to their countries of
origin for brief stays, ranging from one week to three
months to engage their fields of expertise (Macalou, 2009).
The UNDP covered travel costs and stipends and the
diaspora consultants received great personal satisfaction

from contributing to the development of their country of
origin. Since 1998, about 150 Malian diaspora members
have completed 381 teaching missions through TOKTEN
(ibid.). Conflicting views have been expressed on the
effectiveness of the program in facilitating development
in migrant-origin countries. An evaluation report for
the period 1998–2004 for Sri Lanka showed abuse of the
program, with expatriates who planned to visit the home
country using it as a way of defraying travel expenses
(Wanigaratne, 2006). Another evaluation report painted
a more positive picture. Between 2005 and 2007, 47
highly educated recruits from seven countries served as
volunteers in Rwanda under the TOKTEN program and
nine ended up resettling in that country (Touray, 2008).
Similarly, the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) operates the Migration for Development in Africa
(MIDA) program, which supports the short-term return
of African professionals from abroad. Capacity-building
and training of local staff through skills transfer are
important elements of the MIDA program. Under MIDA,
for example, Ghanaian health professionals have been
supported to return to work temporarily in hospitals and
medical training institutions under the Ghanaian Health
Project (Ndiaye, Melde and Ndiaye-Coic, 2011). In Ghana,
more than 8,264 medical staff, consisting of doctors, nurses,
medical assistants and students, have so far benefitted
from the MIDA program.1
1 For
details
about
the
MIDA program,
visit
www.
migration4development.org/content/mida-migration-developmentafrica.
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Migration from Southern Africa
The SADC is an economic grouping of 15 African countries
with a total population of 258 million. As a region, SADC
is characterized by large-scale movements of people
within countries and across borders (Crush and Frayne,
2010; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Segatti and Landau, 2011).
In 2007, an estimated 2.5 million SADC country citizens
were living in another SADC country. Short-term, crossborder movements between countries number in the
millions each year. With the collapse of apartheid and
greater integration into the global economy, the region
has also become a destination for migrants from the rest
of Africa and other parts of the globe, including Asia and
Latin America.
One of the greatest challenges facing the SADC region,
however, is not migration within or to the region from
other parts of the world, but the emigration of citizens
seeking their fortunes elsewhere. In 2000, around 1.5
million people born in Southern Africa were scattered
around the globe, the vast majority in only a handful
of countries (Table 2.1); by now, this number probably
exceeds two million. These emigrants are often among
the most skilled and educated members of society and
their departure has prompted considerable concern.
There is also significant evidence that the departure of
skilled professionals from Southern African countries will
continue (Oberoi and Lin, 2006; Oosthuizen, 2006; Record

and Mohiddin, 2006; Chikanda, 2007; Bezuidenhout et
al., 2009; Crush and Pendleton, 2011).
Previous SAMP surveys have shown that the emigration
potential of professionals and students in all SADC
countries is very high (Table 2.2). In a 2000 survey
of working professionals, for example, 67 percent of
Zimbabweans, 20 percent of Batswana and 13 percent of
South Africans said they would be likely to leave their
countries within five years (McDonald and Crush, 2002).
In another study, around half of final-year university and
college students in six different SADC countries said they
would likely leave within five years (Crush, Pendleton
and Tevera, 2006). The proportion varied from 48 percent
in South Africa to 60 percent in Zimbabwe. Medical
students displayed marginally higher emigration
potential than non-medical students (Crush and
Pendleton, 2012). Finally, a survey of practising South
African health professionals in 2007 showed extremely
high emigration potential, a prospect labelled “brain
flight” rather than “brain drain” by the authors of the
study (Crush and Pendleton, 2011). The major reasons
for continued emigration include: dissatisfaction with
remuneration and job opportunities; better employment
prospects overseas; high levels of local taxation; safety
and security concerns; and the desire to provide children
with better opportunities. Social networks — in which
those who have emigrated facilitate and encourage
relatives, friends and colleagues to follow them — have
an increasingly strong influence.

Table 2.1: Top 10 Destination Countries for SADC Emigrants, Circa 2000
Destination

Number of Emigrants

% of Total

United Kingdom

314,921

21

South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania

Portugal

265,210

18

Angola, Mozambique, South Africa

Germany

146,420

10

Angola, South Africa, DRC

United States

126,669

8

South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Australia

118,414

8

South Africa, Mauritius, Zimbabwe

Canada

86,870

6

South Africa, Tanzania, DRC

France

75,068

5

Mauritius, DRC, Angola

Belgium

58,928

4

DRC, South Africa, Mauritius

Pakistan

38,985

3

South Africa, Angola, Mozambique

New Zealand

31,060

2

South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia

1,262,545

85

247,847

15

1,510,392

100

Subtotal
Other
Global Total

Top Three Origin Countries

Data source: Migration Development Research Centre, 2007.
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Table 2.2: Emigration Potential of Professionals and Students in Southern Africa
Within Two Years

Within Five Years

Skilled professionals by country (2000)
Zimbabwe

55

67

South Africa

5

13

Botswana

13

20

Final-year students by country (2003)
Zimbabwe

70

60

Lesotho

55

50

South Africa

48

48

Swaziland

55

59

Namibia

48

58

40

50

Botswana

Final-year students by intended profession (2003)
Medical students
Non-medical students

65

65

58

62

South African health professionals (2007)
Physicians

24

50

Dentists

41

85

Pharmacists

41

72

Nurses

31

50

Data source: SAMP Migration Database.

Figure 2.1: Total Migration from Southern Africa to Canada, 1980–2009
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Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (see footnote 1 for details).
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SADC Immigration to Canada
Migration from Southern Africa to Canada is certainly not
a recent phenomenon, although the numbers have steadily
increased over time.1 In the 1980s, for example, between
1,000 and 2,000 people from the SADC region emigrated
each year to Canada, a figure that increased to around
3,000 per year in the 1990s and rose again to over 4,000 per
1
This profile of Southern African immigration to Canada draws on
data from two main sources: Statistics Canada census data and CIC
landing data. The Statistics Canada census data is used to derive the
SADC immigrant population in Canada and the settlement patterns of
the SADC immigrant population across the country’s provinces. Statistics
Canada has conducted the census every five years since 1871, and this
report uses data up to the 2006 census, as the 2011 findings were not
available at the time of the study. Landing data collected by the CIC
was used to illustrate migrant flows into the country. The CIC provides
a broad range of statistical information on migration admissions to
Canada. Statistics are available on the admission of permanent residents
to Canada for the three main categories of immigration: economic
immigrants, family-class immigrants and refugees, as well as a fourth
category for “other” immigrants. The CIC also provides landing data
for temporary residents who enter as foreign workers, students and
humanitarian (including refugee) claimants. Data was made available to
SAMP by CIC for the years 1980 to 2009.

year after 2000 (Figure 2.1). Between 1991 and 2006, the
number of Southern African migrants in Canada more than
doubled, from 47,410 to 106,325, representing a 124 percent
increase. Between 1991 and 1996, the overall number rose
by 12,340; between 1996 and 2001 by 14,890; and by 24,445
between 2001 and 2006. At present, the number probably
exceeds 120,000 and continues to grow.
Every SADC country also experienced a growth in
emigration to Canada between 1991 and 2006. The greatest
absolute increase over this period came from South
Africa (21,345 emigrants), the DRC (14,155), Zimbabwe
(6,100), Tanzania (5,685) and Mauritius (4,941) (Table 2.3).
In proportional terms, the greatest increases were from
the DRC, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Angola, the DRC
and Zimbabwe show particularly rapid increases over
time, while several countries, including South Africa
and Tanzania, had a relatively consistent increase over
the period. By 2006, the Southern African immigrant
population of Canada constituted 27 percent of the total
number of African migrants in Canada. Three countries
dominated the flow, making up 72 percent of the total:
South Africa (40,570), Tanzania (20,115) and the DRC
(15,795) (Table 2.4).

Table 2.3: Changes in the Number of Southern African Immigrants in Canada, 1991–2006
Immigrant Population

Total

Numerical
Increase
between
1991 and
2006

Percentage
Increase
between 1991
and 2006

Place of Birth

Before
1991

1991–1995

1996–2000

2001–2006

Total
Immigrants

Nonpermanent
Residents

Total Canada

3,408,415

823,930

844,625

1,109,980

6,186,950

265,355

6,452,305

3,043,891

89

136,235

54,800

66,310

117,215

374,565

23,535

398,100

261,864

192

1,405

160

300

1,175

3,045

225

3,270

1,865

133

65

45

30

80

215

170

390

324

498

1,640

1,745

3,830

6,910

14,125

1,665

15,795

14,155

863

Total Africa
Angola
Botswana
DRC
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi

35

25

0

30

90

10

100

74

211

1,060

405

205

360

2,025

190

2,220

1,160

109

215

75

50

90

425

80

500

285

132

4,995

1,060

740

2,860

9,660

280

9,935

4,941

100

Mozambique

825

55

85

85

1,050

35

1,090

285

35

Namibia

120

35

60

110

330

125

455

335

279
114

Mauritius

Seychelles

420

280

120

65

885

10

900

480

19,225

5,445

7,105

6,525

38,305

2,260

40,570

21,345

111

50

25

15

50

140

25

165

110

220

Tanzania

14,430

2,050

1,345

1,935

19,770

350

20,115

5,685

39

Zambia

1,045

405

385

680

2,515

265

2,780

1,735

166

South Africa
Swaziland

Zimbabwe

1,880

530

620

3,490

6,520

1,515

8,040

6,100

324

Total SADC

47,410

12,340

14,890

24,445

99,100

7,205

106,325

58,915

124

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009 (see footnote 1 for details).
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Table 2.4: Southern African Migrant Population of Canada, 2006
Place of Birth
Angola

Immigrants

Non-permanent
Residents

Total Migrant Stock

% of SADC Migrant Stock

3,045

225

3,270

3.1

Botswana
DRC

215

170

390

0.4

14,125

1,665

15,795

14.9

Lesotho
Madagascar

90

10

100

0.1

2,025

190

2,220

2.1

Malawi

425

80

500

0.1

Mauritius

9,660

280

9,935

9.3

Mozambique

1,050

35

1,090

1.0

Namibia

330

125

455

0.4

Seychelles

885

10

900

0.8

38,305

2,260

40,570

38.1

140

25

165

0.1

South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania

19,770

350

20,115

18.9

Zambia

2,515

265

2,780

2.6

Zimbabwe

6,520

1,515

8,040

7.6

Total SADC

99,100

7,205

106,325

100.0

Total Africa
Total Canada

374,565

23,535

398,100

6,186,950

265,355

6,452,305

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.
Note: Totals may vary due to rounding.

Types of Immigrants
In 2002, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(IRPA) replaced the Immigration Act of 1976. Since then,
Canada’s immigration program has been governed by the
IRPA, which shifts away from an occupation-based model
in favour of a points-based model that takes into account
education, knowledge of official Canadian language(s)
and the transferability of skills sets. The IRPA defines four
basic categories of entry for the purposes of permanent
residence:
• economic class, defined as those individuals who
are selected for their skills and ability to contribute
to Canada’s economy, including skilled workers,
business immigrants, provincial and territorial
nominees and live-in caregivers;
• family class, designed to reunite families and
comprises foreign nationals sponsored by close
relatives or family members in Canada, including
sponsors and partners, dependant children, parents
and grandparents;
• refugee class, designed to protect refugees, including
government-assisted refugees, privately sponsored
refugees, refugees landed in Canada and dependants
of refugees landed in Canada who live abroad; and
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• other class, where, on an exceptional basis, the IRPA
gives CIC the authority to grant permanent resident
status to individuals and families who would not
otherwise qualify in any category, for example,
in cases where there are strong humanitarian and
compassionate considerations, or for public policy
reasons. These discretionary provisions provide the
flexibility to approve deserving cases not anticipated
in the legislation.
In 2010, Canada accepted 280,681 immigrants, of whom
186,913 (67 percent) were economic class; 60,220 (22
percent) family class, 24,696 (nine percent) refugees; and
8,845 (two percent) other class.
Of the 106,325 SADC migrants to Canada in 2006, 93
percent were permanent residents or citizens and 7,205
were non-permanent residents (Table 2.4).2 Migrants from
SADC have entered Canada for permanent residence in
each of the four categories, although the annual numbers
in each category and the relative importance of each has

2 Immigrants are legally defined as persons who are landed immigrants
or permanent residents in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who
has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration
authorities. Non-permanent residents are persons from another country
who, at the time of the census, held a work or study permit, or who were
refugee claimants, as well as those family members living with them in
Canada.

Chapter 2: Out of Africa
varied over time (Figure 2.2). It is clear, for example, that
since 1980, economic-class migrants have consistently been
the largest category of entry every single year. Familyclass migrants have probably varied the least over time,
though their absolute numbers are much lower. Although

refugee-class migrants have been admitted since the mid1980s, the numbers have dramatically increased since the
late 1990s. Migrants entering in the special dispensation
category are a more recent phenomenon.

Figure 2.2: Type of Migration from Southern Africa to Canada, 1980–2009
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Figure 2.3: Total Economic-Class Immigrants to Canada, 1980–2009
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Economic-class Migrants

(Figure 2.4). The number and relative proportion from
other SADC countries has risen. The reason for the South
African decline is not any overall slowdown in emigration
from South Africa, but rather the growing popularity of
Australia and New Zealand as alternate destinations. The
idea that there is an escalating brain drain from Southern
Africa to Canada (as there is to Australia and New
Zealand, for example) is therefore not really supported
by the statistics. The flow is not insignificant, but it is not
growing rapidly either.

Between 1980 and 2009, more than half (55 percent) of
SADC immigrants to Canada entered in the economic
class, compared to 36 percent for Africa as a whole. Since
the early 1990s, the number of economic immigrants has
remained relatively consistent, or even declined slightly
(Figure 2.3).3 The peak year for economic immigrants
was 1994, with nearly 3,000. The number has remained at
around 2,000 per year for most of the past decade. Prior to
2000, South Africans made up the majority of economicclass immigrants and these fluctuations were closely tied
to general emigration flows from South Africa. South
Africa has consistently made up the largest proportion
of SADC economic-class immigrants (45 percent in total),
although its numbers have fallen steadily since 2000

Family-class Immigrants
A primary objective of Canada’s immigration program
has been family reunification. Individual family-class
immigrants either accompany economic-class migrants, or
are family members or close relatives who reunite with their
families later. Under the family class designation, partners,
dependant children, parents and grandparents can also
be sponsored by a close relative or family member who
is already in Canada. Entry to Canada from SADC under
the family class peaked in the early 1990s, fell considerably
towards the end of that decade, then recovered and has
been relatively constant since 2000, between 500 and 700
immigrants per year (Figure 2.5).

3 Economic-class immigrants enter Canada in one of four subcategories
and are selected on the basis of demand for particular occupational skills
in the Canadian economy. These categories currently include: skilled
workers and professionals, selected as permanent residents based
on their education, work experience, knowledge of English and/or
French, and other criteria; investors, entrepreneurs and self-employed
persons; provincial nominees, persons who immigrate to Canada
under provincial nominee programs; and Quebec-selected skilled
workers: under the Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and
Temporary Admission of Aliens, Quebec establishes its own immigration
requirements and selects its own immigrants. New regulations were due
to come into effect in January 2013.

Figure 2.4: Economic-Class Immigration to Canada by Origin, 1980–2009
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Figure 2.5: SADC Family Class Immigration to Canada, 1980–2009
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Asylum Seekers and Refugees
Once a refugee claim has been accepted, those individuals
may make an application for permanent resident status
in Canada. This application may include family members
in the country or abroad. Acceptance or refusal of refugee
claims is determined by the Immigration and Refugee
Board (IRB), an independent administrative tribunal that
oversees claims for refugee protection made in Canada.
While individuals in the humanitarian population are
primarily refugee claimants, applicants under this class
of entry also include foreign nationals allowed to remain
in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate grounds
under special considerations. Any person can apply
to stay in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate
grounds, including refugee claimants whose claims are
not approved by the IRB.
Between 1980 and 2009, a total of 72,706 humanitarian
claims were filed in Canada by people from SADC
countries (Figure 2.6). Since 2000, refugees have made
up the second-largest class of entry for SADC migration
to Canada. In 1980, the number of SADC refugees did
not even constitute one percent of total SADC migration
to Canada. By 1991, refugees accounted for 18 percent of
migrants, and by the turn of the century, 28 percent of
migrants. In 2009, refugees made up one-third of all SADC
migrants to Canada. While the number of SADC migrants
entering as refugees may seem high, the proportion of
SADC refugees is much lower than for Africa as a whole.

1989, only 1,489 claims were filed by SADC citizens, mostly
from South Africa (36 percent), Tanzania (27 percent) and
the DRC (24 percent). Between 1990 and 1999, the number
of claims rose to 18,078. Of these, 79 percent were filed
by people from the DRC fleeing the war in their country.
Between 2000 and 2009, the humanitarian population has
come from more countries and increased significantly to
53,139 people. The share of the DRC fell to 47 percent,
while Zimbabwe’s share grew to 31 percent and Angola’s
to 14 percent.
The two countries that have generated the most refugees
to Canada from SADC are the DRC and Zimbabwe.
According to CIC, these countries continue to make the
overall list of top source countries for refugee entries
to Canada. The DRC and Zimbabwe also generate
considerable numbers of refugees to other countries
within SADC, notably to South Africa (Kadima, 2001;
Amisi, 2006; Steinberg, 2006; Simpson, 2008; Idemudia,
Williams and Wyatt, 2010; Bandeira et al., 2010;
Rugunanan and Smit, 2011). The influx of refugees from
the DRC to Canada started in the early 1990s, accelerated
in the late 1990s and has remained relatively consistent
for the past 10 years (Figure 2.7). Between 1991 and 2009,
refugees comprised three-quarters (13,212 in total) of all
migrants from the DRC.

Of the more than 70,000 refugees to Canada between 1980
and 2009, 39,795 (55 percent) were from the DRC; 16,445
(23 percent) from Zimbabwe; 8,693 (12 percent) from
Angola; 4,509 (six percent) from Tanzania; and 2,662 (four
percent) from South Africa (Figure 2.6). Between 1980 and
SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME • 29
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Figure 2.6: Refugees from SADC in Canada, 1980–2009
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Figure 2.7: DRC Refugees to Canada, 1980–2009
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Canada has seen a significant increase in the number of
refugee claims filed by Zimbabweans (Figure 2.8). After
2000, increasing levels of political violence and persecution
coincided with an unprecedented economic meltdown
in Zimbabwe, forcing many migrants to flee to other
countries (Crush and Tevera, 2010). Even though the vast
majority of victims of political persecution sought refuge in
neighbouring countries, such as South Africa, a significant
proportion have moved to more distant countries such
as Canada. Zimbabweans currently make up the secondlargest group of refugee claimants in Canada and comprise
30 • The Centre for International Governance Innovation

just over 50 percent of all Zimbabwean immigrants to
the country. The numbers of refugee claimants peaked
in 2004 and then declined after the imposition of a visa
requirement that made it very difficult for Zimbabweans
to get to Canada.
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Figure 2.8: Zimbabwean Refugees to Canada, 1980–2009
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Citizenship
Canada recognizes multiple citizenship, but requires
immigrants to meet several requirements before they
can claim Canadian citizenship, including at least three
years of residence in Canada and knowledge of an
official language. The 2006 census showed that 870,255
individuals, or 2.8 percent of the Canadian population,
held citizenship with Canada and at least one other
citizenship. In SADC, only two countries, Mauritius and
South Africa, recognize dual or multiple citizenship. In
theory, citizens of all other SADC countries therefore lose
the citizenship of their country of origin upon acquiring
Canadian citizenship. In practice, 17 percent of the SADCborn population in Canada reported holding multiple
citizenships. Most originate from Mauritius and South
Africa, but not all (Table 2.5).

Temporary Migration to Canada
Temporary Workers
One of the major changes in migration to Canada over
the past decade has been the rapid growth of temporary
migration to the country (Thomas, 2010). In 2006, the
census enumerated approximately 265,000 temporary
residents in the country, compared to 143,000 in 1996. Of
these, 112,000 were working (94,000 full time). In 2010,
Canada admitted 183,322 foreign temporary workers
and 96,147 students. Many temporary workers enter the
country through various officially sanctioned programs,
such as the Temporary Foreign Worker Program, the
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program and the Livein Caregiver Program. These kinds of temporary work
programs are hailed by the Canadian government as “winwin-win”: good for Canada, good for home countries and
good for migrants and their families. Anyone familiar
with Southern African history will know, however, that

temporary work programs have existed in that region
for many decades and are especially associated with
gold mining and commercial agriculture. They have been
severely criticized for being highly exploitative and failing
to protect the basic work and human rights of migrants
(Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1992). While it would be
misleading to directly compare the South African migrant
labour system with Canada’s temporary work programs,
it is important to note that the latter have attracted censure
from researchers and human rights groups (Basok, 2001;
2004; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Goldring, Berinstein and
Berhard, 2009; Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010; Prebisch and
Hennebry, 2010; Hennebry, 2012).
Temporary migration from SADC to Canada has increased
considerably since the late 1990s (Figure 2.9). While SADC
migrants constitute a relatively small percentage of all
temporary migrants in Canada (less than three percent),
they do make up 31 percent of all African temporary
residents in the country. Since 2001, the overall number of
SADC temporary residents has increased by 10 percent.
Findings from the 2006 census suggest that temporary
migration has increased significantly from many SADC
countries (Table 2.6), with some — Angola, the DRC,
Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania — experiencing a
slight fall in numbers.
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Table 2.5: Citizenship Status of SADC-Born Persons in Canada, 2006
Country of Birth

Single Citizenship

Multiple Citizenship

Total

Multiple Citizenship
as % of Total

1,360

125

1,490

8.4

Angola
Botswana

205

10

220

4.5

8,710

845

9,555

8.8

Lesotho

15

0

15

0.0

Madagascar

415

235

650

36.2

Malawi

130

15

140

10.7

3,210

1,335

4,545

29.4

Mozambique

65

20

90

22.2

Namibia

220

15

235

6.4

Seychelles

210

90

300

30.0

9,370

3,195

12,565

25.4

45

10

60

16.7

Tanzania

1,825

320

2,150

14.9

Zambia

455

105

565

18.6

Zimbabwe

4,345

110

4,455

2.5

Total SADC

30,580

6,430

36,765

17.5

Total Canada

30,370,770

870,255

31,241,030

2.8

DRC

Mauritius

South Africa
Swaziland

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.

Figure 2.9: SADC Temporary Workers to Canada, 1980–2009
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Table 2.6: Temporary Migration from SADC to Canada, 2001–2006
Number of Temporary Residents

Place of Birth

2001

Change

2006

%

Angola

680

225

-67

Botswana

70

170

+143

1,715

1,665

-3

Lesotho

15

10

-33

Madagascar

75

190

+153

Malawi

20

80

+400

Mauritius

135

280

+107

Mozambique

25

35

+43

Namibia

50

125

+150

Seychelles

10

10

0

2,310

2,260

-2

Swaziland

15

25

+66

Tanzania

555

350

-37

Zambia

120

265

+121

Zimbabwe

675

1,515

+124

Total SADC

6,470

7,205

+11

Total Africa

22,085

23,535

+7

Total Canada

198,640

265,355

+34

DRC

South Africa

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.

International Students
There has also been a consistent and significant increase
in the number of post-secondary SADC students coming
to Canada since the late 1990s (Figure 2.10). Throughout
the 1980s, the number coming to study in Canada rarely
exceeded 1,000 annually. This number rose in the early
1990s, falling again by mid-decade. Since 1998, however,
the number has increased almost annually, and reached
over 2,500 for the first time in 2009. While these students
are classified as temporary residents in official immigration
statistics, recent changes in Canadian immigration policy
encourage international students to remain in Canada
after graduation (Arthur and Flynn, 2011).

Spatial Location of Immigrants in
Canada
Canada’s 2006 census showed that 96 percent of the SADCborn population resided in just four provinces: Ontario,
with 47,425, or 48 percent of the total enumerated; British
Columbia, with 18,515, or 19 percent; Quebec, with 16,820,
or 17 percent; and Alberta, with 12,010, or 12 percent (Table
2.7). The SADC francophone diaspora was settled mainly
in Quebec (83 percent of immigrants from Madagascar, 63
percent from Seychelles, 57 percent from the DRC and 36

percent from Mauritius). Immigrants from South Africa
and Zimbabwe were dispersed throughout the country.
South Africans were found in largest concentrations in
Ontario (18,155), British Columbia (12,090) and Alberta
(4,950). Eighty-nine percent of migrants from Zimbabwe
and 94 percent of those from Tanzania also lived in these
three provinces.
Data on the place of first residence of all immigrants to
Canada between 1980 and 2009 provides a complementary
picture of patterns of settlement at the intra-provincial
scale (Table 2.8). This is not necessarily an accurate
representation of the actual numbers living in particular
provinces and cities at present, due to later in-migration:
• Southern African migrants to Canada tend to move
to three main metropolitan areas: Toronto (35,719),
Montreal (16,255) and Vancouver (12,145). These
three cities alone were the destination for two-thirds
of all migrants to Canada.
• Toronto is a major gateway for migrants in Canada. In
2006, the city was home to eight percent of Canada’s
population and 20 percent of all immigrants. Threequarters of all SADC migrants arriving in Ontario
went to Toronto. South Africans make up the largest
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proportion, at 43 percent (15,469), followed by
Tanzanians (5,993), Mauritians (5,754), Zimbabweans
(2,917) and Congolese (2,656). Together, these five
countries made up 92 percent of all SADC migrants
arriving in Toronto.
• Vancouver has become a top destination for migrants.
In 2006, the foreign-born population of the city was
831,300 — 40 percent of its total population. A total of
12,145 SADC-born migrants first settled in Vancouver,
with three-quarters from South Africa (9,287, or
76 percent). Other smaller clusters of migrants
in Vancouver include those from Tanzania (734),
Zimbabwe (649), Mauritius (626) and the DRC (411).
• Montreal is the preferred destination for francophone
migrants from African countries. African migrants
make up 26 percent of Montreal’s newcomers and
12 percent of the total immigrant population in the
city. Migrants moving to Montreal came largely from
four countries: the DRC (8,163), Madagascar (1,359),
Mauritius (3,246) and Seychelles (953). Together, they
make up 84 percent of all SADC migrants in the city.
• A total of 17,426, or 18 percent of SADC migrants first
settled in other Canadian cities, a list that includes
several provincial capitals and the national capital,
Ottawa. In other words, 83 percent of all SADC
migrants settle in Canada’s urban centres on arrival
in the country.
• There are variations in this pattern from country to
country, but the major exception is South African
immigrants. The majority went to Toronto (15,469),
followed by Vancouver (9,287), Calgary (2,141) and
Edmonton (1,188). Nearly one-quarter of South
Africans (23 percent) did not go to any major urban
centre. This is a reflection of the fact that many South
African health professionals obtain their first jobs
in Canada in underserviced smaller towns. This is
particularly evident in Newfoundland, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and Alberta, where nearly half (47
percent) of all South Africans did not go to major cities.
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Figure 2.10: SADC Students in Canada, 1980–2009
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Data source: CIC.

Table 2.7: Location of SADC Immigrant Population in Canada, 2006 Census
Province
Country of Birth

NL

PE

NS

NB

QC

ON

MB

SK

AB

BC

YT

NT

NU

Total

Angola

10

0

10

0

735

1,955

45

0

170

125

0

0

0

3,050

Botswana

0

0

10

0

10

115

0

10

40

20

0

0

0

205

DRC

0

0

30

195

7,980

4,325

300

75

785

430

0

0

0

14,120

Lesotho

0

0

0

0

0

60

0

0

10

15

0

0

0

85

Madagascar

0

0

10

0

1,680

195

0

0

50

95

0

0

0

2,030

Malawi

15

0

0

15

30

225

10

15

70

50

0

0

0

430

Mauritius

0

15

30

0

3,475

4,740

140

100

420

740

0

0

0

9,660

Mozambique

0

0

0

0

115

680

40

0

70

155

0

0

0

1,060

Namibia

0

0

10

10

10

110

20

10

85

85

0

0

0

340

Seychelles

10

0

0

0

560

240

25

0

15

45

0

0

0

895

South Africa

125

25

320

125

625

18,155

1,095

720

4,950

12,090

35

40

10

38,315

Swaziland

0

0

0

0

10

65

10

15

30

10

0

0

0

140

Tanzania

10

0

75

10

905

11,600

60

55

4,035

3,010

0

10

0

19,770

Zambia

0

0

25

20

215

1,370

50

90

270

470

0

0

0

2,510

Zimbabwe

0

35

25

10

470

3,590

110

65

1,010

1,175

10

10

0

6,510

170

75

545

385

16,820

47,425

1,905

1,155

12,010

18,515

45

60

10

99,120

Total

Source: Statistics Canada, 2009.
Table acronyms:
AB
BC
MB
NB
NL

Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland

NS
NT
NU
ON
PE

Nova Scotia
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
Ontario
Prince Edward Island

SK
QC
YT

Saskatchewan
Quebec
Yukon
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Table 2.8: Permanent Residents from SADC Countries by Province and Major Urban Areas, 1980–2009
Newfoundland
St. John’s
Other
Total

ANG

BOT

DRC

LES

MAD

MAL

MAU

MOZ

NAM

SA

SEY

SWZ

TAN

ZAM

ZIM

TOTAL

0
5
5

0
0
0

11
1
12

-0
--

-0
--

6
6

0

-0
--

5
7
12

39
359
398

-0
--

7
0
7

7
7

0
0
0

0
12
12

62
397
459

-0
--

-0
--

14
0
14

-0
--

-0
--

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

-0
--

11
11
22

0
0
0

-0
--

0
6
6

0
0
0

0
0
0

25
17
42

0
0
0

0
0
0

58
7
65

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
5

14
0
14

0
0
0

131
113
244

0
0
0

0
0
0

22
0
22

5
5
10

36
8
44

251
153
404

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

183
33
39
255

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
5
5

---7

0
0
0
0

16
15
84
115

-----

-----

0
5
10
15

7
5
14
26

5
14
16
35

211
72
168
458

554
17
6
30
607

0
0
0
8
8

8,163
910
474
1,063
10,610

0
0
0
0
0

1,359
87
14
206
1,666

0
0
5
27
32

3,246
48
11
160
3,465

40
5
0
11
56

0
0
0
11
11

735
11
11
107
864

953
0
0
60
1,013

5
6
0
0
11

414
5
0
59
478

101
0
0
73
174

685
0
0
43
728

16,255
1,089
521
1,858
19,723

956
93
78
190
1,317

503
5
0
132
640

2,656
1,511
275
648
5,090

15
0
5
56
71

5
6
0
51
62

155
46
0
132
333

4,754
348
0
315
5,417

141
41
8
29
219

47
15
14
80
156

15,469
606
733
2,996
19,984

103
0
0
19
122

27
0
0
58
75

5,993
220
64
0
6,841

1,798
169
25
0
2,288

2,917
210
487
0
4,425

35,719
3,270
1,689
6,362
47,040

0
0
0

11
0
11

673
16
689

0
0
0

0
0
0

13
0
13

104
21
125

50
0
50

0
0
0

593
851
1,444

0
0
0

0
0
0

59
4
63

97
11
108

110
23
133

1,710
926
2,636

0
0
0
0

5
0
2
7

31
110
48
189

0
0
0
0

--0
--

0
0
5
5

11
6
22
39

-----

0
0
8
8

401
332
1,356
2,089

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

32
0
32
64

52
25
26
103

14
0
35
49

546

2,553

16
37
15
68

8
18
55
81

322
230
79
631

0
0
0
0

0
6
0
6

10
12
23
45

186
191
75
452

18
--31

15
0
47
62

1,188
2,141
1,621
4,950

0
11
0
11

0
0
6
6

781
1,267
109
2,157

72
61
61
194

357
418
172
947

2,973
4,392
2,263
9,641

26
0
0
26

39
0
39
78

411
0
59
470

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

27
0
10
37

636
12
47
695

25
27
55

0
0
24
24

9,287
593
2,203
12,083

16
0
0
16

30
6
12
48

734
0
79
813

265
0
75
340

649
25
193
867

12,145
663
2,741
15,552

PEI
Charlottetown
Other
Total
Nova Scotia
Halifax
Other
Total
New Brunswick
Moncton
Fredericton
Other
Total
Quebec
Montreal
Quebec City
Hull (Gatineau)
Other
Total
Ontario
Toronto
Ottawa
Hamilton
Other
Total
Manitoba
Winnipeg
Other
Total
Saskatchewan
Regina
Saskatoon
Other
Total
Alberta
Edmonton
Calgary
Other
Total
British Columbia
Vancouver
Victoria
Other
Total
NT

0

0

0

--

--

--

32

--

0

13

--

--

0

6

16

67

YT

--

--

0

--

--

--

--

--

--

20

--

0

0

0

5

25

Source: CIC.
Note: In this table, cells marked (--) represent areas containing fewer than five individuals. In the judgment of CIC, this data could allow for the
identification of specific individuals; in such cases, therefore, CIC does not provide the actual number. As a result, the table contains minor arithmetic errors.
Table acronyms:
ANG
Angola
BOT
Botswana
DRC
Democratic Republic
of the Congo

LES
MAD
MAL

Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi

MAU
MOZ
NAM
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Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia

SA
SEY
SWZ

South Africa
Seychelles
Swaziland

TAN
ZAM
ZIM

Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Chapter 3: Diasporas on the
Web: Study Methodology
Locating Diasporas
Census and immigration data provide a valuable overall
picture of diaspora flows and distributions. Privacy issues,
however, preclude these sources from being used to
provide disaggregated information on individual migrants
or migrant households. Census data tells us the size of the
population to survey, but not who the individuals are,
where they live or how to contact them. Without a sampling
frame, researchers tend to rely instead on techniques such
as “snowball” sampling, moving from one respondent to
another by following their social networks (Simich and
Hamilton, 2004; Pasura, 2006; 2010; Faye, 2007; Mosaic
Institute, 2009; Zohry and Debnath, 2010). This usually
leads to a focus on geographically concentrated diaspora
groups (Orozco, 2005; Schüttler, 2007; Schmelz, 2007;
Makina, 2010; Warnecke, 2010). The diaspora research
literature also tends to rely on small sample sizes, which
raises questions about the generalizability of the findings
(Arthur, 2000; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Belai, 2007; Schlenzka,
2009).
The mail-out survey is the most common method of
reaching members of a geographically dispersed diaspora
(Bloch, 2005; Nworah, 2005). To contact members of the
diaspora, mailing lists are compiled from groups such as
diaspora organizations, embassies, alumni associations,
immigrant service agencies and religious organizations
that keep, and are willing to share, membership lists. This
method of “accessing the diaspora through the diaspora”
is unlikely to provide much information on “hidden”
members of a diaspora who do not participate in or interact
with any of these agencies (Bloch, 2007). Researchers have
noted that members of vulnerable populations, such as
asylum seekers and refugees, may be especially reluctant
to participate in such surveys due to mistrust (Atkinson
and Flint, 2001).
The potential of the Internet for diaspora research is
considerable (Crush et al., 2012). More than one billion
people are connected to the Web, creating seemingly
limitless opportunities for communication and exchange
(Wright, 2005; Weaver and Morrison, 2008). The past
decade has also seen a major increase in the use of the
Internet by diaspora individuals and groups, enhancing
communication
among
diaspora
members
and
influencing the formation of diaspora identities (Ackah
and Newman, 2003; Bernal, 2004; 2006; Hiller and Franz,
2004; Parham, 2004; Ignacio, 2005; Georgiou, 2006; Kissau
and Hunger, 2008; Mano and Willems, 2010; Peel, 2010).
Online communication has become particularly valuable
to diaspora communities, as it creates a meeting place
of the private and the public, the interpersonal and the
communal; through the Internet, diasporas have developed

“virtual communities” within and across national borders
(Karim, 2003; Georgiou, 2006). One study of Eritreans
abroad shows how they use the Internet as a “public
sphere” to produce and debate narratives of history,
culture, democracy and identity (Bernal, 2006). Another
analysis of the use of websites, chat rooms and discussion
forums by the Zimbabwean diaspora shows how the
Internet has connected the diaspora to the homeland in
multiple and imaginative ways (Mano and Willems, 2010).
Zimbabwean online communities also use these forums
to interrogate their own identities, citizenship, sense of
belonging, politics and aspirations (Peel, 2010).
The Internet opens up new opportunities for researchers
to study geographically dispersed diasporas with a strong
online presence (Schmidt, 1997; Berrens et al., 2003; Wright,
2005). The online survey allows researchers to reach much
larger numbers of widely dispersed individuals with
common characteristics in a short period of time and at
greatly reduced fieldwork cost. Other advantages of online
surveying include the ability to post advertisements and
invitations on websites, and to send invitations to listserv
members. By automatically collecting and writing data
to an online database file, the costs of data entry and
cleaning are also eliminated (Wright, 2005). Low-cost,
or even free, online survey companies provide technical
and administrative support in research design, data
collection and analysis. With the rapid advance in online
survey technology over the past 10 years, collecting and
storing data online is now more secure. Through the
use of encryption, survey data can be stored without
the possibility of sensitive and confidential data being
accessed by the public. The advanced nature of some
providers allows researchers to export data to a variety of
data analysis programs. Some even allow researchers to
conduct preliminary analyses on data while the survey is
in progress.
This chapter describes the development of the SAMP
survey methodology and the decision to adopt a mixedmethods approach combining traditional face-to-face
interviewing, mail-out surveys and an Internet-based
survey. The chapter first discusses the strategies used to
locate and interview Southern African diaspora members
in Canada. Particular attention is paid to the use of the
Internet and social networking sites (SNSs), since this
constitutes the most original part of the study (Crush et
al., 2012).

Developing the Instrument
The survey instrument used to collect the data for this
study was collaboratively developed by the SAMP
research team in Canada and Africa. The instrument and
study methodology were submitted to, and approved by,
the General Research Ethics Board at Queen’s University
in Canada. The questionnaire was pilot tested and refined
prior to implementation. The survey consisted of a series
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of closed questions designed to gather information on the
following:
• the demographic, social, economic, employment and
educational profiles of individuals and households;
• reasons for leaving Africa and coming to Canada,
including categories of entry to Canada;
• experiences in Canada and comparisons between
Canada and African countries of origin;
• linkages maintained with countries of origin,
including remittances and other economic
transactions, family ties and the frequency and
reasons for return visits;
• involvement in development-related activities in
countries of origin; and
• the likelihood of returning
temporarily or permanently.1

to Africa,

either

An open-ended question was included at the end of the
survey to allow respondents to write at greater length
about their experiences, perceptions and aspirations.
As shown in Chapter 2, the Southern African diaspora
in Canada is scattered across the country. Cost and
time constraints prohibited a nationwide face-to-face
interviewing strategy and an online survey instrument
was designed instead (Evans and Mathur, 2005). The
survey was hosted by StudentVoice© Canada and was
accessible through a link on the SAMP website.2 Data
collected by the program was encrypted and stored on
a Canadian server. The StudentVoice© Canada team
assisted with questionnaire design, putting the survey
online and troubleshooting technical difficulties that
arose. In total, the project required the design and hosting
of 14 country-specific questionnaires in both official
languages, English and French (i.e., 28 questionnaires
in total). When a survey was completed, the data set
was easily downloaded and manipulated using SPSS, a
statistical analysis software package.

Inviting Diasporas
With the survey online, a multi-pronged strategy was
developed to contact members of the Southern African
diaspora and invite them to complete the survey. These
methods had varying degrees of success.

1 Copies of the survey are available from Jonathan Crush via email to
jcrush@balsillieschool.ca.
2

Access the SAMP website at www.queensu.ca/samp.
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Degrees of Separation
The first strategy was based on the “six degrees of
separation” concept, starting with the contact lists of the
members of the research team itself (Watts, 2004). The
research team included one member of the South African
diaspora (Mary Caesar) and one from the Zimbabwean
diaspora in Canada (Abel Chikanda). A third member was
born in the United Kingdom, but raised in South Africa,
Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Jonathan Crush). A fourth
is a member of the Indian diaspora, whose partner is a
member of the South African diaspora in Canada (Sujata
Ramachandran). A fifth is Canadian and Australian, and
has conducted research on migration to South Africa
(Ashley Hill). A sixth (Wade Pendleton) is a member of
the US diaspora living in South Africa (and prior to that,
Namibia). The final member of the team is from the German
diaspora in Canada and has conducted research on Latin
American immigration to Canada (Cassandra Eberhardt).
The team was therefore extremely heterogeneous, but has
the diaspora experience in common.
Each member of the research team has friends, relatives,
colleagues and acquaintances from Southern Africa in
Canada. Using the six-degrees logic, an invitation list was
drawn up of personal contacts. These contacts were then
invited to complete the survey and to pass the invitation
on to their own circle of personal contacts. The logic of
the degrees of separation is that within a maximum of six
steps of contact, every member of the SADC diaspora in
Canada should have become aware of the survey. This
method was not a great success, however, yielding only
80 respondents in the first six weeks of the survey. This
number was not significantly greater than the original list
of personal contacts of the research team (around 60). This
suggests that while many of these contacts completed the
survey themselves, very few passed on the invitation.
SNSs
Social media, especially SNSs such as Facebook, have
profoundly reshaped Internet usage in the past decade
(Brickman-Bhutta, 2009; Wink, 2010; Redmond, 2010).
SNSs have become a way for users to connect and interact
with family, friends and colleagues globally. They have
also opened up opportunities to make contact with new
individuals, both personal and professional, and with
other diaspora members. In one recent study, Facebook
data was used to define user subgroups by gender, race/
ethnicity and socio-economic status with distinct network
behaviours and cultural preferences (Lewis et al., 2008).
Facebook users themselves have the ability to form and join
groups based on shared interests and activities, providing
members with the ability to network with other members
and to share information relevant to the group description.
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Table 3.1: Facebook Presence of SADC Diaspora in Canada
Number of Facebook Groups

Number of Facebook Group Members

Number of Individuals Messaged

Angola

SADC Country of Origin

3

34

22

Botswana

3

54

51

DRC

5

130

59

Lesotho

0

0

0

Madagascar

7

663

505

Malawi

1

26

26

Mauritius

15

1,639

911

Mozambique

1

27

4

Namibia

3

68

14

Seychelles

0

0

0

South Africa

36

5,371

2,581

Swaziland

2

506

7

Tanzania

4

201

132

Zambia

6

366

263

Zimbabwe

11

477

1,046

Total

97

9,562

5,621

Note: The number of individuals messaged may not correspond with the total number of individuals in a Facebook group for one or a combination of
the following reasons: a person’s Facebook profile prohibited sending them a message, the individual member was not living in Canada, the existence
of duplicate profiles and individuals being under the age of 18. As some groups were more “global” in nature, only individuals who appeared to be
living in Canada were sent a message.

Diaspora groups on Facebook have grown rapidly in
number and size since 2004. In total, 97 SADC-related
Canadian Facebook groups were located and contacted,
most relating to South Africa (36), Mauritius (15) and
Zimbabwe (11) (Table 3.1). Information about the survey
and invitations to participate were posted on the message
boards of the diaspora groups. Each member of a given
group was then sent a personal message explaining the
purpose of the survey and inviting their participation.
Many people belonged to more than one group, but each
individual was only messaged once. The overall response
was extremely positive. A total of 5,621 people were
messaged via Facebook with an overall response rate
(in terms of completing the survey) of over 40 percent;
however, the country coverage achieved via Facebook
messaging varied considerably. In total, around six
percent of the SADC diaspora was sent an individual
message. Most countries were in the five to 15 percent
range, although over 20 percent of migrants in Canada
from Botswana, Madagascar and Zimbabwe were located
and messaged.
Other SNSs target particular subgroups. LinkedIn and
Academia.edu, for example, are directed at professionals
and academics, respectively. LinkedIn, which also has
diaspora groups, proved a useful tool for identifying and
messaging professionals, primarily from the business,
banking, legal and Internet technology sectors. The
Academia.edu site proved less useful for recruiting
diaspora academics, necessitating a time-consuming
search of Canadian university websites using various

keywords to try to identify faculty who had trained in
Southern Africa.
Public Websites
Two diaspora websites, South Africans in Ontario and
the South African Jewish Association of Canada (SAJAC),
containing the names and mailing addresses (but not
email addresses) of members were found. Hard copies of
the survey were mailed to 554 addresses with a response
rate of over 40 percent. Another subgroup that the study
was interested in was health professionals, given the
considerable amount of attention and controversy that
surrounds the migration of health professionals from
South Africa to Canada. Some health professionals were
recruited during the Facebook campaign, but the numbers
were insufficient to undertake any general analysis of the
medical diaspora in Canada. Together, the websites of each
province’s College of Physicians and Surgeons provide the
names and addresses of all physicians in the country. Using
“languages spoken” and “degree-granting institutions” as
search terms, it was possible to construct a large database
of diaspora physicians. In the case of South Africans, for
example, a total of 791 physicians were identified. The
questionnaire was mailed to all physicians identified and
554 responded, an exceptional response rate of 70 percent,
far exceeding the 32 percent response rate reported for the
National Physician Survey conducted by the College of
Family Physicians of Canada in 2007 (Grava-Gubins and
Scott, 2008).
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Figure 3.1: Online Recruitment of Southern Africans in Canada
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The relative importance of the different online methods
of recruiting diaspora respondents is shown in Figure 3.1.
Without the innovative use of the Internet to identify and
contact potential respondents, the study would certainly
have been far less effective in accessing the SADC
diaspora in Canada. At the same time, online recruiting
was far more effective with some country diasporas than
others.
Face-to-Face Interviews
Although the online methods used to identify respondents
reached a sizable proportion of the SADC diaspora in
Canada, certain groups were not adequately represented in
the sample. Thus, a decision was made to hire researchers
from the diaspora to conduct face-to-face interviews. Given
financial constraints, all the interviews were conducted in
Toronto. The first “scattergun” approach was to target the
annual Afrofest in Toronto, as one of the research team
members was on the festival’s organizing committee. While
the project had a booth at the festival with researchers ready
to interview anyone willing to complete the survey, only
a handful of questionnaires were completed. Community
researchers were then hired and, under supervision,
administered the questionnaire to individuals from countries
that were poorly represented in the sample, such as Angola,
the DRC, Tanzania and Zambia. Respondents were identified
using social networks and snowball sampling. Data from
the completed hard-copy questionnaires was then entered
online on the StudentVoice© Canada server. This research
method yielded an additional 345 respondents, bringing the
study total to 2,439 (Table 3.2).
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Interviewing Organizations
The study also set out to collect information on diaspora
organizations and their development initiatives. The
specific objectives of this component were to compile
a database on the size and origins of the diaspora
organizations, to establish the general development
potential of diaspora associations, to consider the role
of diasporas in furthering the Millennium Development
Goals, to examine the ways in which governments
and regional organizations can engage with diaspora
associations and to determine the potential for future
diaspora engagement in development activities.
With no database of diaspora groups and organizations
in Canada, SADC diaspora organizations were identified
initially through intensive Web-based searches using a
variety of keywords. Additional groups were located
through Facebook and community-based contacts. In
some cases, community identity is cohesive and several
diaspora members are actively involved in more than
one organization. Community-based contacts proved
useful in these situations in drawing attention to diasporaled development-oriented initiatives. Conversely, in
other SADC diaspora communities, where ethnic or
racial identities play a strong role in the formation
of group participation in activities, members are less
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Table 3.2: Total Survey Respondents
Country of Birth
Angola

Internet Respondents

Personal Interview
Respondents

Total Respondents

10

47

57

Botswana

7

6

13

DRC

12

116

128

Lesotho

2

1

3

Madagascar

25

0

25

Malawi

9

0

9

Mauritius

52

0

52

Mozambique

8

0

8

Namibia

26

0

26

Seychelles

2

0

2

South Africa

1,635

0

1,635

Swaziland

9

1

10

Tanzania

37

89

126

Zambia

40

25

65

Zimbabwe
Total

220

60

280

2,094

345

2,439

familiar with or able to identify groups/organizations other
than their own. Another challenge was the identification
of diaspora-led organizations that focus on development
projects in SADC countries and are largely independent of
“ethno-national” community diaspora groups.
Some groups exist only informally and are not registered
entities. Others do not have websites, or do not provide
contact information about their executive members, raising
problems of access in order to study them in depth, identify
their activities or assess their development potential. One of
the consequences of not having a comprehensive database
was that it was not possible to determine the number of
interviews that would provide us with a representative
sample. However, the broader goal in this part of the study
was not to make generalizations, but rather to collect and
disseminate information on the range and diversity of
organizations and initiatives. The results were therefore
compiled into a database that included the organization’s
name, mission statement, contact details, office bearers and
management, and fundraising objectives and programs,
including international development initiatives.

consenting to an interview and providing supplementary
material.
In many cases, founding members of organizations were
interviewed. In others, like ethno-national and ethniccultural diaspora groups, the interviewees had played an
active role in these groups for several years and possessed
a strong familiarity with the group’s goals and practices.
Respondents were typically members of the executive
committee or the board of these organizations. Interviews
were conducted in person or by telephone using a semistructured interview guide. Depending on the nature of
the organization and its activities, interviews varied in
length from 40 minutes to a few hours. Where respondents
agreed, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Where
they did not, the interviewer took notes.

As soon as a set of organizations had been identified and
their activities assessed through material in the public
domain, a selection was contacted in order to conduct
in-depth interviews with a representative familiar with
their work, structure, history and activities. In a few cases,
despite expressing strong interest in the SAMP project
and its outcomes, representatives were reluctant to be
interviewed. Instead, they directed our attention to other
material, such as website information, books and other
information about the organization and its activities in
their countries of origin. Some organizations did both,
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Chapter 4: Engaged Diaspora:
Southern Africans In Canada
Dividing the Diasporas
When interpreting the results of the survey, it quickly
became evident that there were considerable differences in
the responses received from South Africans and migrants
from other Southern African countries now living in
Canada. Rather than treating the SADC diaspora as an
undifferentiated whole, therefore, we have separated these
two groups and present the survey results separately.
Ideally, we would have liked to present a separate
analysis for each SADC country; however, the number of
responses from some countries was too small to allow for
country-specific conclusions. Only the South African and
Zimbabwean samples were large enough to permit single
country analysis, thus, for this report, the Zimbabwean
data has been combined with that from other countries
outside South Africa. A separate report has been published
elsewhere on the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada
(Chikanda, Crush and Maswikwa, 2012).
There are five major differences between the South African
group of respondents and those from other Southern
African countries now living in Canada (referred to here
as “other Southern Africans”): immigration timelines,
channels, reasons for coming to Canada, current
employment profiles and earnings, and the type and
intensity of connections that they maintain with their
countries of origin.
Immigration Timelines
The two groups’ timelines for immigration to Canada
vary considerably (Table 4.1). Just over 43 percent of
South African respondents immigrated before 1998,
compared with one-quarter of the other Southern African
respondents. This is consistent with Canadian census and
CIC immigration figures that show that South Africans
have a much longer history of migration to Canada and a
major increase from other Southern African countries over
the last decade (see Chapter 2).
Immigration Channels
There are significant differences in the immigration
channels through which the two groups entered Canada
(Table 4.2). For example, only 0.1 percent of South Africans
entered as asylum seekers or refugees, compared with
one-third of the other Southern Africans. The dominant
category of South African migrants was the economic
class (56 percent), compared to just under 20 percent of
the other group. Other smaller differences were noted
in the student class (18 percent versus four percent) and
the temporary worker class (two percent versus seven
percent).

Primary Reasons for Coming to Canada
The survey found major differences in the main reasons
the two groups gave for coming to Canada, some of them
counterintuitive (Table 4.3). For example, although over
half of South Africans entered Canada as economic-class
migrants, less than 10 percent of them said that their
primary reason for coming was economic. In the other
Southern Africa group, the proportion who entered as
economic-class migrants (19 percent) was reflected in the
proportion who said that they entered for economic reasons
(18 percent). Conversely, while less than one percent of
South Africans entered as refugees or asylum seekers, 40
percent said that their main reasons for emigrating related
to personal safety and security, as well as political reasons.
Among the other Southern Africans, the discrepancy
was in the opposite direction, with one-third entering as
asylum seekers or refugees, but only 23 percent of them
citing politics or personal safety and security as primary
reasons for entry.
Employment Profiles and Earnings
There are major differences in the employment profile
and earnings between the two groups (Figure 4.1). Almost
one-third of the other Southern African respondents earn
less than CDN$25,000 a year. An additional 34 percent
reported earning between CDN$26,000 and $50,000 a year,
and less than five percent earn more than CDN$200,000
a year. A Statistics Canada report shows that the income
profile of SADC-country respondents is consistent with
its profile of the general African immigrant population
in Canada (Lindsay, 2001). This report found that the
average income for African immigrants was CDN$24,000,
almost CDN$6,000 less than the average income for the
Canadian-born population. Moreover, the report shows
that 39 percent of African immigrants have incomes below
Statistics Canada’s low-income cut-off, compared to only
16 percent of the Canadian-born (ibid.).1 South Africans in
Canada, on the other hand, are relatively high earners. As
many as 44 percent earn more than CDN$100,000 per year,
a figure that dwarfs both the five percent for Canadianborn people and the 10 percent for other Southern African
survey respondents (Golombek, 2011). Over one-quarter
of South Africans earn more than CDN$200,000 per year,
compared with less than five percent of the non-South
African respondents.

1 According to Statistics Canada, the 2011 low-income cut-off for an
individual living in a metropolitan area of 500,000 or more is CDN$23,298.
See: www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/75f0002m2012002-eng.pdf for
details.
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Table 4.1: Year of Migration to Canada
Other Southern Africans
%

South Africa
%

Before 1991

13.2

21.8

1991–1998

13.1

21.5

1999–2002

34.4

22.5

2003–2006

20.9

16.5

2007–2010

18.4

17.7

Number of Respondents

733

1,577

Table 4.2: Official Category of Entry of Respondents
Other Southern African
%

South African
%

Asylum seeker/Refugee

34.3

0.7

Economic class (skilled worker or professional)

19.5

56.1

Student

18.2

4.3

Family sponsorship/Assisted relative class

15.5

12.4

Temporary worker

1.9

5.6

Canadian experience class

0.5

2.0

Government sponsored

0.5

1.5

Provincial nominee

0.3

3.1

Other

5.9

8.8

Unknown

3.4

5.6

Number of Respondents

735

1,585

Table 4.3: Main Reasons for Moving to Canada
Other Southern African
%

South African
%

Total Southern African
%

Children’s future

18.1

26.2

23.6

Economic

17.8

9.7

12.3

Educational

22.5

3.3

9.5

Political

8.2

5.4

6.3

Professional

6.2

7.6

7.1

0

0.4

0.3

Religious
Safety/Security

14.4

34.5

28.1

Unite with relatives

6.7

3.7

4.7

Other

6.1

9.0

8.1

Number of Migrants

742

1,584

2,326
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Figure 4.1: Income Profile of Respondents
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Maintaining Connections with Countries of Origin
Finally, there are significant differences between the two
groups in terms of the type and intensity of connections
that they maintain with their countries of origin. These
differences are so significant that we have labelled the two
groups accordingly: “disengaged” (South Africans) and
“engaged” (other Southern Africans).

Profile of an Engaged Diaspora
This section rounds out the immigration history and
patterns discussed in the previous section by providing
additional information on other Southern African
migrants. South African migrants are considered
separately, in Chapter 5 of this report.

More than
$201,000!

South African!

to be socially integrated in the host country and to send
less in remittances, and they are less likely to return home
(Chetsanga, 2003; Bloch, 2005; Chikanda, 2010).
Demographically, the sample is split almost evenly
between males and females (Table 4.5). Racially, the
majority are black (63 percent), while 17 percent are
white and 12 percent are mixed race. The age profile of
the respondents shows that they are generally young,
with nearly two-thirds below the age of 40. Slightly more
than half are married, while 39 percent have never been
married. A further eight percent are divorced or separated
and two percent are widowed.

As noted, these migrants entered Canada through a variety
of legal channels. Compared with migration flows to
Canada as a whole, Southern African asylum seekers and
refugees are overrepresented (at 34 percent) and familyclass entrants are significantly underrepresented (at only
15 percent). Irrespective of the category of entry, however,
the vast majority of respondents (81 percent) have made
the transition to citizenship or permanent residence (Table
4.4). Only three percent of the respondents from these
states were still in the asylum-seeker or refugee class
at the time of the survey. This is a similar pattern to the
sample as a whole, which includes South Africans. This
suggests that most SADC migrants, wherever they come
from, share the common goal of establishing permanent
residence in Canada. In the context of the aims of this
study, this is an important finding. Previous studies have
found an inverse relationship between legal status in the
destination country and commitments in the country of
origin: immigrants with secure legal status are more likely
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Table 4.4: Current Immigration Status
Immigration Status

% of Other Southern Africans

All Respondents %

Citizen

53.2

58.8

Permanent resident

27.5

26.4

Work permit

7.0

9.0

Student

7.1

3.0

Asylum seeker/Refugee

3.1

1.1

Other

2.0

1.7

Number of Respondents

742

2,331

Table 4.5: Demographic Profile of Other Southern African Migrants
Number

%

Female

394

50.3

Male

389

49.7

Total

783

100.0

Black

498

63.2

White

138

17.5

Indian/Asian

98

12.4

Other

43

5.5

Gender

Race

Coloured

11

1.4

Total

788

100.0

17–30

298

39.0

31–39

194

25.4

40–46

122

15.9

47–52

78

10.2

53–90

73

9.5

Total

765

100.0

Married/Common law

406

51.4

Never married

311

39.4

Age

Marital Status

Divorced/Separated

60

7.6

Widowed

13

1.6

Total

790

100.0

Table 4.6: Level of Educational Attainment
Other Southern Africans
%

Recent Immigrants to
Canada
%

Canadian-born Population
%

Less than high school

11

11

15

High school

33

22

26

College or trade diploma

26

31

39

University degree or more

30

35

19

Number

743

1,460,900

15,306,300

Data sources: SAMP survey data and Fleury, 2007.
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The migrants had attained high levels of education
before coming to Canada (Table 4.6), comparable to most
recent immigrants to the country and exceeding the
Canadian-born population. For example, 30 percent of
the migrants had at least a university degree upon entry
to Canada, compared with 19 percent of the Canadian
population.
Three-quarters of the respondents indicated that they
had continued their formal education outside Africa. The
most common qualifications earned included bachelor’s
degrees (30 percent), technical or vocational diplomas and
certificates (29 percent) and master’s degrees (11 percent).
For many, this was a matter of necessity rather than choice.
As many as 33 percent of respondents said they have been
asked to recertify or retrain in Canada in order to work in
a field for which they were already trained. Furthermore,
30 percent reported that they work in occupations that do
not make full use of their professional qualifications. One
survey respondent observed that moving to Canada set
them back a few years and that it took a long time to get to
the point they were at before leaving Africa:
From a job point of view, my husband and I
took a moment, on our 12-year anniversary of
immigrating to Canada, to evaluate and compare
where we were in our careers 12 years ago when
we left South Africa (after leaving Zambia) and
where we are now, 12 years later in Canada and
we have still not caught up to where we were.
Immigrating to Canada sets you back about 10 or
more years in your career, unless you are a doctor.
I think immigrating to Canada is most beneficial
to doctors, in my opinion, because they seem to
be the most successful here. (Respondent No. 61,
Zambia)
The respondents face four main barriers in accessing
the Canadian labour market: a lack of Canadian work
experience, language problems, a lack of foreign
credential recognition and a lack of job contacts in
Canada. Access to the labour market has an influence
on the level of integration in Canada, as well as on the
migrants’ capacity to send remittances. Only seven
percent of the respondents were not employed, while an
additional 21 percent were students. The most common
occupations include sales and service (10.7 percent),
health (8.4 percent), and finance, business and banking
(7.1 percent) (Table 4.7).

Table 4.7: Current Job/Occupation
Occupation

%

Management

8.1

Business owners

1.8

Finance, business, banking

7.1

Engineering and construction

3.0

Health

8.4

Legal

0.6

Sales and service

10.7

Information technology

2.3

Advertising, media, communications

0.9

Arts, sports and culture

0.6

Social services

4.7

Civil service

0.4

Technical and trades

6.3

Education

3.0

Student

21.4

Self-employed

2.8

Administrative and clerical

4.7

Other

6.4

Not employed

7.0

Number of Respondents

704

Ties That Bind
Emotional ties are central to the idea of diaspora-led
development, as they prompt migrants to maintain
social links with family and friends in their country of
origin. Just over half of survey respondents (55 percent)
said they have immediate family members living there
(defined as a spouse, child, sibling, parent, grandparent
or grandchild) (Figure 4.2). The majority of the immediate
family members are siblings (19 percent), parents (19
percent) and grandparents (13.6 percent). Only a few
respondents reported having their children (2 percent) or
spouses (0.5 percent) living there.
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Figure 4.2: Family Ties to Country of Origin
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Table 4.8: Identification with Country of Origin
%

To what extent do
you agree with
the following
statements?

Being from that country is an important part of
how I view myself.
I feel strong ties with people from that country.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

58.7

24.7

3.9

2.2

Number of Respondents: 602
50.1

30.1

4.3

2.7

Number of Respondents: 585

Table 4.9: Interest in Culture and Politics of Country of Origin
Do you:

% Yes

Want your children to know about the culture of your country of origin?

83.7

Listen to music from your country of origin?

82.1

Make or buy traditional foods from your country of origin?

74.6

Consult websites from your country of origin?

72.1

Want your children to learn the language(s) of your country of origin?

70.8

Read newspapers from your country of origin?

60.1

Closely follow political events in your country of origin?

59.2

Find that most of your best friends in Canada are from your country of origin?

48.1

Go to a cultural event or show in Canada with performers from your country of origin?

39.8

Read online newspaper(s) from your country of origin?

12.2

Participate in a social networking site associated with your country of origin?

12.0

Note: Multiple responses permitted.
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Continued links with family and friends in the country of
origin may be transformed into obligations, commitments
and concrete actions for the diaspora, particularly if
migration was used as a household livelihood strategy to
diversify, secure and potentially improve livelihoods (de
Haas, 2010). There may therefore be networks of mutual
obligation and implicit contracts within families that
ensure that migrants continue to send money home until
family members emigrate, join them in the host country or
pass away (Bloch, 2006; Crush and Frayne, 2007).
In the survey, respondents were asked a set of questions to
measure the strength of their attachment and identification
with their country of origin. Over 80 percent said they felt
strong connections: 83 percent agreed with the statement
that being from their country of origin is an important part
of how they view themselves and 80 percent said they felt
strong ties to other people from that country (Table 4.8).
Over three-quarters of the respondents said they eat foods
from their home country, listen to music from that country
and want their children to know about the culture of the
country (Table 4.9).

Remitting Behaviour
Remittances are one of the most significant indicators of
the strength of the ties that migrants maintain with their
countries of origin. The critical role that remittances have
played in the survival of households in Southern Africa is
well documented (Chikanda, 2010). The weight of academic
evidence, however, suggests that these remittances have had
little developmental impact in countries of migrant origin.
This study sought to measure the frequency, value, and the
use of the money and goods that migrants remit. Nearly
70 percent of the respondents send money to their country
of origin. The frequency of remitting is distributed fairly
evenly: 25 percent remit once a month or more, 29 percent
once a year or more and 10 percent remit occasionally (once
every few years) (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10: Frequency of Remitting
Money
% of Remitters

Goods
% of Remitters

More than once a month

7.5

1.8

Once a month

18.0

2.7

A few times a year

26.0

18.1

Once a year

3.1

9

Occasionally

10.5

19.9

Never

32.2

44.6

Don’t know

2.8

3.9

678

659

1,000

500

Number of Respondents
Median Value (CDN$)

The average (median) amount sent is CDN$1,000 per
year. These amounts are low compared with West African
migrants (Ghanaians, Nigerians and Senegalese) in
OECD countries who remit an average of US$2,500 per
year (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2009). More than
66 percent of the remitters send less than CDN$2,000 in
cash remittances annually, while only 21 percent of the
remitters sent more than CDN$3,000 annually (Table 4.11).
Table 4.11: Cash Remittances Sent Annually
Amount (CDN$)

% of Remitters

1–999

42.0

1,000–1,999

23.9

2,000–2,999

13.1

3,000–3,999

5.5

4,000–4,999

4.0

Over 5,000

11.6

Number of Respondents: 398

The study results show that a smaller, but still significant,
proportion of the diaspora remit goods (55 percent), though
they do so less frequently than with cash remittances. The
reported average value of goods remitted was CDN$500.
Only 30 percent of the remitters sent goods with a value of
more than CDN$1,000 annually (Table 4.12). On average,
therefore, the respondents remit about CDN$1,500-worth
of goods and cash each year, from an average annual
income of CDN$37,500, or four percent of their earnings.
Table 4.12: Value of Goods Remitted Annually
Amount (CDN$)

% of Remitters

1–499

40.7

500–999

28.5

1,000–1,999

17.4

2,000–2,999

5.6

3,000–3,999

2.2

Over 4,000

5.6

Number of Respondents: 270

The proportion of remitters who send money to immediate
family members is 95 percent (Table 4.13). Significantly,
nearly 50 percent also remit to extended family, which
indicates that responsibilities for financial support extend
to a broader circle of relatives. Only 10 percent send
remittances to community groups and organizations,
and six percent remit to their own bank accounts in
their country of origin. In other words, remitting by this
diaspora consists almost exclusively of private funds sent
to immediate and extended family. Unlike other engaged
diasporas, they do not remit for community projects or to
build personal capital in their home country.
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Table 4.13: Remittance Recipients
% of Remitters
Immediate family members

95.0

Extended family

47.2

A personal bank account for future use

6.0

Community group or organization

10.0

Other people

8.5

Total

100.0
Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Households receiving remittances from relatives in
Canada tend to spend the funds on their immediate needs
(Table 4.14). Sixty-one percent of remitters sent money for
food purchases and 44 percent to meet other day-to-day
household expenses. A significant proportion also sent
money to meet medical expenses (59 percent) and to pay
for education and school fees (58 percent). A much smaller
proportion sent money for direct productive investment:
for example, 12 percent sent remittances for the purchase
of agricultural inputs, 10 percent for starting or running
a business and six percent for buying property. In other
words, not only are remittances essentially intra-family
transfers, they are used primarily to help meet the basic
needs of relatives in the country of origin.

per se. Clearly, these funds contribute to the human
development of the recipients (through ensuring greater
food security and health and educational opportunities),
but the investment of remittances in productive enterprises
is not significant at present.

Diasporas in Development
Diaspora engagement is increasingly advanced as a way to
enhance the positive impacts of migration and to minimize
its negative impacts on developing countries (Chapter 1).
Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the respondents agreed
that they have an important role to play in developing their
countries of origin (Figure 4.3). Only 15 percent thought
that they had no role to play.
In terms of actual activities, nearly half of the respondents
said that they already participated in some kind of
economic activity in their country of origin: 25 percent
had exported goods there for sale, 11 percent had invested
in business, 11 percent had generated employment, 10
percent had engaged in research partnerships and nine
percent had purchased local goods for resale in Canada
(Table 4.15).
Table 4.15: Level of Participation in Economic
Activities in Country of Origin
% of
Remitters

Table 4.14: Use of Remittances
% of Remitters

Exported goods for sale

25

Invested in a business in country of origin

11

Provided employment in country of origin

11
10
9

Buy food

61.5

Pay medical expenses

59.4

Pay educational/school fees

58.2

Carried out research with people based in
country of origin

Meet other day-to-day household expenses

44.1

Purchased goods at home for resale in Canada

Buy clothes

34.6

For special events

33.4

Pay transportation costs

32.5

Build, maintain or renovate their dwelling

21.3

For agricultural inputs/equipment

11.6

Start or run a business

10.2

Buy property

6.3

For savings

5.3

Purchase livestock

4.6

Other

6.7

Number of Respondents

431

Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Remittances are a primary means by which diasporas
engage economically with countries of origin. Remittances
from Canada, however, are overwhelmingly private,
small-scale transfers rather than activity motivated by a
desire to further national or community development
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Note: Multiple responses permitted.

The respondents were then asked to identify
developmental activities in which they were willing
to participate (Table 4.16). Only nine percent said they
had no interest in any of the activities. Among the most
popular activities were skills transfer (mentioned by 58
percent), investing in businesses (55 percent), participation
in developmental projects (52 percent) and educational
exchanges (52 percent). Interestingly, 36 percent stated that
they would like to contribute to development by sending
remittances, suggesting that there is a willingness to see
the development potential of remittances reaching beyond
the migrant’s own family.
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Figure 4.3: Level of Interest in Development in Country of Origin
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Table 4.16: Interest in Participating in Specific Development Activities
% of Respondents
Transfer skills through training people in country of origin

58

Invest in a business in country of origin

55

Transfer skills through working in country of origin

52

Participating in developmental projects in country of origin

52

Educational exchanges

52

Volunteer work

48

Fundraising for projects

46

Making charitable donations

43

Exporting goods

39

Invest in infrastructure

39

Importing goods

38

Provide distance teaching (via Internet)

37

Sending remittances

36
Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Others specifically mentioned their desire to be involved
in activities that would lead to greater empowerment for
women and children:
I would play an important role, such as being able
to help women and children and educate them
about their rights because these are things that
[the] Tanzania government is still failing to do
and especially women and children who live in
villages are still ignorant of their own rights and
continue to face oppression. (Respondent No. 19,
Tanzania)
I will play a big role in African development,
especially in education for women and children to
help them reach their goals and more than that if I
have an opportunity. My main goal is to improve
women’s ability to access their rights and equal
opportunity and respect from men. (Respondent
No. 20, Tanzania)

Return Migration
Return migration has been proposed as a means by which
developing countries can benefit from the professional
expertise and material resources of their diasporas. The
probability of return migration is related to a number
of factors, including immigration status, number of
dependants in the country of origin, age, income, gender
and the original reasons for migrating (Bloch, 2007). The
respondents in this survey have certainly given thought to
returning: 55 percent said they had given it some or a great
deal of consideration; only a third had given it little or no
thought. Because thinking about return is no guarantee
that someone will actually do so, the respondents were
asked to specify a time frame within which they thought
their return was likely. Only 15 percent thought it was
likely within two years, a figure that rose to 27 percent for
a return within five years and to 57 percent at some time
in the future.
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The qualitative responses suggest that many of those who
contemplated return at some point were mainly thinking
about retirement:

percent) and a change in the political system (66 percent).
A small number related return to a feeling that they could
be of more value in their countries of origin:

I do not think I would go back to work but I most
certainly would go back to retire...the beach, sun
and sand. Family relationships are completely
different...we were more family-oriented in
Mauritius than here. If I have kids I would rather
have them educated and instructed in Mauritius
than here. (Respondent No. 33, Mauritius)

I am strongly thinking of returning to Africa
to live, particularly for work-related purposes,
especially as it relates to my field of international
development. I believe I have the necessary
skills and strong passion to contribute to a more
developed Africa. I hope to return within the next
five to 10 years. (Respondent No. 69, Zambia)

I maintain links with home because I will always
be an African and home is home. I don’t see myself
in those retirement homes. I would rather have
family not workers to take care of me at an old
age. (Respondent No. 9, Tanzania)

I think that I owe a lot to my home country,
Madagascar. I believe that at some stage(s) of my
life I will go back to Madagascar to help my fellow
citizens. My ultimate goal is to practice my new
skills in Madagascar, even if it would mean going
back and forth between Canada and Madagascar.
I feel strongly about being a Canadian as well.
Canadians have values that are very similar to
mine. I think that I have grown a lot and became
stronger here in Canada. If I ever move back to
Madagascar, I believe that I will never forget
that I am also a Canadian. (Respondent No. 81,
Madagascar)

I would go back once I feel I can retire comfortably
as cost of living is not as high as Canada as well
as social life is the best in Zambia. More time
with friends and family being spent as well as the
weather is excellent all year round. (Respondent
No. 58, Zambia)
I have family at home, as well as property and
business interests, and I am likely to inherit
my parents’ property. I will return to Malawi
permanently on retirement, so in around 10 to 12
years. (Respondent No. 76, Malawi)
The general evidence suggests that promoting large-scale
return migration is problematic, particularly in countries
that have been through protracted conflicts or crises,
such as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe in the Southern
African context (Missika et al, 2010). This is because the
social, political, economic and legal environment is often
so dysfunctional that there is a serious mismatch between
the demands and needs of the diaspora and the country’s
capacity to meet those needs.
A comparison between perceptions of living conditions
in the country of origin and destination can also
provide insights into return potential. An unhappy and
marginalized diaspora is more apt to consider return
than one that is not. When presented with 15 comparative
quality-of-life indicators, the respondents indicated that
their lives were better in Canada in all but two: social life
and level of taxation (Table 4.17). A large majority felt
that Canada offered better medical services, personal and
family safety, a better future for their children, prospects
for professional and job advancement, income and
suitable jobs.
Despite the fact that economic and social conditions were
viewed as far better in Canada, the respondents said they
might consider returning to their country of origin if
economic conditions improved (75 percent), with improved
safety and security (74 percent), job opportunities (71
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In general, however, return migration does not seem very
likely in the short or even the medium term.
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Table 4.17: Perceptions of Life in Canada versus Country of Origin
Better in Canada
%

Better in origin
country
%

No difference
%

Don’t know
%

Medical services/treatment

92

3

2

3

Upkeep of public amenities

88

4

2

6

My personal/my family’s safety

87

3

8

3

Future of my children

86

3

3

8

Environmental protection

80

9

4

7

Honesty/integrity of politicians

76

1

13

9

Prospects for professional/job advancement

73

15

6

6

My level of income

71

12

7

9

Availability of a suitable job/job security

69

14

9

8

Attitudes to foreigners/immigration/refugees

60

18

12

11

Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance

54

24

15

7

Cost of living

52

36

5

7

Affordable housing

49

33

7

11

Social life

44

46

7

3

Level of taxation

33

42

7

17
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Chapter 5: Disengaged
Diaspora: South Africans in
Canada

chapter first presents a profile of the South Africans who
answered the research survey, then examines the nature of
the linkages that South Africans in Canada maintain with
South Africa. As we show, these tend to be personal. The
majority of South Africans do not see themselves playing
any role in the future of the country and some are actively
hostile to the idea. The final part of this chapter shows that
there is a minority of South Africans who do constitute an
engaged diaspora and whose attitudes are similar to those
of the other Southern Africans discussed in Chapter 4.

Withdrawing from South Africa
The end of apartheid in 1994 marked the dawn of a new
era in South Africa’s political landscape. While the country
celebrated the positive changes, emigration to countries
like Canada began to accelerate (Weiner, Mitchell and
Price, 1998; Brown, Kaplan and Meyer, 2001; Crush, 2002).
The global South African diaspora has grown at a rapid
pace post-apartheid, and Canada has emerged as one of
the most important destinations for professionals leaving
South Africa. This chapter provides a profile of South
African immigrants in Canada and assesses their attitudes
towards, and level of engagement with, their country of
origin. As we have suggested, the South African diaspora
in Canada is very different from the diaspora from other
countries in the Southern African region.

Profile of a Disengaged Diaspora
As noted, South Africans have a long history of migration
to Canada (Figure 5.1). Data from 1980 onwards shows
considerable fluctuation in annual flows over time. The
numbers fell in the early- to mid-1980s and then rose
dramatically from the mid-1980s as the armed struggle
against apartheid intensified and political repression
increased. The outflow stabilized in the late 1980s and then
began to increase again in the run-up to the country’s first
democratic elections in 1994. The peak year of emigration
to Canada was 1994, after which the numbers stabilized at
1,500 to 2,000 people per year. The number of migrations
fell again after 2000, then stabilized after 2005 at 1,000 to
1,500 per year. Although the survey methodology targeted
all South Africans irrespective of when they moved to
Canada, a disproportionate number of the respondents
were post-1994 immigrants (Figure 5.2).

In sharp contrast to their other Southern African
counterparts, South Africans in Canada bear many of the
hallmarks of a classic “disengaged diaspora,” but more a
result of their own choices than forced exile. To characterize
all South Africans in Canada as “disengaged,” however,
would do an injustice to the minority who see themselves
playing a significant role in the future of South Africa. This

Figure 5.1: South African Immigration to Canada, 1980–2009
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Figure 5.2: Year of Immigration to Canada of Respondents, 1953–2009
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Although the survey respondents are from every Canadian
province, the overwhelming majority live in Ontario (41
percent), British Columbia (26 percent) and Alberta (18
percent) (Table 5.1). The urban bias of the sample simply
reflects the strong attraction of Canadian cities for South
Africans. One-third of the sample live in cities with a
population of more than one million, and 60 percent live in
metropolitan areas with populations of more than 250,000
people. Less than 25 percent live in rural areas with less
than 1,000 residents.
Slightly more males (55 percent) than females (45 percent)
responded to the survey. Racially, the sample is largely
white (88 percent of respondents) (Table 5.2), which is
consistent with the past pattern of migration from South
Africa. The respondents are mainly of working age, with
more than 80 percent under the age of 53. The majority are
married (78 percent).

Table 5.1: Geographical Location
of Respondents
Number

%

Ontario

665

40.7

British Columbia

422

25.8

Alberta

299

18.3

Manitoba

109

6.7

Saskatchewan

51

3.1

Nova Scotia

32

2.0

Newfoundland and Labrador

23

1.4

Quebec

16

1.0

New Brunswick

13

0.8

Prince Edward Island

3

0.2

Northwest Territories,
Nunavut, Yukon

2

0.1

1,635

100.0

Province or Territory of Residence

Total

Population of City/Town of Residence
>1,000,000

536

33.9

500,000–1,000,000

340

21.5

250,000–500,000

43

2.7

100,000–250,000

133

8.4

50,000–100,000

151

9.6

10,000–50,000

194

12.3

1000–10,000

160

10.1

<1000 (rural)

23

1.5

1,580

100.0

Total
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Table 5.2: Demographic Profile of South
African Respondents
Number

%

889

55.1

Gender
Male
Female
Total

724

44.9

1,613

100.0

positions and another five percent are employed in the
finance, business and banking industry (Table 5.4). As
noted above, the South African diaspora in Canada are
high earners by Canadian standards. Nearly one-quarter
of respondents earn more than CDN$200,000 per year and
almost 40 percent earn more than CDN$100,000 per year
(Table 5.5). Only 12 percent earn less than CDN$25,000
per year.

Race (South African terminology)
White

1,438

88.5

Indian/Asian

87

5.4

Coloured

57

3.5

Table 5.3: Educational Profile of
South African Respondents
Number

%

Black African

28

1.7

Highest level of education in South Africa

Other

14

0.9

Less than secondary school

132

8.2

Secondary school

222

13.8

Total

1,624

100.0

Technical/vocational diploma or certificate

325

20.1

17–30

298

18.6

Bachelor’s/honour’s degree

307

19.0

31–39

346

21.6

Master’s degree

93

5.8

40–46

340

21.2

Professional degree (e.g., LL.B, M.B.A., M.D.)

443

27.4

47–52

315

19.7

Ph.D.

36

2.2

53–90

303

18.9

Other

56

3.5

100.0

Total

1,614

100.0

Age

Total

1,602

Qualifications achieved/in progress outside South Africa

Marital Status
1,265

77.6

Less than secondary school

Never married

250

15.3

Secondary school

28

3.8

Divorced/separated

97

6.0

Technical/vocational diploma or certificate

219

29.4

18

1.1

Bachelor’s/honour’s degree

121

16.2

1,630

100.0

Master’s degree

63

8.4

Professional degree

143

19.2

Ph.D.

32

4.3

Other

136

18.2

Total

746

100.0

Married/common law

Widowed
Total

The South African diaspora in Canada is highly educated
and dominated by skilled professionals. Before leaving
South Africa, 54 percent of the respondents had obtained
a university degree. South African immigrants are
therefore far more qualified than the general Canadian
population, 23 percent of whom possess a university
degree (Statistics Canada, 2009). After leaving South
Africa, 47 percent of respondents continued with their
formal education, primarily in Canada. Technical or
vocational qualifications were either obtained or in
progress by 29 percent of respondents. Other qualifications
include professional degrees, mainly in law, medicine
and business administration (19 percent), while others
pursued bachelor’s (16 percent) and post-graduate
degrees (12 percent) (Table 5.3). As many as 25 percent of
the respondents claimed that they were underemployed
in jobs that did not make full use of their professional
qualifications and experience.

4

0.5

Of the respondents’ occupations, 30 percent are health
professionals, eight percent are employed in the
education field, seven percent occupy management
posts, six percent are employed in the sales and service
industry, five percent occupy administrative or clerical
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Table 5.4: Current Job/Occupation in Canada
%
Management

6.9

Business owners

3.8

Finance, business, banking

5.0

Engineering and construction

2.6

Health

30.4

Legal

1.4

Sales and service

5.8

Information technology

3.7

Advertising, media, communications

3.0

Arts, sports and culture

3.4

Social services

1.6

Civil service

0.5

Technical and trades

4.4

Education

8.4

Student

1.4

Self-employed

2.4

Administrative and clerical

5.2

Other

1.6

Unemployed

8.5

Total

1,529

Table 5.5: Income Profile of
South African Respondents
Annual Income (CDN$)

%

Less than 25,000

11.9

26,000–50,000

16.4

51,000–75,000

11.2

76,000–100,000

10.6

101,000–200,000

15.9

More than 201,000

22.8

Prefer not to answer

11.2

Total

100.0

Reasons for Leaving South Africa
More than half of the respondents immigrated to Canada
under the economic class of entry. A smaller number of
respondents entered as temporary workers and later
managed to secure permanent residence, especially in the
health field:
When I initially came to Canada it was supposed
to be for a 30-month work exchange (so purely for
professional reasons, rather than socio-economic
factors). However, we decided to apply for
permanent residency and remain in Vancouver,
predominantly because of the amazing lifestyle
here, rather than the conditions in South Africa
(which according to all accounts has deteriorated
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significantly since we left). The longer we stay in
Vancouver, the more difficult it would be to give
up the Vancouver lifestyle and return to South
Africa. (Respondent No. 604)
I qualified as a family doctor in South Africa
and came to Canada with the plan of staying
for two years to save some money. After two
years, I decided to stay for another year because
financially, I was doing very well. I was about
to go back to South Africa to specialize but then
got offered a position as a resident in obstetrics
and gynecology at the University of Alberta.
(Respondent No. 39)
By contrast, only 10 percent of the respondents said that
their primary reason for coming to Canada was economic
in nature (Figure 5.3). Another eight percent said that
professional reasons had brought them to Canada. The
two most common reasons given for moving to Canada
were safety and security (34 percent) and their children’s
future (26 percent). These findings confirm previous
studies that suggest that concerns about personal and
family safety are a leading driver of migration from
South Africa (Awases et al., 2004; Grant, 2006; Joudrey
and Robson, 2010).
Many of the respondents provided vivid anecdotes of their
personal experiences with crime and violence in South
Africa:
I was personally attacked and assaulted eight
times in one year. My eldest daughter was robbed
and held at gunpoint three times in one year. My
house was robbed twice in one year, whilst I was
in the house. (Respondent No. 26)
Crime was a big factor in my decision to move
away from South Africa. Myself and four other
family members had been carjacked over the
years. My immediate family and relatives had
been victims of robbery and or burglary of some
sort. It was just a matter of time before someone
was murdered. (Respondent No. 107)
I realized that sleeping with a gun under my
pillow was not normal practice. The statistics at
the time were that one out of three women would
be raped, and if you were raped, you would
contract HIV/AIDS. That equals a death sentence
for me. (Respondent No. 345)
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Figure 5.3: Most Important Reason for Coming to Canada
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I worked in a security armed response control
room, and we would receive the distress calls
from homes that we monitor. The things I heard as
we would dispatch armed guards to try and help
were unimaginable. There is no media out there,
Canada included, that shows the true occurrences
that take place in South Africa. I promised myself I
would not have children in South Africa and took
my entire family (mom, dad, brother, sister-in-law
and wife) to Canada. I have never returned, nor
will I ever. (Respondent No. 319)
I feel that I had no choice but to leave my beloved
South Africa for reasons of safety. My children’s
lives and future are more important than living
the South African lifestyle and being with my own
family and friends. I hate living in Canada, I loathe
the weather and the lifestyle but my children are
happy here and have established themselves. I
could never leave without them and they aren’t
going anywhere. I am stuck here! (Respondent
No. 11)
Some argued that they were victims of affirmative action
and that the future of white children in South Africa
was threatened by the policies of the African National
Congress government. None of the respondents showed
any concern about either the future of black children or
the fact that unemployment rates in South Africa are much
higher among blacks than whites:

Political!

Unite with
relatives!

Educational!

Religious!

Other!

forced our clients to discriminate against our firm
and we could not afford the BEE changes forced
upon us. (Respondent No. 423)
I struggled to find work mostly for not being black
enough. The irony was that under apartheid, as an
Indian I was not white enough. (Respondent No.
228)

Comparing Canada and South Africa
The survey asked respondents to compare South Africa and
Canada on 15 quality-of-life indicators (Table 5.6). Canada
scored higher on every single indicator except social life,
which was seen as better in South Africa. Predictably, both
personal and family security were seen as significantly
better (by 98 percent of respondents), as was the future of
children (91 percent). Other indicators that were ranked
significantly higher in Canada included the upkeep of
public amenities (92 percent better in Canada), racial/
ethnic/cultural tolerance (85 percent better in Canada) and
environmental protection (83 percent better in Canada).
On nine indicators, less than 10 percent thought that South
Africa was better. On no indicator (except social life) did
more than one-third think South Africa was better.

I was laid off at Telkom on management level,
because I’m white. They had to “correct” the
numbers by having less white managers.
(Respondent No. 32)
My business was forced to employ Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) staff who did not fit into my
practice or could not contribute in the improvement
of our service to clients. The government’s policies
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Table 5.6: Perceived Quality of Life in Canada versus South Africa
Better in Canada
%

Better in South Africa
%

No Difference
%

Don’t Know
%

98

0

1

1

Personal/Family safety
Upkeep of public amenities

92

1

2

5

Future of my children

91

1

2

6

Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance

85

2

9

4

Environmental protection

83

4

6

7

Availability of a suitable job/job security

79

6

10

5

Attitudes to foreigners/treatment of refugees

77

4

10

9

Prospects for professional/job advancement

77

7

10

6

Honesty/integrity of politicians

74

1

17

8

Medical services/treatment

72

18

7

3

Level of income

69

11

10

10

Cost of living

54

28

11

7

Affordable housing

44

32

13

11

Social life

35

44

17

4

Level of taxation

30

27

23

20

Number of Respondents: 1,533

The preference for living in Canada was reflected in the
fact that 61 percent had acquired Canadian citizenship.
Another 26 percent, more recent arrivals, are permanent
residents (landed immigrants) who can be expected to
acquire citizenship in due course (Table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Immigration Status of
South African Respondents

Table 5.8: Interest in South African
Culture and Politics
Do you:

%

Make or buy traditional foods from South Africa?

91

Want your children to know about the culture of South
Africa?

82

Listen to music from South Africa?

80

Read newspapers from South Africa in print or online?

73

Number

%

Canadian citizen

975

61.4

Permanent resident/Landed immigrant

411

25.9

Participate in a social networking site that is associated with
South Africa?

58

Non-permanent resident (work permit)

158

9.9

Want your children to learn the language(s) of South Africa?

48

Not specified

25

1.6

37

Non-permanent resident (student)

17

1.1

Find that most of your best friends in Canada are from South
Africa?

Asylum seeker/Refugee

3

0.2

1,589

100.0

Total

What are we to make of the fact that South Africa scores
so poorly in comparison with Canada on quality-of-life
tests and that so many South African immigrants in the
survey have taken out Canadian citizenship? It certainly
does not mean that South Africans in Canada no longer
identify in any way with their country of origin. A large
majority of respondents (88 percent) said that being
from South Africa is an important part of how they view
themselves. Furthermore, 80 percent said that they felt that
they have strong ties with people from South Africa. The
survey also asked about various cultural activities and
preferences, which again indicated high levels of personal
identification. The vast majority (91 percent) make or buy
traditional foods from South Africa, want their children
to know about South African culture (82 percent) and
listen to South African music (80 percent) (Table 5.8).
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Three-quarters of respondents regularly consult South
African newspapers online, while 48 percent want their
children to learn a South African language.
The majority of respondents are integrated into Canadian
society, but still maintain a sense of themselves as South
Africans rather than Canadians:
There’s also something about South African
culture and the connection to the South African
landscape that never truly leaves you. When I
think of “home,” I don’t think of St. John’s (where
I’ve lived for the past seven years) — I think of
Table Mountain, I think of the Drakensberg, I
think of Kirstenbosch, I think of the highveld, etc.
I’m only just starting to identify with Canadian
culture. I don’t think I’ll ever feel truly Canadian,
though. Not even after I receive my citizenship.
(Respondent No. 362)
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I came over to Canada to see if the grass is actually
greener on this side. My personal opinion is that
it is easier for the white English-speaking people
to immigrate, adapt and fit in than the Afrikaansspeaking people. South Africa is the only place in
the world where the Afrikaners would ever feel
at home. That would also be the main reason for
returning home one day, and that is to be between
my people, culture and to speak my own language.
(Respondent No. 190)
South Africa is where I was born and spent intense
years and my emotions run very deep there. I
am very sentimentally attached to South Africa
because I remember my parents and grandparents
and all our shared memories and nostalgia. I miss
the colour and vibrancy of the place, the nature
and animals, especially the smell of dust and rain.
So in a poetic way I am always linked to Africa
and get excited to meet people from all over the
continent. (Respondent No. 297)

80 percent of the most recent visits were for family-related
issues and events. Only six percent visited for tourism and
four percent for business purposes.
The survey also ascertained what other links South
Africans in Canada maintain with South Africa. About 40
percent still maintain bank accounts in South Africa, while
22 percent have investments, 14 percent own a house and
nine percent own land in South Africa (Table 5.9). However,
half of the respondents indicated that they do not own any
of these assets in South Africa. The survey also showed
that the longer a person has lived in Canada, the less likely
they are to hold assets in South Africa (Table 5.10). In other
words, over time, South Africans progressively disinvest
and cut these links.
Table 5.9: Asset Ownership in South Africa
%

A small minority claimed to have successfully shed their
South African identity:
I feel very “North American” in many ways after
studying and living in North America for my
adult life. (Respondent No. 312)
Canada is the only home my children know. They
are Canadian and can be the best they want to
be if they apply hard work, respect and humility
to their choices in life. My family is blessed in
Canada. South Africa is one chapter in the book of
our lives. We have many other chapters and many
more to be written. (Respondent No. 87)
I only have a brother in my immediate family left
in South Africa. He is all I personally care about in
South Africa. The rest I do not care about really. I
decided to distance myself from it. As the world
doesn’t care, neither do I. I do not have any other
interest in that country. (Respondent No. 617)

Family Ties
The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that
they have close family members in South Africa. These
include siblings (74 percent of respondents), parents
(69 percent), grandparents (45 percent) and children (13
percent). Most South African immigrants in Canada still
maintain close contact with their family members in the
country. The survey showed that they travel relatively
frequently to South Africa. As many as 92 percent had
visited South Africa at least once since immigrating to
Canada, and 59 percent had done so in the previous three
years. More than 30 percent visit South Africa every two to
three years and 18 percent at least once a year. More than

Bank account

41

Business

2

House

14

Investments

22

Property (land)

9

Savings

16

Table 5.10: Asset Ownership Levels in South
Africa, by Year of Migration to Canada
Period of Immigration
Before
1980
(%)

1980–
1984
(%)

1985–
1989
(%)

1990–
1994
(%)

1995–
1999
(%)

2000–
2004
(%)

2005–
2009
(%)

Bank
account

8.9

10.3

14.3

20.5

19.5

26.1

35.3

Business

2.5

0.0

0.0

0.6

0.6

1.6

2.0

House

5.1

0.0

3.8

7.1

6.4

9.2

13.0

Investments

3.8

3.4

9.8

17.3

12.8

17.3

15.3

Property

5.1

3.4

4.5

3.2

5.4

5.7

7.4

Savings

3.8

0.0

3.8

6.4

7.7

11.4

14.2

Remitting Behaviour
Remittances are usually viewed as the most visible
evidence of the material ties that migrants maintain with
their countries of origin; however, nearly 45 percent of
the South African respondents indicated that they have
never sent remittances to South Africa. Only 12 percent
can be considered regular remitters, sending money to
South Africa at least once a month. Many of those who
remit do so irregularly: 23 percent a few times a year and
18 percent less than once a year. The amounts remitted in
the previous year varied considerably: just over one-third
of respondents had sent less than CDN$5,000, while only
12 percent had remitted more than CDN$5,000 to South
Africa (Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4: Volume of Remittances Sent to South Africa
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The bulk of the remittances go to immediate and extended
family members. In the previous year, more than half of
the remitters (58 percent) had sent remittances to their
immediate family members in South Africa, while 15
percent sent the remittances to their extended family.
Only 13 percent sent them to a personal banking account
in South Africa. Remittance usage is consistent with the
private intra-family nature of the transfers. Over one-third
(38 percent) of the remitters identified household expenses
in South Africa as the major use of the remittances,
followed by paying medical expenses (33 percent), buying
food (31 percent), covering costs of special events (31
percent), buying clothes (21 percent) and education (16
percent) (Table 5.11). Remittances are focussed on meeting
the consumption needs of family members and very little
is spent on investing or savings.
More than half of the respondents (54 percent) had not
remitted any goods to South Africa since migrating
to Canada. In the year prior to the survey, only 39
percent had sent goods to that country. Just 24 percent
reported sending goods to South Africa at least once a
year. Very few (eight percent) sent goods valued at more
than CDN$500. The average value of goods sent was
CDN$415 for the whole sample and CDN$1,045 for the
remitters. Books and other educational material (sent by
40 percent of respondents) were the most common items
sent to South Africa. Other goods sent include household
goods and appliances (12 percent), food (nine percent)
and equipment (six percent).

10,001−20,000!

>20,000!

Table 5.11: Use of Remittances
% of Remitters
Meet day-to-day household expenses

38.3

Pay medical expenses

32.7

Buy food

31.2

For special events

31.1

Buy clothes

21.3

Pay educational/school fees

16.3

Build, maintain or renovate dwelling

14.4

Pay transportation costs

13.6

For savings/investment

9.1

Buy property

3.7

Start or run a business

2.8

For agricultural inputs/equipment

1.4

Purchase livestock

1.1

In sum, South Africans in Canada are not a remitting
diaspora in the conventional sense or in comparison to
other Southern Africans in the country (see Chapter 4).
The majority have not remitted anything since moving to
Canada. And of those that have, the remitting frequency
is generally erratic and the amounts relatively small,
especially in relation to their earnings in Canada. Those
who do remit clearly do so to meet the needs of immediate
family members in South Africa. There is little evidence
that remittances are seen as developmental in nature (i.e.,
designed to promote economic and social development
of the country). Levels of savings and investment of
remittances are extremely low and there is little evidence
of collective remitting for development projects.
Disengagement in Development
The survey asked the respondents to indicate their interest
in contributing to development in South Africa and the
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likelihood of their participating in development-related
activities linked to South Africa. In sharp contrast to other
Southern Africans, over 80 percent of the South African
respondents said that they did not see themselves playing
any role in the development of their country of origin. The
survey revealed very low levels of interest in activities
such as educational exchanges, volunteer work, making
charitable donations, skills transfer, import and export of
goods, fundraising for projects in South Africa, remitting
for development projects and investment in South African
businesses. More than 70 percent of the respondents did
not see themselves participating in any of these activities;
in some cases, the figure was over 90 percent. The lack of
interest was consistent with the fact that over 80 percent
of the respondents did not feel that they had an important
role to play in development in South Africa. In justifying
their position, some noted that they had already done
so, while others were highly critical of the South African
government and NGOs:
South Africa holds no allure for me any longer. I
spent eight years of my professional life providing
medical care to disadvantaged communities. I’ve
paid any “debts” I may have had. (Respondent
No. 32)
I have no role in South Africa’s development…I
invested 30 years of my life in South Africa —
that’s enough! (Respondent No. 216)
The money goes into a deep dark pit, and does
not contribute to self-development. Any help sent
there lands in the bottomless pit of corruption.
(Respondent No. 16)
I do not contribute to charities and NGOs, as I do
not believe the money actually gets to those who
need it; rather, the money lines the pockets of
“higher-ups.” This has been evident for numerous
years and is often reported in the South African
media. I do not believe it is the role of expats to aid
in South African development; the change needs
to come from within. (Respondent No. 33)

said they were likely to return within the next two years,
10 percent within the next five years and 20 percent at
some time in the future. The absence of imminent plans
to return to South Africa is confirmed by the fact that only
two percent had applied for a job there in the previous
year, although 10 percent said they had been offered
employment. The evidence for “brain circulation” is also
minimal, with only four percent having worked in South
Africa in the previous year — and some of these were
probably recent immigrants to Canada. Only one percent
had been on an exchange program in South Africa in the
past year, while two percent had volunteered there.
Consistent with the reasons stated for coming to Canada
in the first place, the lack of safety and security was cited
as the most significant obstacle to return. A reduction in
crime levels in South Africa and the abolition of affirmative
action were major preconditions for reconsidering a return
to South Africa. Other reasons cited included an absence of
family in South Africa, the respondent’s age and a feeling
that they owed nothing to the country:
All my immediate family now live in Canada and
my children (18 and 16) were born in Canada and
for that reason I would not return there to live in
South Africa. (Respondent No. 63)
Emigration makes one start all over. We emigrated
at age 36. It took four years to become somebody.
Now, at age 50, we don’t have motivation to try
and start over again, in another country, not in
Africa or anywhere else. (Respondent No. 554)
I have never returned, nor will I ever. I served in
the military for four years, as did my brother and
my father and his father before him. We have paid
our dues to South Africa...I love the country, but
my new home is Canada. Canada has provided
our kids with opportunity and our family with
safety. The only time I am South African is when
it is Rugby World Cup time. (Respondent No. 319)

Return Migration
Return migration is seen as one of the ways by which
migrant-sending countries can benefit from their
professional diasporas overseas (Van Houte and Davids,
2008). The survey found that the potential for return
migration to South Africa is very low, with only 13 percent
having considered it a “great deal” and 21 percent having
given “some consideration” to returning (Figure 5.5).
About 46 percent had never considered returning, while a
further 19 percent had given it hardly any thought.
Even fewer respondents indicated that they are likely to
return to South Africa in the near future. Only six percent
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Figure 5.5: Consideration Given to Returning to South Africa
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Figure 5.6: Annual Income of Engaged and Disengaged South Africans
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The Committed Minority
Differentiating Engaged South Africans
While the majority of South Africans in Canada are not
involved in the range of activities typical of an engaged
diaspora and do not see themselves playing any role in
the future of South Africa, a small minority does. What
differentiates these South Africans from the rest of their
peers? Do they display a different demographic, social or
economic profile? Do they have a more positive view of
South Africa and its future than the majority? What kinds
of development-related activities do they engage in? To
answer these questions, we differentiated between those
who agreed (the engaged) and disagreed (the disengaged)
with the statement: “I have an important role to play in the
future development of South Africa.”
The first task was to determine whether there were any
differences in the demographic and socio-economic
profiles of engaged and disengaged members of the
South African diaspora in Canada. There were no
significant differences between the two groups on a range
of indicators, including where they lived in Canada (city
and province), gender, race, education and training
(both inside and outside South Africa), or whether or
64 • The Centre for International Governance Innovation
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not they had family members still in South Africa. Other
variables, however, did seem to differentiate the two
groups. First, in some income brackets (i.e., CDN$75,000–
100,000 and over CDN$200,000 per year) the proportions
of engagement are very similar (Figure 5.6). However,
proportionally more members of the engaged diaspora
are in the lower income brackets: 38 percent earn less
than CDN$50,000, compared to only 22 percent of those
who are disengaged.
Second, there is a marked difference between the
two groups in terms of their main reason for coming
to Canada. The disengaged diaspora was far more
motivated by concerns about safety and security and
their children’s future than the engaged diaspora. Twothirds of disengaged South Africans gave these as their
main reasons for coming to Canada, compared with 46
percent of engaged South Africans. In other words, these
issues were important for both groups, but seem far more
significant for those who see no role for themselves in the
future of South Africa.
Third, engaged South Africans in Canada tend to visit
South Africa more frequently than their disengaged
counterparts (Table 5.13). Only 10 percent of the latter
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group visit the country once or more a year; in contrast,
over one-third (36 percent) of the engaged diaspora group
visit South Africa this frequently. Or again, 30 percent
of the disengaged group have either never been back to
South Africa or visit less than once a decade, in contrast to
only 13 percent of the engaged group.

a strong affinity with other South Africans and with South
African culture is strongly correlated with the degree of
personal commitment to South African development.
Table 5.14: South African Identity of Engaged
and Disengaged Diaspora

Table 5.12: Main Reason for Moving to Canada

Engaged

Disengaged

%

%

Engaged

Disengaged

%

%

Strongly agree

84.4

48.3

Safety and security

24.5

37.6

Agree

12.7

31.5

Children’s future

21.8

28.9

Neither agree nor disagree

1.8

10.6

Economic

13.9

8.8

Disagree

1.1

5.9

Professional

8.5

5.6

Strongly disagree

0.0

3.7

Educational

6.8

1.3

I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.

Unite with relatives

5.4

5.4

Strongly agree

79.3

33.1

Political

4.1

5.6

Agree

17.5

33.6

Religious

0.3

0.3

Neither agree nor disagree

2.9

19.5

Other

14.6

6.6

Disagree

0.4

9.2

100.0

100.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

4.5

Total

Table 5.13: Frequency of Visits to South Africa
Engaged

Disengaged

%

%

More than once a year

8.2

1.2

Once a year

27.9

9.1

Every 2 to 3 years

32.0

30.2

At least once every 5 years

11.9

18.0

At least once every 10 years

7.1

11.4

Less than once every 10 years

1.4

11.4

Never

11.6

18.7

Total

100.0

100.0

Identification with South Africa
In theory, members of the engaged South African
diaspora should exhibit more positive feelings toward,
and identification with, South Africa. The vast majority
of South Africans in Canada do exhibit a strong South
African identity; however, the strength of that identity
is even stronger among the subgroup who constitute the
engaged diaspora. For example, 84 percent of the engaged
group strongly agreed that being from South Africa is an
important part of how they view themselves (Table 5.14).
The equivalent figure for the disengaged group was only
48 percent. Or again, 79 percent of the engaged group
strongly agreed that they felt strong ties with other South
Africans, compared to just 33 percent of the disengaged
group. In addition, they are more likely to continue with
cultural practices that remind them of South Africa. On
every measure used in the survey, engaged South Africans
exhibit a stronger identification with South African culture.
In other words, self-identification as South African, feeling

Being from South Africa is an important part of how I see myself.

The other question is whether engaged South Africans
rate South Africa more highly than they do Canada. In
fact, Canada is rated more positively by both the engaged
and the disengaged groups on almost all quality-of-life
indicators. The proportion that rates South Africa better,
however, is consistently higher among the engaged group
(Table 5.15). This holds true across all indicators, with
the exception of personal income, although there is no
difference in perceptions about the honesty and integrity
of politicians and personal and family safety.

Links with South Africa
How strong are the links of engaged South Africans with
their country of origin? The first and most obvious area
is remittances. While engaged South Africans tend to be
lower wage earners than disengaged South Africans, they
remit more and do so more regularly. For example, while 53
percent of disengaged South Africans have never remitted,
the figure for engaged South Africans is only 32 percent.
The average annual remittance of the engaged group is
more than twice as much as the disengaged group. Onehalf of engaged South Africans remit at least once a year,
compared to only 29 percent of disengaged South Africans
(Table 5.16).
A second important indicator of diaspora engagement
is the extent to which members of the diaspora associate
themselves with, and are involved in the activities of,
diaspora organizations and associations. In the case of the
South African diaspora in Canada, rates of participation in
such organizations are generally low in both the engaged
and disengaged groups; however, there is a relatively
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consistent pattern of greater involvement by the engaged
group (see Chapter 6).
Table 5.15: Perceived Quality of Life in Canada
versus South Africa
Engaged

Disengaged

Difference

(% Better
in South
Africa)

(% Better
in South
Africa)

%

Social life

61

38

+23

Affordable housing

41

32

+9

Cost of living

35

26

+9

Level of taxation

31

26

+5

Medical services/
treatment

23

16

+7

intention to engage in the future was also significantly
higher among the engaged group. For example, 28 percent
of the respondents from the engaged group said they
were likely to work in South Africa in the next two years
(compared to only three percent of the disengaged group)
(Table 5.18). Forty percent of the engaged said they would
fundraise for projects in South Africa, compared to only
six percent of the disengaged. Other major differences
included sending funds for development projects in
South Africa (39 percent versus four percent) and making
charitable donations that benefit South Africa (55 percent
versus 16 percent).
Table 5.17: Diaspora Engagement Activities
(in the previous year)
Engaged

Disengaged

%

%

Bought a house or property in
South Africa

4.1

1.0

+7

Carried out research with people in
South Africa

12.2

1.5

12

-1

Exported goods to South Africa
from Canada

2.7

1.2

10

4

+6

Invested in a business in South
Africa

2.7

0.7

Environmental
protection

7

3

+4

Purchased goods from South Africa
to sell in Canada

3.7

1.0

Racial/ethnic/cultural
tolerance

7

1

+6

17.3

7.1

Future of my children

3

0

+3

Made a donation to a Canadian
NGO/charity operating in South
Africa

Upkeep of public
amenities

2

1

+1

Made a donation to an NGO/
charity in South Africa

14.2

5.9

Honesty/integrity of
politicians

1

1

0

Made a donation to a religious
organization in South Africa

13.2

5.6

My personal/my
family’s safety

0

0

0

Prospects for
professional/job
advancement

13

6

+7

Availability of a suitable
job/job security

12

5

My level of income

11

Attitudes to foreigners/
immigration/treatment
of refugees

Table 5.18: Likely Diaspora Engagement
Activities (in the next two years)

Table 5.16: Frequency of Remittances
Engaged

Disengaged

%

%

More than once a month

2.4

0.6

Once a month

12.9

10.5

A few times a year

28.8

12.2

Once a year

5.8

5.8

Occasionally (<once a year)

16.6

16.3

Never

32.5

53.0

Don’t know
Total

1.0

1.5

100.0

100.0

Third, there is a consistent pattern of greater involvement
by the engaged group than the disengaged group on
every measure used, ranging from buying property, to
investments, importing South African goods for sale
and, especially, to charitable donations (Table 5.17). The
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Engaged

Disengaged

%

%

Invest in business in South Africa

22.1

1.7

Work in South Africa

27.6

3.0

Participate in exchanges

31.2

3.7

Fundraise for projects in South Africa

39.7

5.9

Send money for development projects
in South Africa

38.7

4.4

Make charitable donations that benefit
South Africa

54.6

15.7

Volunteer work in Canada to benefit
South Africa

40.7

5.6

Finally, the survey provides insight into the kinds of
activities that the engaged South African diaspora are
interested in participating in (Table 5.19). Skills transfer
was rated as the most important contribution either
through training programs in South Africa (55 percent
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of respondents) or working in South Africa (53 percent).
Forty-four percent were interested in undertaking
educational exchanges. Another area of preferred
activity was philanthropy, with 54 percent willing
to fundraise in Canada for projects in South Africa,
49 percent volunteering in South Africa, 42 percent
participating in development projects in South Africa
and 34 percent making charitable donations to South
Africa. Less significant, but by no means unimportant,
were entrepreneurial activities, such as investing in
South African businesses (34 percent), importing goods
from South Africa (27 percent) and investing in South
African infrastructural development (18 percent). While
the majority of engaged Canadian South Africans
remit money to family in South Africa, only 23 percent
see themselves remitting specifically for development
projects.
Table 5.19: Preferred Diaspora
Engagement Activities
%
Transfer skills through training people in South Africa

54.7

Fundraising for projects in South Africa

54.3

Transfer skills through working in South Africa

52.5

Volunteer work in South Africa

48.6

Educational exchanges

43.8

Participate in development projects in South Africa

42.0

Making charitable donations

34.4

Invest in business in South Africa

34.0

Importing goods from South Africa

27.5

Sending remittances

23.2

Investment in infrastructure

17.7

Exporting goods to South Africa

13.4

Additional insights into the thinking of the engaged South
African diaspora group came from their verbatim comments:
I think a program where people could take their
annual vacations in South Africa, including a week
of volunteering paired with a week of holidays,
would get lots of votes of popularity from South
African transplants looking to contribute to
change without putting their family, their lives
and their economic futures at great personal risk.
(Respondent No. 402)
I support two South African NGOs that focus
on female empowerment and support, and I do
a lot of fundraising and raising awareness for
these issues. Last Christmas, I took a group of
volunteers to KwaZulu-Natal and next year will
be moving to Cape Town for the summer to work
with the organizations I support. I think I have a
crucial role to play in African development. I also

work with an NGO that sets up education and
support systems in Uganda and Kenya, because
I am a South African who has been blessed with
opportunities and it is up to me to use those to
empower the people living there. I am passionate
about volunteer work and international
development, especially in Southern Africa.
(Respondent No. 454)
I am still passionate about South Africa. Six years
ago, I started a home-based travel agency. My core
business is selling South Africa. Annually, I book
many expats to South Africa for vacation and
send Canadians on tours or safaris. For me, this
is a unique way of contributing to South Africa
and to focus on the positive. South Africa is an
amazing country and has lots to offer to travellers.
(Respondent No. 200)
We support an African school feeding program.
This is an interest as my niece, who lives in the
United Kingdom, is a director and fundraiser for
the charity. For four years, I imported products
from three self-help groups in South Africa to sell
for them at fairs and through stores in Canada.
(Respondent No. 285)

Return Migration
Given that the engaged diaspora is more favourably
disposed towards South Africa on most measures, it is
interesting to see if this translates into an intention to
return. As noted above, 46 percent of South Africans in
Canada have given no consideration to returning, and only
13 percent say they have given it a great deal of thought;
however, the engaged and disengaged groups think about
this question very differently. For example, 64 percent of the
disengaged group have given it no consideration, compared
to only 17 percent of the engaged group. Similarly, only four
percent of the disengaged group have given it a great deal
of consideration, compared with one-third (34 percent) of
the engaged group. The differences are also marked on
the question of likelihood of return (Table 5.20). Nearly 20
percent of the engaged group said it was likely they would
return within two years, compared to only two percent of
the disengaged group. At the five-year mark, the figures
were 30 percent and three percent, respectively. As many as
65 percent of the engaged group thought it likely that they
would return at some point, compared to only seven percent
of the disengaged group. In other words, the likelihood of
engaged South Africans returning to South Africa increases
over time, while the likelihood of disengaged South Africans
returning is low and static.
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Table 5.20: Likelihood of Returning
to South Africa
Engaged

Disengaged

% Likely

% Likely

Within next two years

18.9

2.3

Within next five years

30.5

3.1

At some point in the future

65.3

7.4

What motivates people to consider thinking of return?
Clearly it is not nostalgia or homesickness or the Canadian
weather; rather, it is because potential returnees see a
development-related role for themselves, as the following
comments demonstrate:
I am thinking of moving back to Cape Town since
I have received a job offer there. I feel like I have
to take the skills I have gained abroad back to
my home, I have a responsibility to improve the
country at this critical time for all South Africans.
(Respondent No. 137)
I have been considering moving back to South
Africa for a year now and have finally made the
decision. Despite an excellent income and good
quality of life, I prefer to be home. I preferred to
share an uncertain future with family, friends and
people who share the same background as me.
Despite making great friends and acquaintances
and making progress in my field I still feel like
an immigrant to Canada. And I don’t blame any
of its citizens for not making me feel at home…
But because I was always interested in politics I
couldn’t help seeing a dark future. I realized that
with my emigration to Canada I have also forsaken
South Africa. I have realized in the last three years
that the answers and solutions to South Africa’s
problems are far more likely to be found amongst
the skilled and possibly therefore emigrants.
(Respondent No. 176)
Personally, I would like to go back to South Africa
to hopefully play a role in its politics for the better
— meaning making everything equal in that
country, even though it seems like a goal that will
never be reached. This is why I want to go back,
because this situation needs to change in order
for my kids and my family to one day go back to
South Africa, their rightful home and live their
lives in prosperity and safety. I do not want the
situation that apartheid presented to ever happen
again, so I hope something good happens in the
future where I can actually play a role and make a
difference. (Respondent No. 415)
I love South Africa, and it will always be home.
Even if nothing changes back there, I will still move
back at some point. I believe everyone has to make
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it work for himself. I have all my relatives back
there, and they are all very happy and successful
and will never move. (Respondent No. 562)
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Organizations In
Development
Engaging Collectively
Migrants are well known for forming diaspora associations
and organizations with those who come from the same
country. These associations allow for a range of social,
cultural and economic interactions within the diaspora
(Mercer, Page and Evans, 2008). Besides demonstrating an
affinity with the country of origin, diaspora associations
provide an avenue for the diaspora to make meaningful
contributions to those countries. This chapter examines
the development-related activities of Southern African
diaspora organizations in Canada, focussing primarily
on those associations actively engaging in development
initiatives or those with the potential for engaging in
such development work.1 The activities discussed here
include initiatives by individuals who rely on their
diaspora networks, as well as initiatives by groups that, as
a collective, raise funds and material resources in Canada
to support projects or institutions in their countries or
communities of origin.
The chapter demonstrates that diaspora organizations
engage in a wide variety of formal and informal
development initiatives in Africa. Most tend to be
directed at the grassroots level and generally avoid
engagement with national governments. Despite their
strong developmental focus and impact, very few
associations and projects receive financial or material
support from either the federal or provincial governments
in Canada. Their main source of support and fundraising
is the diaspora itself. There is significant overlap in the
sectors and kinds of activities of diaspora associations,
but the majority of them tend to support initiatives in the
education and health fields.
The survey found that 52 percent of individuals from the
Southern African diaspora outside of South Africa are
involved in at least one of the different types of diaspora
association (Table 6.1). The proportion of engaged South
Africans is also relatively high, at 48 percent; however,
as might be expected, disengaged South Africans do not
participate in these organizations to the same degree (only
31 percent). When the general pattern of involvement
is disaggregated by type of organization, none of the
organizations has more than 20 percent involvement by
the disengaged diaspora. Only one type of organization
(alumni associations of African universities) has more than
10 percent involved. By contrast, more than 10 percent of
both the other Southern African and the engaged South

1 A number of diaspora associations or networks limit their activities
to Canada and are given less attention in this chapter.

African diaspora are involved in at least five of the eight
types of organization listed.
What is of interest is the patterns of membership
between the two types of engaged diaspora. Southern
Africans from outside South Africa are much bigger
supporters of African diaspora associations (16 percent
versus less than one percent of South Africans), ethnic,
cultural or HTAs (18 percent versus eight percent), and
religious organizations (18 percent versus 11 percent).
Engaged South Africans are more likely to be members
of alumni associations (17 percent versus seven percent
of other Southern Africans), professional associations
(17 percent versus five percent) and Canadian charitable
organizations with African links (18 percent versus 13
percent). Both are equally involved with NGOs with
links to Africa. While these numbers are not large and
the differences are not very significant, they do suggest
different potential channels for engagement by the two
groups. The engaged South African group tends to be
associated with more formal organizations that are
exogenous to the diaspora itself while the other Southern
African group tends to be more involved in self-organized
institutions.

Typology of Organizations and
Associations
The various Southern African diaspora organizations
in Canada can be classified using a modified typology
suggested by the IOM (Ionescu, 2006). The classification
is certainly not comprehensive and further research
may help clarify the diversity of current and emerging
initiatives; some overlap may also exist between these
broad categories.
National/Ethno-national Associations
These associations are the most common form of diaspora
organization in countries of settlement and numerous
groups exist in Canada. For example, the Tanzanian
Canadian Association (TCA) represents people of
Tanzanian origin in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA);
other ethno-national organizations for the Tanzanian
diaspora community in Canada are the Montreal
Tanzanian Association (MTA) and the Tanzanian
Community Association of Northern Alberta (TANA)
(MTA, 2013; TANA, 2013). Amongst Zimbabweans,
associations include the Zimbabwe Community
Assistance Association (ZCAA) for recent Zimbabwean
migrants based in Hamilton, Ontario (ZCAA, 2013).
Many associations are organized groups with their own
websites and formal organizational structures, such
as formal membership with dues, an elected board of
directors, bylaws and constitutions. Other smaller, more
informal, groups perform a similar function within
migrant/diaspora communities.
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Table 6.1: Participation in Activities of Diaspora Organizations
Southern African
Diaspora

Engaged South African
Diaspora

Disengaged South
African Diaspora

%

%

%

African diaspora association

15.6

0.7

1.3

African students’ association in Canada

7.4

2.2

0.1

Alumni association of African university

6.8

16.6

11.3

Canadian charitable organization with links to Africa

12.7

18.4

9.7

Ethnic, cultural or hometown association in Canada

17.8

8.1

4.4

NGO in Canada with links to Africa

10.6

10.0

2.5

Professional association in Africa

5.4

17.3

5.5

Religious organization with links to Africa

18.3

11.4

8.8

None of the above

48.0

52.0

69.0

Number of Respondents

735

271

636

These associations play a meaningful role within the
diaspora. Perhaps the most important role is community
building. By organizing regular social events like picnics,
dinners and celebrations of milestones in the countries
of origin (such as Independence Day) and emphasizing
cultural preservation, they help immigrants and their
children to maintain symbolic and cultural ties with
their countries of origin. They provide a vital platform
for second-generation diasporans, contributing to the
formation and development of diaspora identity and
collectivity.

SADC countries, though further research may well
find more connections. Many of the groups focus on
the diaspora/immigrant community in Canada by
providing social support to members, often helping
diaspora members to adjust and integrate into receiving
societies. Nevertheless, their potential to contribute to
development in SADC countries is considerable. Several
groups indicated that there was strong interest among
members in supporting worthwhile projects “back home”
and discussions had begun regarding participation in
selected projects.

Ethnic/Religious Associations

HTAs

Most members of these associations belong to a common
ethnic, cultural and/or religious group. Examples include
SAJAC and the Canadian Chinese Association (South
Africa). The Tanzanite Association represents the largely
Christian Goan community from Tanzania, who trace their
roots to the western Indian state of Goa.

HTAs are formal or informal associations established by
diaspora members from the same town or region in the
country of origin (Orozco and Rouse, 2007; Somerville,
Durana and Terrazas, 2008; Mercer, Page and Evans, 2009).
Our preliminary inventory of diaspora groups located very
few of these associations, which may be linked to lower
migrant numbers, diverse political histories of Southern
African countries and disparate motivations for migration
to Canada among diaspora members. Examples include
ZANCANA, a community organization for people from
the Tanzanian region of Zanzibar, and Outreach Zanzibar
(ZANCANA, 2013; Outreach Zanzibar, 2013).

This category includes groups whose organization and
activities are based on religious principles: there is an
affiliation with a religious body and the group’s mission
statement derives from faith-based values. In some cases,
the groups obtain financial support from religious sources.
Examples include the Canadian Friends of the South
African Chevrah Kadisha (CAFSACK) and the Ismaili
Youth Soccer (IYS) group, founded by Tanzanian-born
Amyn Bhulji to encourage Ismaili youth in Vancouver to
play soccer (CAFSACK, 2013; IYS, 2013). A substantial
percentage of the Ismaili community in Canada migrated
from Tanzania and Zanzibar and other East African
countries during the 1960s and 1970s (“Ismailis,” 2012).
Although the research identified the existence of many
ethno-national diaspora associations, it also showed
generally weak involvement in development work in
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Alumni Networks and Associations
This diaspora group consists of alumni members from
schools and universities in Southern Africa. Formal and
informal alumni associations help to keep their members
connected to their educational institutions, each other and
to their diaspora communities. Examples in this category
include alumni groups from South Africa’s Rhodes
University and UCT (Rhodes University, 2013).
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Professional Networks

Knowledge Networks

Examples of professional networks include the
Organisation des Professionnels Congolais du Canada
(OPCC). Formed in 1997, this organization’s mission is
to create a network of professional leaders, students and
entrepreneurs in Canada and the DRC and to increase
their influence through the activities and credibility of
this network. It also seeks to promote cooperation and
foster new partnerships between Canadian and Congolese
organizations such as companies, universities and research
institutions (OPCC, 2013).

These transnational networks, established by members
of the Southern African diaspora in Canada, aim to
build linkages between research institutions — within
and outside universities — in Canada and Africa. They
build up knowledge systems about Southern African
countries, provide research opportunities to scholars in
these countries and build capacity by training researchers
from SADC countries. Research institute and university
exchange programs provide new opportunities for
educators, students and academics in both Canada and
Southern Africa. They help to increase scholarly and
research expertise in developing countries and promote
knowledge transfer. In 2004, South African diaspora
members in Canada played a major role in facilitating
an exchange agreement between Queen’s University and
UCT. In 2009, the Canada-based UCT Foundation helped
facilitate a comprehensive exchange and collaborative
agreement between UCT and York University in Toronto
(UCT Foundation, 2009). A number of universities in
Southern Africa are part of research and development
partnerships with Canadian universities (Table 6.2). These
are not diaspora initiatives per se, although diaspora
academics are often centrally involved.

Business Networks
Business networks link entrepreneurs and companies in
Canada and elsewhere with business opportunities in
Southern African countries. They play an important role
in deepening foreign investment in the country of origin.
For example, the Zambia Diaspora Business Group Inc.,
launched in Calgary in 2010, allows the Zambian diaspora
to invest in business opportunities in that country (Zambia
Diaspora Business Group, Inc., 2013). The group describes
itself as “an investment vehicle with the objective of
channeling investment funds into promising business
opportunities in Zambia” and is based on the premise
that the Zambian diaspora are “best positioned” to “direct
and optimize investment opportunities that will benefit
Zambia’s development efforts” (ibid.).
Chambers of Commerce
Chambers of commerce are similar to business networks,
in that they provide their members with opportunities
for trade and investment in countries of origin. They also
maintain strong links with businesses and governments in
both countries of origin and settlement, and play a key role
in trade missions between the two countries. An example
is the Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business, which
organizes regular events like the Mining Breakfast, Indaba
dinner and seminars to achieve these objectives (CanadaSouthern Africa Chamber of Business, 2013).
Collaborative Networks
Collaborative networks bring together a variety of diaspora
and non-diaspora groups and institutions for specific
projects on issues such as health care. The Ottawa-based
North-South Institute’s (NSI’s) Diaspora Giving Back
project, for instance, attempts to provide opportunities
to Southern African diaspora health-care professionals
based in Canada to contribute, on a short-term basis, to
the national health systems of their country of origin (NSI,
2013). The NSI designed this project in collaboration with
the South African-based Southern African Network of
Nurses and Midwives and the Somerset West Community
Health Centre, based in Ottawa.

Significant diaspora-led knowledge networks include the
Canadian International Development Agency-funded
African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) that
links six Canadian universities with university partners
in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
(AFSUN, 2013).
Community Initiatives
Community initiatives support local development and
community-based projects in countries of origin, and
include non-profit and charitable foundations engaged in
development work.
Social-Philanthropic Networks
The Canadian Southern African Network (CSAN) is
a representative example of this category. Established
in September 2009, this Toronto-based non-profit
organization has formed a social and philanthropic
collective of Southern African diaspora members and other
Canadians interested in their objectives. Another example
is the Stephen Leacock Foundation for Children, which
raises funds for education-based programs affecting more
than 2,000 children in Toronto and South African schools
(Waldie, 2011).

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME • 71

Divided Diasporas: Southern Africans in Canada
Table 6.2: Research and Training Partnerships between Canadian and SADC Universities
African Country

Canadian Partner

African Partner

Angola

Ryerson University

Agostino Neto University

DRC

Laurentian University

Université de Kinshasa

Laurentian University

Université d’Antananarivo

Université de Montréal

Université d’Antananarivo

Memorial University

Bunda College, University of Malawi

Queen’s University

Chancellor College, University of Malawi

University of Victoria

Eduardo Mondlane University

Queen’s University

Eduardo Mondlane University

Queen’s University

University of Namibia

University of British Columbia

UCT, Stellenbosch University

McMaster University

University of KwaZulu-Natal

Concordia University

University of the North

University of Alberta

University of Fort Hare

Queen’s University

UCT, Wits University, University of KwaZuluNatal

Madagascar
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia

South Africa

York University

UCT

Swaziland

Queen’s University

University of Swaziland

Zambia

Queen’s University

University of Zambia

Umbrella Organizations
Umbrella organizations are national and international
platforms for individuals in diaspora communities and
diaspora-based associations whose objectives focus on
diaspora involvement and development-based issues
in their countries of origin. Examples include Zambia
Diaspora Connect (ZDC) and the newly constituted
Zambian Canadian Friendship Association. Efforts
have been made recently to develop a similar structure
for Tanzanian associations in Canada. Other umbrella
groups have been created to forge a more integrated
diaspora community identity. The Canadian Council
for South Africans (CANCOSA) was established in
1995 as the umbrella organization representing South
African groups in the GTA (CANCOSA, 2013a). The
amalgamation of the South African Nationals in Ottawa
and the Protea Club led to the formation of the South
African Rainbow Association of Canada — Ottawa,
which, since 2005, has been instrumental in the formation
of the African Diaspora Association of Canada (ADAC),
an umbrella organization for all African diaspora
communities in Canada (ADAC, 2013).
NGOs in Canada
This category includes NGOs in Canada that are either
founded by diaspora members or in which diaspora
members play a prominent supporting or management
role. Examples include:
• Tanga Education Support Association (TESA), which
is supported by the diaspora alumni group of the
Usagara School in Tanga, Tanzania (Sembony, 2010);
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• Reachout to Africa, a Christian humanitarian
organization operating out of North Vancouver
(Reachout, 2013);
• Zanele Poverty Relief Effort, founded in 2007 focussed
on poverty relief in rural Zimbabwe (Zanele Poverty
Relief Effort, 2013);
• Rural Action International (RAI), dedicated to gender
equality and women’s empowerment in Zambia
(RAI, 2013);
• Kuwasha Project, which aims to provide sustainable
and cheap solar power in Tanzania;
• Vancouver-based Education Without Borders (EWB),
which seeks to develop educational facilities in
disadvantaged communities in South Africa;
• My Arms Wide Open (MAWO) Foundation, a
Canadian charitable foundation created in 2009 to
support comprehensive community-based projects in
South Africa (MAWO, 2013);
• Outreach Zanzibar, which aims to provide
development assistance to Zanzibar in partnership
with Zanzibar Help Foundation (Outreach Zanzibar,
2013);
• South African Women for Women (2013), which runs
a scholarship program for South African-born female
students from poor backgrounds; and
• Zenzele (2013), a charitable organization based in
Toronto that provides skills training, entrepreneurial
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development and business support to women in
Southern Africa.
Diaspora members also make donations to registered
charities in Canada to support work either in their home
country or in Southern Africa generally, depending
on the focus of the charity. For example, the Torontobased Nirvana Cultural Society has raised funds to
support the activities of the Stephen Lewis Foundation
and the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund (Canada).
The Stephen Lewis Foundation works with grassroots
organizations in developing countries, strengthening
and implementing HIV and AIDS initiatives in most of
the countries included in this study. Similarly, the Nelson
Mandela Children’s Fund (Canada) was founded in 1998
to “give disadvantaged children and youth in South
Africa a hand up to overcome the continuing effects of
the previous apartheid government, disability, HIV and
AIDS, homelessness and poverty” (Nelson Mandela
Children’s Fund, 2013).
Student Associations
These networks are made up of international students from
SADC countries and youth from Southern African diaspora
communities enrolled in Canadian universities. Like
ethno-national associations, these networks emphasize
social and cultural events, reinforcing connections with
countries of origin. In some cases, these formal and
informal associations may lead to the formation of ethnonational organizations. A case in point is the TCA, which
emerged out of the Tanzanian Students’ Association,
formed by diaspora members studying at colleges and
universities in the GTA during the 1970s (TCA, 2013).
Virtual Diaspora Associations
The Southern African diaspora in Canada has taken in
large numbers thanks to the networking potential of
social media platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn.
Almost 100 diaspora groups with Canadian-based
administrators were identified on Facebook, with a total
of 9,652 members in early 2011. Only two SADC countries
(Lesotho and Seychelles) had no identifiable groups. The
greatest number related to South Africa (36), followed by
Mauritius (15) and Zimbabwe (11) (Table 6.3). The number
of LinkedIn groups is much smaller, but includes groups
such as the CSAN (with over 300 professionals as members
from throughout Canada), SA Canada (over 150 members),
Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business (around
80 members), Tanzanians in Canada (30 members) and
Zimbabweans in Canada. The vast majority of social media
groups aim to reach out and attract fellow individuals
from the same country. All of the South African groups
include a variation of the words “for South Africans living
in Canada.” This intention is also expressed in the title of
the virtual diaspora associations, with names like “South
Africans Living in Toronto,” “South Africans Living in

Vancouver,” “South Africans in the GTA,” “South Africans
in Ottawa,” “Young South Africans in Vancouver,” and
“South Africans in Canada” (at least six groups with this
name).
Most virtual diaspora associations are established to
facilitate contact between diaspora members from the same
country of origin. A common theme in the descriptions
of the virtual diaspora associations is facilitating social
connections between persons from the same country. In
some instances, associations extend invitations to others.
For example, the South Africans in Ontario Business
Group on Facebook invites other Canadians to join the
group, describing itself as a “non-invasive” space to
share ideas about small business or new business ideas.
Another group, Canadian Friends of South Africa, has a
membership that clearly consists of a mix of South African
and other Canadians.
Table 6.3: Online Diaspora Groups
Country

Number of Groups

Number of Members

South Africa

36

5,371

Zimbabwe

11

477

Madagascar

7

663

Zambia

6

366

DRC

5

130

Tanzania

4

201

Namibia

3

68

Angola

3

34

Botswana

3

54

Swaziland

2

506

Malawi

1

26

Mozambique

1

27

The research identified at least two cases where the
associations have clearly stated political objectives. Both
the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) in Canada and
the Zimbabweans Living in Canada Association describe
the purpose of their associations as raising awareness
about the political situation in their countries. The SSN,
a virtual association on Google groups and Wikispaces,
provides a collection of articles and documents that focus
on political, social and economic issues in Swaziland. “As
Canadians,” they note, “we are hoping to increase public
awareness of the oppressive government of King Mswati
III and to demand that our government actively supports
democracy in this corrupt kingdom” (SSN, 2013).

Development Initiatives
All of the 70 or so groups identified during the research
play a role in building, maintaining or strengthening
the transnational engagement of the SADC diaspora.
Given their diversity and function, their actual roles and
contributions to development-related activities are wide-
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ranging and varied. To begin with, it is clear that while
the real and potential contributions of the SADC diaspora
in Canada to their countries of origin has only recently
been acknowledged, their involvement is not a recent
occurrence. The historical dimension, however, is even
more poorly studied and documented than the current
patterns. The Forum Club, for example, now a dormant
entity, was formed in 1976 by members of the South
African diaspora in Ontario after the Soweto uprising.
Its purpose was to aid victims of the “cruel and unjust
policy of apartheid” and, until 1994, it contributed to
various projects, including the Bishop Tutu Fund to help
families of political prisoners, school feeding programs
and homes for the aged (CANCOSA, 2013b). A principal
project supported by this club for 15 years was the African
National Congress-run school for children of exiles in
Tanzania (ibid.).
As far as contemporary patterns of engagement are
concerned, a number of groups have been directly involved
in projects from their inception to completion. This is
most clearly the case for community-based initiatives
established by diaspora-led charitable or non-profit
organizations in Canada. Several of these foundations
have been, or are involved in, implementing projects in
a number of countries at the same time. We identified 23
such groups, with the largest number involving South
Africa and Zambia (six organizations each) followed
by Zimbabwe, Tanzania and the DRC (four each). Other
diaspora organizations have played a supporting role to
organizations or projects already set up in Africa. Still
others have provided support to Canadian organizations
with development projects in SADC countries. In some
cases, a collective of diaspora and non-diaspora actors
have worked jointly to build up existing systems in SADC
countries in areas such as education and health.
Diaspora-led charitable organizations have contributed
to a variety of sectors, including education (high school
and college/university), humanitarian assistance, gender
and development, poverty reduction, environment and
development, food security, basic amenities development
and health (Table 6.4). The number and strength of
diaspora-led charitable and non-profit organizations is not
necessarily related to the size of a country’s diaspora in
Canada. Smaller diaspora communities, such as Zambians
in Canada, have established similar or larger numbers of
development-centred organizations compared with larger,
more established communities such as the South African
and Tanzanian diaspora communities.
Many diaspora associations have contributed to several of
these activities rather than only one (Table 6.5). Education
is clearly the most important area for diaspora engagement,
with many groups contributing in various ways in an effort
to improve existing facilities and access to education for
vulnerable communities in Southern Africa. This decision
to invest in education draws on the groups’ beliefs that
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existing facilities are inadequate and that governments
have failed to meet educational needs, particularly of rural
and marginal communities. It is also motivated by the view
that “young people are the country’s future” (Mulenga,
2011). One respondent explained the decision this way:
Education is the best way to break the cycle of
poverty. Education provides the fundamental
foundation otherwise you are wasting. There are
people who say we should be giving money to
AIDS, this, that or the other, but I think education
is positive. It is enthusiastic and when you see the
results of these kids and you talk to these kids and
you see how smart they are and then you think if
they hadn’t gone to the Get Ahead, how miserable
their lives would have been or how wasted that
potential would be. (Anonymous respondent)
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Table 6.4: Development Activities of Diaspora Organizations
Thematic Focus
Education
(school-level support)

Higher education

Health

Humanitarian assistance

Activities
•

build/improve infrastructure (classrooms, buildings)

•

improve or expand existing facilities (desks, books and computers)

•

special programs to enhance learning and improve standards of education

•

curriculum development in partnership with Canadian teachers and educators

•

additional teaching guidance and programs to address shortage of teachers

•

provide scholarships to outstanding students

•

pay school fees for children from marginalized communities to reduce rates of attrition

•

improve resources, such as books and journals for university libraries

•

financial support for research and community-based projects at universities

•

collaborative projects

•

contribute to scholarships and bursaries or create new scholarships and bursaries for students (based
on merit and need)

•

build knowledge systems about SADC countries

•

enhance research potential

•

capacity building through participation of SADC university faculty and students

•

improve or expand existing facilities

•

train health professionals

•

provide specialized services (like physiotherapy, occupational therapy)

•

HIV and AIDS prevention and sexual health projects

•

donate medical supplies and equipment

•

collaborative projects involving diaspora participation

•

donations of food, money and supplies for accidents or disasters

•

projects for internally displaced populations

•

donate used clothing and supplies to impoverished communities

Poverty alleviation

•

create short-/long-term employment for participating communities

Food security

•

feeding programs for vulnerable households, especially female-headed households and orphans

•

food garden program

•

diversified uses of existing foods

Basic amenities

•

improve or increase access to amenities (clean drinking water, housing and electricity)

Youth and development

•

programs that focus on at-risk youth from marginal communities

Gender and development

•

programs targeting women

•

programs that support or enhance women’s empowerment in communities

•

scholarships for female students in schools/universities

•

provide new opportunities for research and participation

•

train local participants in projects

•

creating formal mechanisms for diaspora engagement with governments in countries of origin

•

developing and enhancing diaspora engagement with state structures in countries of origin

•

introduction of eco-friendly technology, such as solar power

•

tree-planting schemes

•

organize events to raise funds for projects and organizations

Capacity building and skills transfer
Institutional development
Environment and development
Fundraising
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Diaspora networking groups can indirectly contribute to
development processes by reinforcing the work carried
out by other organizations based in Canada and Southern
Africa. CSAN has organized several fundraising events,
the proceeds of which have supported the expansion of
educational opportunities for disadvantaged children
in Southern Africa and Canada. Two past recipients are
the Stephen Leacock Foundation and Make a Difference
(MAD) Foundation. The South Africa-based MAD
Foundation organizes financial support, especially for
schooling, to youth from poor backgrounds and has a
mentoring program pairing MAD members and volunteers
with beneficiaries. So far, the Foundation has supported 79
students through scholarships (determined on the basis
of merit and need) and more than 500 children from their
educational programs in the Western Cape, Gauteng,
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. In 2012,
CSAN’s fundraising event supported ZimArt-in-Trust’s
Maori Primary School Project outside Harare (ZimArt,
2013). The Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business
has similarly donated funds through special events to
the African Preschools Society, a Canadian-registered
charitable organization that develops primary schools
and has built schools in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal
provinces in South Africa (African Preschools Society,
2013). In 2002, the South African Women for Women
helped to raise money for the Phelophepa Train Project,
whose objective is to improve health services in remote
South African rural communities through a mobile medical
unit providing primary medical care, including optometry,
pharmaceutical and dental care.

to come to Canada to study various aspects of health at
the University of British Columbia (Centre for Molecular
Medicine and Therapeutics, 2011). He also helped to create
and implement the Masiphumelele Youth Project (MYP)
near Cape Town (MYP, 2010).

Although diaspora alumni groups have raised funds
for their alma mater institutions in South Africa, other
diaspora-based organizations have also contributed
financial resources to support educational institutions. The
No Future Without Forgiveness gala event, inspired by
Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s book of the same name, was
held in Toronto in 2002. It was organized by South African
Women for Women, in collaboration with the Law Society
of Upper Canada, raising more than half a million South
African rands to support the Faculty of Women’s Studies
and Faculty of Law at the University of the Western Cape.
The Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business has
instituted a postgraduate bursary award at UCT (UCT,
2011).

• from 2008–2010, Malamulele Onward received
funding from the Social Justice Fund of the Canadian
Auto Workers;

Group initiatives, including the formation of organizations
and foundations, have often emerged out of individual
diaspora philanthropic efforts. Examples include the
Enanae Foundation, Global Light Projects, Rural Action
International, Qamer Foundation and ZDC. South
African-born doctor Michael Hayden used his 2008 award
from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to fund
the establishment of the Ripples of Hope trainee awards,
including the annual Global Health Award, for recipients
from African countries. These awards allow trainees
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Philanthropic activities and development initiatives by the
Southern African diaspora in countries of origin are often
concomitant with similar activities in Canada. Several
diaspora groups have contributed to developmentoriented or social projects in Canada, such as the Stephen
Leacock Foundation-sponsored Triangle of Hope Program,
which provides support to children from poorer families
in two Toronto schools.
Diaspora groups in Canada raise funds for their projects
through membership donations, corporate sponsorship
and special events. Examples of activities supporting the
sponsorship and member donations are:
• Qamer Foundation’s Change for Change Campaign,
which urges people to gather loose change or coins
in old water bottles for their clean drinking water
project;
• Outreach Zanzibar and MAWO’s collected donations
through a partnership with Tides Canada;
• MAWO’s partnership program with You Change,
which allows US and Canadian residents to recycle
electronic items, whose equivalent monetary value is
subsequently donated to the projects;

• the Simon Poultney Foundation has created
supporting charitable organizations in Zambia and
the United Kingdom; and
• the Zambian Canadian Foundation and TCA have
changed their status to charitable organizations
to enable them to issue tax receipts to donors and
raise larger sums for their activities in Canada and
countries of origin.
Although financial resources are largely raised and
collected in Canada, in some instances international
diaspora groups like TESA and ZDC, and projects such as
the MYP have received funding from diaspora members
outside Canada.
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Table 6.5: Development Engagement of SADC Diaspora
Country

Diaspora Association

Activity

Education
DRC

Africa-Japan Chamber of Commerce

•

raised funds for a school in Kinshasa

DRC

Nyantende Foundation

•

improved primary and secondary school enrollment for children in Nyantende

South Africa

EWB

•

expanded educational facilities in two schools in the Western Cape province

South Africa

CAFSACK

•

donated funds are used for existing social programs for the Jewish community in
South Africa, like burial expenses support, senior citizens and youth welfare, and
employment support

South Africa

Stephen Leacock Foundation

•

the Get Ahead Project provides special education programs for disadvantaged
youth

Tanzania

TESA

•

runs an independent learning centre (with a library and computers) and program
at the Usagara School in Tanga

Tanzania

TESA

•

runs an after-school meal program for students at the Usagara School

Tanzania

TESA

•

recruited retired Canadian teachers contribute to learning programs by revising,
updating the curriculum and providing training to current teachers

Tanzania

TESA

•

raised funds to renovate school building

Tanzania

Qamer Foundation

•

donated school supplies for children from a marginal community

Tanzania

IYS

•

in partnership with the Aga Khan Educational Society (Tanzania), raised funds to
renovate the soccer field at the Aga Khan Primary School, Dar-es-Salaam

Tanzania

Zanzibar Canada Association
(ZANCANA)

•

donated computers to two schools in Zanzibar

Tanzania

IYS

•

raised funds in 2010 to revamp the soccer fields at the Aga Khan Primary School,
Dar-es-Salaam

Zanzibar,
Tanzania

Outreach Zanzibar

•

raised funds and helped to renovate the Unguja Ukuu Primary School in Zanzibar

Zambia

RAI

•

helped to construct a new school building

Zambia

Simon Poultney Foundation

•

built a new staff house at Sungula School in Chibwelelo in central Zambia

DRC

Fondation Lazare

•

donated computers to the University of Kinshasa

Zimbabwe

Hutano

•

organized a fundraising event to purchase textbooks and journals for the
University of Zimbabwe medical library

Zimbabwe

Runyararo Zimbabwe Children’s
Charity

•

provided scholarships (covering school fees and educational supplies) for children
in three schools

Southern Africa

SAMP/AFSUN

•

provides new avenues for collaborative research between diaspora and nondiaspora faculty at Queen’s University and institutions in Southern African
countries

South Africa

Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of
Business

•

created a postgraduate business bursary award at UCT

South Africa

UCT Foundation/UCT alumni group

•

helped to establish the research and student exchange program between UCT and
York University

South Africa

UCT Foundation/UCT alumni group

•

provided funds for scholarships, bursaries and various university-based projects

Zambia

Masomo Foundation

•

provides university-level scholarships each year to a select number of students in
Canada and Zambia

DRC

Fondation Lazare

•

donated medical supplies and equipment to the Kalembelembe Children’s
Hospital in Kinshasa

Lesotho and
South Africa

Malamulele Onward

•

provides specialized therapy such as physiotherapy, occupational therapy and
speech therapy along with equipment and caregiver training in poor rural
communities

Zanzibar

Outreach Zanzibar

•

opened a low-cost dental clinic with volunteer staff

Tanzania

Qamer Foundation

•

provided clean drinking water through construction of new wells

Health

Humanitarian Relief
DRC

Shiloh Place

•

provided housing and living needs for vulnerable groups, such as orphans and
widows

Tanzania

ZANCANA

•

collected funds and supplies of families of victims of a ferry accident
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Country

Diaspora Association

Activity

Zambia

Mulenga Michael Sikombe/Enanae
Foundation

•

collected gently used items (including clothing, shoes and bedding) in partnership
with Zambians in America group to donate in Zambia

Zimbabwe

Moonraiser Entertainment

•

donated clothes and other supplies to two orphanages

South Africa

MAWO

•

implemented One Brick at a Time employment program for local communities in
Berknok, Limpopo

Zimbabwe

Canada Rural Folk of Africa
Foundation

•

donated poultry to small farmers in Rusape, Manicaland Province

DRC

Fondation Lazare

•

provided 40 acres of land for community farming and food production in the
Mbakana rural community

South Africa

EWB

•

established a food garden program

Zambia

RAI

•

established an education program to make diverse foods using local crops like
cassava

Poverty Reduction

Food Security

Environment and Development
South Africa

MAWO

•

established a tree-planting program

Tanzania

Carbon X Energy

•

implemented a solar energy program

Zambia

Global Light Projects

•

implemented a solar energy program

Diaspora engagement is also evident in the willingness
of diaspora faculty at Canadian universities to leverage
and establish institutional partnerships for international
research collaboration and education capacity building
in SADC countries. A 2008 symposium organized by
the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada
(AUCC) with the World University Service of Canada and
the IDRC recorded the specific advantages of diaspora
faculty to set up such collaborative ventures and the large
numbers of diaspora faculty who were leading projects
in their country or region of origin (AUCC, 2009). The
increasing numbers of SADC diaspora faculty appointed
in Canadian universities reinforces this aspect (ibid.).
Prosperous migrants, such as many South Africans in
Canada, are well positioned to generate sizable sums for
development causes. There is already evidence of this
in the work of groups like CSAN. Faith-based groups,
many of which have ties to Tanzania, are another diaspora
group with solid prospects for transnational development
engagement. Ismaili communities in different parts
of Canada possess a strong record of community and
humanitarian work. They also have a very high profile
within Canada for raising funds for development work
in Canada and developing countries, including Tanzania,
through the Aga Khan Foundation. The annual World
Partnership Walk, organized by the Aga Khan Foundation
Canada, has raised more than CDN$70 million. In 2011,
alone, some 40,000 participants raised more than CDN$7
million for projects in Africa and Asia (World Partnership
Walk, 2013).

Promoting and Impeding Engagement
While the range of projects and involvement is impressive,
the depth and scale of engagement varies by group and
country. Like individual engagement, diaspora group
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involvement is strongly influenced by conditions that
enable or limit engagement in activities with development
outcomes (Table 6.6).
The philanthropic efforts and development engagement
of the Southern African diaspora communities clearly
enhance the emotional, cultural and personal ties that
they maintain with their countries of origin. A Zambian
diaspora member living in Ontario who is involved
with several diaspora-based groups, wrote recently that
despite “living away from home for many years, they
[the Zambian diaspora] have not forgotten their land of
birth” (Sichilima, 2009). “I wanted to give back to my
motherland” was how another respondent explained his
engagement with Zambia.
These engagements reveal the multiple attachments
of diverse Southern African diaspora communities
to different geographic locations. For certain groups,
especially those who can trace their origins to places
outside Southern Africa, these emotional and cultural
ties extend to several countries rather than one country of
origin. A participant from the Tanzanian Goan diaspora
explained the decision to support projects in different
places: “I wanted to give back to Tanzania, India and
Canada because all these three places have moulded who
I am as a person.” Funds raised at the Tanzanite group’s
annual event in 2010 were donated to projects in Goa,
Tanzania and Canada. The Nirvana Cultural Society’s
annual dinner event has raised funds for victims of the
Bhopal gas disaster in central India and contributed to
initiatives in South Africa through the Stephen Lewis
Foundation and Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund.

Chapter 6: Diaspora Organizations In Development
Table 6.6: Factors Affecting Diaspora Engagement
Enabling

Constraining
•

weak mechanisms of diaspora engagement by African and
Canadian governments

•

limited funding for diaspora-led initiatives

•

corruption and bureaucratic red tape

•

skepticism of government agendas

•

double burden on diasporas in sending and receiving contexts

•

weakening engagement over different diaspora generations

•

small, isolated diaspora associations

•

divided communities and politics within

•

political histories of African countries

•

excessive reliance on volunteers

Canada’s international engagement and humanitarian role

•

varying skill sets of volunteers

synergies of existing groups

•

longevity of involvement

•

emotional and cultural ties with Africa and/or countries of origin

•

appreciation and ties to alumni institutions in Africa

•

role of gratitude and privilege

•

supporting diaspora and non-diaspora networks in Canada

•

support from family and friends in Africa

•

social and economic integration in Canada

•

diaspora skills and expertise

•

familiarity and knowledge of countries of origin

•

importance of volunteerism and philanthropy for faith-based
diasporas

•

Internet and social media

•
•

Attachment to places of birth and places where they spent
their formative years is a key factor in the selection of
project locations by diaspora members:
I think that with our knowledge of Zanzibar, the
fact that we speak the language, the fact that we
were born there and raised there and understand
the nuances of the people, we can make the most
impact on a lot of people, [more] than other people
who try to help. (Anonymous respondent)
Unsurprisingly, many projects have been carried out in
the home villages or towns of key members of diaspora
organizations. The inaugural school lighting initiative of
Global Light Projects was implemented in Chona village,
the native village of one of the organization’s founders.
Another project is being planned in Mwanangonze village,
the ancestral home of another Zambian-Canadian, based
in Peterborough, who has raised funds for Global Light
Projects.
To foster engagement, members of diaspora organizations
have relied on their personal networks in Canada and
Southern African in a variety of ways. To identify suitable
projects and where these should be carried out, diaspora
members have relied on their own knowledge, familiarity
with the area and the advice of family and friends in
Southern African countries. The education project of
Outreach Zanzibar has focussed on the Unguja Ukuu
School, where one of the organization’s founders worked
as a teacher in his youth. The founder of the Runyayaro
Charity asked her sisters in Zimbabwe to identify
schools where the scholarship program would be best
implemented. Besides identifying worthy initiatives,
target locations and project beneficiaries, family members,
relatives and friends have been asked to join the executive
committee of organizations in Canada. They have
participated in similar committees or sister organizations
in the countries of origin, overseeing the progress of

projects and disbursement of project funds. The Qamer
Foundation, Simon Poultney Foundation and MAWO are
among the groups where family members are executive
members and play an active role in organizational
activities.
Diaspora members’ networks have also proven beneficial
in generating funds for development initiatives. Three
examples of networks that extend beyond Canada
and SADC countries are the Zimbabwe Gecko Society,
which used its church-based contacts in Vancouver and
Burnaby to sell wire ornaments to raise funds for its
programs; Global Light Projects, which reached out to
the congregation at the Royal View Church in London
to collect funds for its school lighting projects in Zambia;
and diaspora members who used the email list of Umoja
Tanzanian Canadian Community Organization to raise
funds for victims of a bomb blast in Tanzania.
With its large immigrant population, progressive outlook
towards refugees and immigrants, and long-standing
humanitarian engagement, Canada is well positioned
to play a strategic role in facilitating and strengthening
global diaspora linkages. Many reunions of diaspora
communities in North America, Europe, Australia and
elsewhere have been held in Canada. More than 350
former residents of Arusha, Tanzania now residing in the
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and
Canada attended the first global reunion in Toronto in mid2010. That same year, Toronto hosted a similar reunion of
diaspora Zanzibaris, and in mid-2012, the city also played
host to Ismaili diasporans originally from Tanga, Tanzania.
The synergies of diaspora organizations, especially those
working in similar geographical locations, can strengthen
existing projects and initiatives. Global Light Projects and
RAI plan to provide solar power to a rural community
in northern Zambia in a joint project that will not only
deliver electricity to the local school, but will also allow the
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community to dry cassava using solar heating technology,
buttressing RAI’s existing education and food security
projects in the area. The success of small-scale projects can
act as a stimulus for new projects. For example, the Chona
village school lighting project and its immediate benefits
for the community motivated one of its Canadian donors
to establish a solar energy-based project in Zambia, using
the solar water disinfection method to disinfect drinking
water and reduce water-borne diseases.
By virtue of their dual association, diaspora organizations
can function as bridges between countries of origin and
Canada. In addition to raising funds, they can contribute to
development work in other ways, including strengthening
Canadian non-diaspora philanthropic efforts by providing
volunteers for projects. Many groups have drawn on the
large pool of Canadians interested in volunteering in these
countries to participate in existing diaspora development
projects. For example, Outreach Zanzibar engaged the
voluntary services of two retired British schoolteachers to
revise the English language curriculum at the Unguja Ukuu
School. TESA organized and funded accommodation for
volunteer Canadian teachers at the Usagara School.
The funds raised by diaspora groups vary considerably,
from a few hundred dollars to much larger sums for
worthy projects. The MYP solicited close to CDN$400,000
globally; the Stephen Leacock Foundation for Children has
collected more than CDN$8 million in Canada for schoolbased programs in South Africa; Canadian UCT alumni
donated close to CDN$100,000 in 2009 and 2010 to support
bursaries and other programs; and TESA has collected
more than CDN$50,000 for school improvement projects.
A striking feature of contemporary diaspora development
engagement is the increasing role and innovative use
of information and communication technologies in
developing transnational networks and strengthening
linkages with countries of origin. The ZDC conducted their
second e-conference using the Zambia Blog Talk Radio,
while the Yahoo groups messaging system was used
to conduct the first conference. The ZDC has regularly
informed the Zambian diaspora about its activities and
mandate through Zambia Blog Talk Radio. The MYP
involved UCT medical school alumni members living in
countries including Israel, United States and Canada.
Notwithstanding these enabling factors, there are serious
limitations and barriers to diaspora engagement. Because of
the difficult histories of several countries tied to colonialism
and apartheid, combined with the variable reasons that
diasporas left these areas, these relationships are not as
straightforward as might be imagined. They can be much
more complicated and ambivalent, raising questions about
who and how many in the diaspora community are willing
to participate in organized development activities.
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It certainly cannot be assumed that all members of the
Southern African diaspora in Canada have the ability or
are ready to contribute to their countries of origin. One
recent immigrant from South Africa who was opposed to
fundraising for projects said, “I have just left that place. Why
would I want to give back?” When diaspora communities
are divided economically, racially or politically, the task
of bringing them together under a common banner to
work cooperatively can be challenging. Conflicts between
members in an organization can disrupt its functioning
as well as project continuity. These differences may be
magnified when umbrella organizations are created for
development engagement.
The question of attachment becomes even more important
for successive generations. While several participants felt
that their children’s attachment to their country of origin
was equally strong and would remain so over several
generations, others were not as optimistic:
My relationship with Zanzibar is very strong. But
I am not sure about my children’s attachment to it.
They are born here and are much more interested
in the Canadian culture. They know that their
roots are there — in Zanzibar and Tanzania — but
they may not feel the same as I do. When someone
asks me where I am from, I always say Tanzania,
but my children [when asked the same question]
say Canada. (Anonymous respondent)
Diaspora-based initiatives and organizations often rely
on the time and skills of volunteers, which may limit the
scope and impact of projects. Some diaspora organizations
have very limited funding, which may restrict their ability
to contribute to and run projects.
Concerns about corruption and the lack of financial
transparency can be a barrier to diaspora involvement
in development projects in their countries of origin. One
respondent said that there was “corruption at all levels”
in Canada and African countries and that “money raised
for such work did not always go where it was supposed
to.” An anonymous respondent gave the example of a
wealthy South African relative living in Ontario who had
given a substantial amount of money to an orphanage
in South Africa, only to discover that the money had
been misappropriated. The relative then had to spend
additional funds to employ another manager to oversee
the operations of the orphanage.
Weak state structures to engage the diaspora and the
absence of dual citizenship provisions were deemed other
hurdles to engagement. While many respondents indicated
their keenness to work with local authorities to run their
projects, others expressed equally strong concerns about
excessive regulation, having to deal with corrupt officials
and the indifference of state authorities. Organizers of a
school-based project complained that, despite having
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followed the proper procedures for securing work visas,
they were forced to bribe immigration officials to end the
constant harassment over the immigration documents of
their Canadian volunteers. A diaspora member suggested
that African countries establish structures such as a
diaspora ombudsman, with authority over government
departments, to liaise with diaspora communities. Another
respondent bemoaned the lack of support from local
officials for a project in a government-run school: “We are
working in a vacuum. There is no recognition from the
government or ministry of education. If the government
gives us support, we can work much better.”
Divergent perceptions about diaspora initiatives are
obstacles to engagement. One respondent said that
diasporas were sometimes seen in their countries of
origin as “money-making machines, which we are not.
We are often using our personal resources to do the
work.” Diasporas are sometimes perceived as a threat and
competition to citizens living in these countries: “People
think that we want to be masters of [countries of origin].
But we don’t, we only want to achieve our goals,” was one
interviewee’s explanation. Another respondent wrote that
“rather than seeing the diaspora as a miser doubly bent
on benefitting from the Zambian resources, the Zambian
government should see the diaspora as an integral part of
its development strategy.”
The high cost of sending goods, steep custom duties and
shipping delays were identified as other barriers. One
respondent indicated that the diaspora community in
Toronto had been discouraged by the experience of similar
groups in the United States. The respondent explained
that an organization in Dallas, Texas, had raised money
to send medical equipment to Tanzania, but the beds and
equipment were held up at customs for over a year and the
organization was unable to raise additional funds to get the
consignment released. A different participant recounted a
similar experience for Zimbabwe: “I know of a friend of
an aunt of mine living in Michigan who had organized a
book drive to send used books to Zimbabwe. Now all of
the books are sitting in her basement because she has not
found a way to be able to ship the books to Zimbabwe.”
Some diaspora groups revealed that they were
overwhelmed by the many needs of marginal communities
in Southern Africa. “The biggest room in Zambia,”
remarked an interviewee, “is the room for improvement.
When I reached the school, it was disappointing. There
were no desks or chairs in the classroom. We had brought
the technology [to electrify the school] but there were no
desks or chairs for the children.” Despite the great need,
organizations may not always be able to implement
programs in the most deprived communities in Southern
Africa.
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Since 1990, over five million people have immigrated
to Canada, an average of 250,000 people a year. Of the
three million who entered after 2000, 60 percent arrived
as economic immigrants, 26 percent were in the family
class of entry and 11 percent were given refugee status.
Under Canadian immigration law, all three groups
become permanent residents of Canada. Recent estimates
suggest that the foreign-born population of Canada and
their Canadian-born children (so-called second-generation
immigrants) make up 20 percent of the total Canadian
population. In other words, one in five Canadians can be
considered a member of a diaspora.
While the number of immigrants to Canada has been
relatively constant, the volume of temporary migration
has grown rapidly over the past decade. The two main
categories of temporary residents are workers and
international students. Between 2000 and 2011, the number
of temporary migrant workers in Canada increased from
90,000 to 300,000, and the number of students increased
from 115,000 to 239,000. Neither group can really be
considered members of a diaspora, however, unless they
change their status and remain in Canada.
Advocates of temporary migration to countries like
Canada argue that the temporary foreign worker program
is a good example of migration and co-development, or a
“triple win” for all the participants: Canada, the country
of origin and the migrants themselves (Newland, 2009;
Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmerman, 2012; ZapataBarrero, García and Sánchez-Montijano, 2012). While
temporary work programs around the globe are notorious
for the exploitation of migrants, there are clear economic
benefits to source countries as well as migrants themselves
from well-run, rights-based programs.
In contrast, permanent immigration has conventionally
been seen only as a “double win,” benefitting Canada,
which gains skilled workers without spending on training,
and the immigrants themselves, who are upwardly mobile
and tend to earn more than they did in their countries of
origin.
From the perspective of source countries, the movement
of skilled and educated migrants from South to North
has been seen as a negative and damaging phenomenon,
encapsulated in the oft-used pejoratives “poaching” and
“brain drain.” By redefining immigrants as diasporas,
researchers and governments are now trying to develop a
more nuanced position on the global impacts of migration.
The growing use of this term, including by many migrants
themselves, is meant to draw attention to the emotional
and material ties that those who relocate maintain with
their countries of origin, and even pass on to their children.

Immigration to Canada has been increasingly dominated
by countries in the South over the past two decades.
Between 2000 and 2011, for example, 1.45 million people
emigrated from Asia to Canada (50 percent of the total).
In addition, 612,000 people (21 percent) emigrated from
Africa and the Middle East and 283,000 (10 percent) from
Central and South America. In other words, just over 80
percent of Canada’s immigrants come from developing
countries. Conventional “brain drain” wisdom might
suggest that Canada is guilty of “poaching” the brightest
and the best from the South and negatively impacting the
development of these countries and regions. Redefining
immigrants from developing countries as diasporas
raises the interesting possibility that there might be
real development benefits for those countries, and
that immigration, not just temporary migration, might
constitute a “triple win” as well. This study set out to test
this proposition with a subset of African immigrants in
Canada — those from the southern part of the continent.
Various methodological difficulties made it impossible
to collect a representative survey sample from all 15
countries of the SADC. In two cases (South Africa and
Zimbabwe), there were sufficient responses to undertake
an independent analysis of the diaspora (Chikanda, Crush
and Maswikwa, 2012; Crush, 2012). In the South African
case, the sample was large enough to undertake a separate
analysis of health professional immigrants in Canada
(Crush, Chikanda and Pendleton, 2012). This report
focusses on the contrast between South African immigrants
in Canada and immigrants from other countries in the
Southern African region. The latter were aggregated into
a single group for purposes of analysis in order to create a
large enough sample. Further research would be needed to
see how far the diasporas from individual countries fit the
aggregate picture.
The primary reason for separating out the South Africans
in this analysis is that it soon became clear that there
were considerable attitudinal and behavioural differences
between this group and other immigrants from Southern
Africa. When it comes to the maintenance of links with
countries of origin, attitudes towards those countries and
engagement in development, the differences are so stark
that the term “divided diasporas” was coined to describe
them. The South African diaspora in Canada — for all
its wealth, privilege and skills — displays an attitudinal
and behavioural profile that leads us to the conclusion
that it is largely disengaged in development. The majority
used their skills and training acquired in South Africa to
emigrate to Canada; however, they generally do not feel
that they owe their country of origin anything. For some,
life under a black majority African National Congress
government was unpalatable after the benefits of apartheid
for whites. Others left over fears of crime and personal
lack of security. We could find no evidence of sympathy
towards the black population of South Africa, however,
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who are far more vulnerable to crime than most whites.
The majority of South African whites in Canada hold
negative views about their country of origin, are divesting
themselves of their resources there and show little desire to
be involved in its development. Their contacts with South
Africa primarily involve visiting family there; very few
are interested in return migration. The majority of South
Africans in Canada appear to be “lost” to South Africa.
At the same time, the South African diaspora in Canada
is itself divided, with a minority showing a very different
attitudinal profile. This minority, around 20 percent of
those interviewed, are far more typical of an engaged
diaspora, demonstrating a genuine desire to be involved
in the development of South Africa. Their views and
activities are far more similar to immigrants from other
Southern African countries in Canada than they are to
their fellow South Africans.
Immigrants from the Southern African region outside of
South Africa are characterized by the findings of this report
as an engaged diaspora. The majority are comparatively
recent immigrants to Canada and maintain close personal
cultural and economic ties with their countries of origin.
The clearest indication of this is their remitting behaviour.
They are not particularly high earners in Canada and
individually, they do not remit large sums, but they
do remit cash (and goods) extremely regularly, mostly
through formal channels. While most remit to help meet
the living expenses of relatives, remittances clearly have
positive development implications at the household and
community levels, including contributing to improved
food security and nutrition, medical expenses and the
education of children. Only a small minority use their
remittances in a broader development-related manner
through investment in community projects, productive
activity, entrepreneurship and so on. A significant minority
do engage in other activities that have developmentrelated implications: for example, a quarter have exported
goods from Canada for sale in their countries of origin,
and 10 percent have imported goods for sale in Canada.
The same proportion have invested in business, generated
employment and engaged in research partnerships. These
numbers could grow rapidly with the return of political
and economic stability and opportunity in countries such
as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe.
The basis for this conclusion is the openness of the
engaged South African diaspora and other Southern
African diaspora participating in a variety of development
activities in the future. Two out of every three survey
respondents agreed that they have an important role to
play in the development of their countries of origin. The
most-cited activities of interest included skills transfer
(mentioned by 58 percent), investing in businesses (55
percent), participating in developmental projects (52
percent), educational exchanges (52 percent), volunteer
work (47 percent), fundraising for development projects
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(46 percent), philanthropy (42 percent), export and import
of goods (39 percent), infrastructural investment (39
percent) and providing long-distance learning (37 percent).
One-third of respondents would also like to contribute to
development by sending remittances, suggesting a desire
to see the development potential of remittances reaching
beyond their own families.
How can the gap between what members of the diaspora
are actually doing and what they are interested in doing
be bridged? The questionnaire did not ask what would
help individuals or associations to bridge the gap, but
some tentative answers can be advanced. The first
challenge is an attitudinal one. Disapora individuals
or groups are unlikely to put words into action if it
means supporting a government or political system
that they consider unacceptable or unrepresentative.
Most diasporic Zimbabweans, for example, want to see
major changes in the country’s political dispensation
before they will commit to supporting any development
projects or programs involving the government.
However, even if the members of a diaspora will not
work with government, this does not mean that they
will do nothing until the political situation is more to
their liking. Chapter 6 of this report demonstrates that
highly motivated individuals and groups in Canada have
already established a significant and impressive array of
community-oriented projects throughout the Southern
African region, particularly in education and health, with
their own resources and through fundraising within and
outside the diaspora. An evaluation of many of these
initiatives would help to identify best practices and
new ideas which could be scaled up, with appropriate
financial backing, to have a broader impact.
Another challenge is that there is only so much that
individuals can do unless they are independently wealthy
or have major financial backing. Here, there is a critical
enabling role for various types of diaspora organizations
that potentially provide the structure, ideas and resources
to harness individual energy and enthusiasm. Such
organizations rely heavily on volunteer and pro bono
work, and private donations, which affects their ability
to develop serious and systematic long-term projects
and planning. The Canadian government, in particular,
could reframe the diaspora as development partners in
new ways and creatively support their work and projects
with dedicated funding and support. By identifying the
kinds of activities that members of the diaspora are, or
would like to be, engaged in, this report makes a valuable
contribution to this process.
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In the space of a decade, international migration has shifted
from being an issue that was of marginal interest on the
international development agenda to one that is increasingly at
its centre. This paper provides a context for understanding the
nature of cooperation between the EU and ACP Group of States
on international migration governance.
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KEy Points
• East Asian states do not perceive Arctic issues through an “Arctic” lens; rather,
they are deemed “maritime” or “polar” issues. This preference reflects a global,
rather than a regional, perspective on the Arctic. East Asian Arctic interests can
thus be pursued in a range of international fora; they do not need Arctic Council
membership to pursue their Arctic interests.
• The Arctic Council’s member states should welcome East Asian states as observers
to enmesh them into “Arctic” ways of thinking; otherwise, these states may pursue
their Arctic interests via other means, which would undermine the Arctic Council’s
place as the primary authority on Arctic issues.
• The most important element of this integration will be to foster dialogue between
East Asian states and the Arctic Council’s six permanent participants (PPs) that
represent northern indigenous peoples.
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The significant changes taking place in the Arctic are attracting worldwide
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attention, often to the discomfort of Arctic states and peoples. This is no better
demonstrated than by the East Asian states’ growing interest in Arctic issues. All
three major East Asian states — China, Japan and South Korea — bid for Arctic
Council membership in 2009 and all have active polar research programs. This
interest has met with concern in several quarters, not least because of China’s
perceived belligerence in its own claimed maritime areas and because of the
widely held misperception that it claims some portion of the Arctic Ocean.
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KEy Points
• The Early Warning Exercise (EWE) was designed as a joint program between the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to identify
low-probability systemic financial risks. Although cooperation between the IMF and
FSB is central to the exercise, this needs to be significantly improved and strengthened
to effectively alert and warn of potential crises.
• The EWE suffers from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation,
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures.
• The EWE requires specific changes to address these shortcomings and would also
benefit from a regular publication to boost its visibility and impact.

introduCtion
The global financial crisis has shown the need for stronger surveillance and
better foresight in financial governance. In 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20)
sought to bolster these by initiating the semi-annual EWE. Two international
institutions — the IMF and the FSB — were tasked with conducting the EWE.
Although the EWE is a critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and
vulnerabilities, several problems constrain its effectiveness. The exercises
suffer from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation,
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures.
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The 27th volume of this influential series analyzes the ebb and flow
of Canada’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through different
lenses, highlighting the opportunities and difficulties that exist
for Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is clear that a new Africa is
emerging, and Canada must be prepared to change the nature of its
relationship with the continent.

Jonathan Crush

JONATHAN CRUSH

The MillenniuM
DevelopMenT Goals
anD posT-2015:
squarinG The CirCle

Edited by Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy

Between North and South: The
EU-ACP Migration Relationship

CIGI PAPERS

CIGI PaPers

no. 17 — May 2013

CIGI PaPers

no. 15 — aPrIl 2013

Are Short SellerS
PoSitive FeedbAck
trAderS? evidence
From the GlobAl
FinAnciAl criSiS
MartIn t. Bohl, arne C. KleIn and
PIerre l. sIKlos

Bessma Momani et al.

The need for stronger surveillance and better foresight in financial
governance was made clear during the global financial crisis. The
Group of Twenty initiated the early warning exercise, which is a
critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and vulnerabilities;
however, several problems constrain its effectiveness.

Are Short Sellers Positive
Feedback Traders? Evidence
from the Global Financial Crisis
Martin T. Bohl, Arne C. Klein and Pierre L. Siklos

During the recent global financial crisis, regulatory authorities in
a number of countries imposed short-sale constraints aimed at
preventing excessive stock market declines. The findings in this
paper, however, suggest that short-selling bans do not contribute to
enhancing financial stability.
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and the Challenges of Our Time
Kevin English
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Coordination Critical to
Ensuring the Early Warning
Exercise is Effective

Barry Carin and Nicole Bates-Eamer

Based on a series of reports and discussions on the post-2015
development agenda, this paper reviews the history of the
Millennium Development Goals, describes the current context
and lists the premises and starting points. It concludes with some
observations on each of the 10 recommended goals.

East Asian States, the Arctic
Council and International
Relations in the Arctic
All three major East Asian states — China, Japan and South Korea
— have bid for Artic Council membership and have active polar
research programs, but their interest has met with concern in several
quarters. This policy brief suggests that the Arctic Council’s member
states should welcome East Asian states as observers to enmesh
them into “Arctic” ways of thinking.

The Millennium Development
Goals and Post-2015:
Squaring the Circle

ConferenCe report

This report, from the CIGI and INET conference, focusses on how
economists should work with other areas of study, such as history,
law, psychology and political economy, to enrich research and
provide more well-rounded answers to the questions facing the
economic community today.
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The failure of many observers to recognize the varied scale of the
G20’s efforts has made it harder for the G20 to gain credit for the
valuable role it can play. This paper offers five recommendations for
the G20 to present a clearer understanding of how it functions and
what it has to offer.
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